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January-June201
1
IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment,Vol.5,No.1,2011
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice
EvanRiley
AmartyaSenhasrecentlylevelledaseriesofwhatheallegestobequiteseriousbutverygeneral
objectionsagainstRawls,Rawlsianfellowtravellers,andothersocialcontractaccountsofjustice.
InTheIdeaofJustice,publishedin2009,Senspecificallychargeshistargetphilosophicalviews
withwhathecallstranscendentalismandproceduralparochialism,andwithbeingmistakenly
narrowlyfocusedoninstitutions.Healsothinksthatthereisabasicincoherence—arisingfrom
aversionofDerekParfit’sIdentityProblem—internaltotheRawlsiantheoreticalapparatus.
Senwouldhavepoliticalphilosophypursueinter-societalcomparisonsofrelativejusticemore
directlyandinthemannerofsocialchoicetheory.Yetthepositiveargumentthathedevelopsin
supportofthismethodisquitethin.Thataside,Sen’spolemicalstrategyofinflictingdeathbya
thousandcutsisineffectiveagainsttheRawlsianparadigm.For,asIshowherein,noneofthese
criticismshastheforcewemightbeledtoexpect.
Keywords: TheIdeaofJustice,AmartyaSen,TransendentalversusComparativejustice
Amonghismanycontributionstomorallyengagedintellectuallife,AmartyaSenhas
longbeenatrenchantandsympatheticcriticofJohnRawls''swork.1Oneofhisseminal
effortsinthatregardishischargethatRawls''soriginalemphasisinATheoryofJustice
onsharesofprimarysocialgoods,andinparticular,onthesociallysanctionedall
purposemeansoffulfillingone’slegitimateends—forexample,monetaryincomeand
wealth—isperhapsdistorted(seeSen,1980).RecallthatforRawlstherein,theprimary
socialgoodsarebroadlycategorizedasthe“rightsandliberties,opportunitiesand
powers,incomeandwealth”thatarationalrepresentativebehindtheveilofignorance
ispresumedtowant,andtowantmoreof,whateverelsetheymaywant.2OnRawls''
view,itisthefairdistributionoftheseverygoodsthatthejustbasicstructureofsociety
isproperlyconcernedwith.AsSenpointedout,thisclassificationmayobscurethefact
thatwhatweoughttocareaboutinthisconnectionisnotthelargestfairshareofstuff
assuch,evensuchpotentiallyusefulstuffasmoney.Instead,thetrulybasicemphasis
shouldbeonfairlyfosteringthedevelopmentofcapabilitiesofindividualhuman
beingstorealizevaluableformsoffunctioning.Itistheproductionanddistributionof
thissortofthingthatproperlyconstitutedsocietiesoughttobeconcernedwith.This
isavaluableinsight,andmoreofafriendlyemendationthanadevastatingcriticism.3
First,byabstractingawayfrommonetarywealth,Sen’slineofthoughtbroadensthe
potentialscopeoftheRawlsian-styleargumenttonaturallyincludemoresocialworlds
andmorekindsofindividuallives.Second,byplacingtheemphasissquarelyonthe
realizedcapabilitiesofhumanbeings,Senencouragesusnottodistortourreflections
aboutsocialjusticeinthedirectionofthinkingthatitismerelyamatterofsecuringthe
negativeliberties.Isay‘Bravo!’tothis.
VisitingAssistantProfessorofPhilosophy,TheCollegeofWooster,Ohio,USA.Email:eriley@wooster.edu
212?IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment
Senhasmorerecentlybeenarguingforafull-scalerecastingofacademic
philosophicaltheorizingaboutsocialjustice.4Ithinkthatthisnewlineofargumentis
neitherremotelyconvincinginitsattackonRawlsnorinsightfulinitsintendedbasic
aim.Inanarticlewrittenin2006,“WhatDoWeWantfromaTheoryofJustice?”(see
Sen,2006),hedefendedthislineandstrikinglyconcludedthatpoliticalphilosophers
shouldsimplystoppursuing,inthestyleofRawls,thegrandquestion‘Whatisa
justsociety?’.Inpresumptivecontrastwiththisdominantapproach,Senarguesthat
politicalphilosophersshouldbecentrallyconcernedwiththemakingofcomparative
judgmentsofjusticeinawayinspiredbythesocialchoicetraditionandbyAdam
Smith,amongothers.Thislineofthinkinghasbeenredeployed,alongwithseveral
otherargumentsthatarecriticalofRawls,andoftheRawlsianparadigm,inSen’srecent
book,TheIdeaofJustice(seeSen,2009).ThereinSenallegesthatRawls''exhaustively
discussedandenormouslyinfluentialaccountofsocialjusticeinATheoryofJusticeis
vitiatedbyahostofveryseriousfaultsthathavenotbeenproperlyappreciatedtodate.
Chiefamongthesearetranscendentalism,proceduralparochialism,institutionalism,
andpopulationalplasticity.Thefaultsareseriousenough,accordingtoSen,torender
thetheoryanditsmanyrelativesanddescendantsdistinctlyunhelpfulastoolsfor
“enhancingjusticeandremovinginjustice”orforservingas“thebasisofpractical
reasoning”inthatregard(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.ix).Anewapproachis
recommended:callitcomparativism.
Here,Iarguethattherearebasicdifficultieswiththecriticalsideofthisline
ofthought.First,itappearsthateithertheseallegedfaultsarenotbothcorrectly
attributabletoRawlsandgenuineproblems,oriftheyaregenuineproblems,arenot
specifictotheRawlsianproblematic.Second,itisnotclearthateverysuchtheoryof
justiceisproperlysupposedtoprovideuswithconcreteplansofactionforitsown
realization,andSendoesnotmakethatcase.Herein,Iammostlyoccupiedwitha
criticaldiscussionoftheallegedproblemsmentionedabove.Iclosewithsomevery
briefreflectionsontheoriesofjusticeandtheactualizationofjustice.
First,whatisthecharacteroftheallegedproblemoftranscendentalism,said
tobecharacteristicofwhatSencalls“transcendentalinstitutionalism”orinsome
places,the“contractarianapproach”(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,pp.5andxvi,
respectively)?SensuggeststhattheRawlsian-stylepursuitofthegrandquestion—
‘Whatisajustsociety?’—involvesapretensiontoextremelydemandingtheoretical
comprehensivenessconcerningitsobject.Indeed,Sentakesthecontractariantradition
generallytobesofocusedonakindoftheoreticalperfectionthatitisblockedfrom
developingthematerialsformakingcomparativejudgmentsofrelativejusticeand
injustice.Itdoesseemclearthatmakingsuