|
Italy’s economy 意大利经济 That sinking feeling 颓丧感  Italy may look like Greece writ large, but the truth is more complex 意大利可能看上去像典型的希腊，但事实更为复杂 Nov 12th 2011 | from the print edition EVER since the euro zone’s sovereign-debt crisis began in earnest two years ago, the common fear has been that the sheer bulk of Italy meant it was too big for other countries to bail out, should it sink. 自从两年前欧元区主权债务危机正式爆发以来，一致的担心是意大利这个庞然大物是如此之大，一旦倒下，则他国无法纾困。 A quieter hope was that Italy’s size might also save it. If investors rushed out of Italian bonds, went the whispered argument, there were few big markets where they could then park their euros and still get a decent return (the smaller German bond market could not accommodate everyone without yields falling sharply). Scared investors often rush into the big and liquid market for US Treasuries, despite anxieties about America’s public finances. That safety-in-numbers logic ought to keep Italy from trouble, too. 更加沉寂的期望是意大利的规模也可能挽救它。依据传言的思路，如果投资者一哄而散地抛弃意大利国债，那么，能存放其欧元且仍能获得体面回报率的大型市场少之又少（规模更小的德国债券市场不可能在收益率没有大幅下滑的前提下为每个人提供保障）。惊慌失措的投资者通常奔向规模大流动性强的美国国债市场，仅管对美国的公共财政焦虑不安。人多势众的逻辑也应该确保意大利免受灾难。 Some hope: Italian bonds are now a badge of shame for banks who are rushing to dispose of them. Their ten-year yields have jumped beyond 7% and, once euro-zone yields reach these levels, they tend to spiral out of control. 一些人希冀：意大利债券现在让急于处置这些债券的银行蒙羞。意大利 10 年期国债收益率已经超过 7%。一旦达到高于这一水平，欧元区国债收益率会急剧恶化以致失控。 For some this proves that Italy is an oversize Greece: a country with a debt burden that is too heavy for it to bear and, unlike Greece, for others to help shoulder. There are uncomfortable parallels. Both countries’ public debts have long been bigger than their annual GDP. Both suffer crippling rigidities in their economies. But there are enough differences in Italy’s finances, and enough potential in its economy, to mean it could stay solvent if its borrowing costs could be capped at, say, 6%. 对于某些人而言，这表明意大利是大号的希腊：持有自身不堪承受的债务负担，但又不同于希腊的是他人也无法分担意大利的债务负担。意大利和希腊相似之处令人不适。长久以来，两国的公共债务均超过其年度国内生产总值 (GDP)。两国经济体均严重僵化死板。但是意大利的财政又有足够多不同点，其经济体也有足够强的潜力。这意味着如果其借贷成本能控制在一定范围（比如，6%）以内，那么，意大利仍保有偿付能力。 Start with the finances. One reason why markets eventually shunned Greece, Portugal and Ireland was the uncertainty about how far their debts might rise. All three had huge budget deficits (so were adding to their debts at an alarming rate) and were struggling to keep their economies on track, while at the same time cutting spending and raising taxes. Greece’s public debt was forecast to rise towards 190% of GDP, before some of its private-sector creditors agreed to a bigger write-off of what they are owed. Italy’s public debt, by contrast, is set to stabilise at around 120% of GDP in 2012. Its government will run a small surplus on its “primary” budget (ie, excluding interest costs) this year, and an overall deficit of less than 4% of GDP, below the euro-area average. 先看下意大利的财政状况。市场最终避开希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰的一个理由在于对其债务的可能上升速度不确定。这三个国家均拥有巨额的预算赤字（这些赤字以惊人的速度增加到其债务之中），均极力确保其经济体在期望范围内，与此同时，均在削减开支并增加税收。在私营部门信贷者同意以更大幅度注销其债务之前，希腊的公共债务预计会上升至 GDP 的 190%。相比之下，意大利的公共债务在 2012 年将稳定在 GDP 的 120% 左右。意大利政府今年的“基本”预算（即，排除利息成本）将有小部分盈余，且总体赤字不到 GDP 的 4%，低于欧元区平均水平。 Italy has fewer foreign debts than the other troubled euro-zone countries, as it ran only modest current-account deficits in the boom years. Its net international debt (what Italy’s businesses, householders and government owe to foreigners, less the foreign assets they own) was 24% of GDP in 2010, not much above that of Britain or America, and well below the position in Greece (96%), Portugal (107%) or Spain (90%). Indeed Italy’s overall private-sector debts are modest by rich-country standards. This matters for the nation’s solvency. If less wealth goes outside Italy to service foreign debts, more is left to tax. 与其他困难重重的欧元区国家相比，因为意大利在经济繁荣年份只持有适度的经常账户赤字，所以，其国外债务也更少。意大利国际净债务（意大利企业、家庭及政府的国外负债减去其拥有的国外资产）在 2010 年为 GDP 的 24%，略高于英国或美国的比例，且远低于希腊（96%）、葡萄牙（107%）或西班牙（90%）的比例。事实上，按照富裕国家标准衡量，意大利的私营部门总债务还算适度。这对于意大利的偿付能力比较重要。流出意大利支付国外债务利息的财富越少，留下来用于征税的财富就越多。 The healthy rate of Italian household saving underpinning this could be tapped by the government as an alternative to bond-market funding, which looks a lost cause. Because Italy’s deficit is fairly small and the average maturity of the bonds it has already issued is quite long (around seven years), it would take a while for higher borrowing costs to make a huge difference to its interest payments. Next year, Italy has €306 billion of bonds and bills coming due, around a fifth of its stock of capital-market debt, in addition to the budget deficit it has to finance. Assuming all new debt is priced at 7.5%, Italy’s overall interest costs would rise by around 1% of GDP next year—steep but not yet crippling for the sovereign (though Italy’s banks would struggle). 意大利健康的家庭储蓄水平支持上述论点。政府可以利用家庭储蓄作为看上去注定失败的债券市场资金的替代手段。因为意大利赤字相对较小且已经发行的国债平均到期时间相对较长（7 年左右），较高的借贷成本要经过一段时间才会对其利息支付造成巨大影响。明年除了必须融资的预算赤字外，意大利将有 3,060 亿长期和短期国债到期，约占其资本市场债务存量的五分之一。假设所有新发行国债定价为7.5%，那么，意大利明年的利息总成本将上升一个 GDP 百分点——涨幅很高但不至于威胁到意大利主权（虽然，意大利银行将苦苦挣扎。） Italy’s debt could be capped, but could it ever be reduced to a more comfortable level? Bold privatisation would go some way, but in the long run what is needed is faster GDP growth. The average Italian was worse off in 2010 than in 2000: GDP per head fell over the decade (see chart). Outsiders point to the lost option of devaluation to explain Italy’s funk. But the root cause of Italy’s lost export competitiveness is its dismal productivity growth. 意大利债务可控，但能否降至一个更合理的水平呢？有力的私有化措施会有所裨益，但长期看，需要更快的 GDP 增长率。2010 年意大利平均生活水平比 2000 有所下降。在过去的十年，人均 GDP 持续下跌（见表）。局外人指出，货币贬值手段的丧失可以解释意大利的困境。但意大利出口竞争力丧失的根本原因在于其令人沮丧的生产率增长水平。  The deeper causes of weak productivity are a two-tier jobs market, which protects the jobs of older workers in dying industries but traps youngsters in temporary work; the industry-wide wage bargains that mean businesses cannot match wages to productivity; the closed-shop professions and trades that are a barrier to innovation and efficiency; and so on. 生产率疲软的更深层次原因在于：双重就业市场，这保护了夕阳产业年长工人的饭碗但将年轻人局限在临时工作中；行业范围内的工资协商，这意味着企业无法将工资与生产率相匹配；封闭的行会，这是创新和效率的障碍；如此等等，不一而足。 Italy still has some world-class firms and brands, and an exporting prowess that could be built on. Yet it does not have enough firms of sufficient scale. The ubiquity of micro family businesses is related to Italy’s rigid regulations, as are its tax-collecting problems. Small firms fall below the regulatory thresholds and are less often attached to the formal economy. If Italy is to carry its outsize public debts, it urgently needs to promote an environment where big businesses can flourish. 意大利仍有一些世界级的公司和品牌以及可以依赖的强大出口优势。然而，意大利却没有足够的规模企业。微小的家族企业无所不在，这与意大利刻板的规章制度不无关系，也与其征税问题相关联。小公司低于监管门槛且不常附属于正式经济。如果意大利要承担起超大的公共债务，那么，它迫切需要改善环境，让大型企业能繁荣昌盛。 |
|
|
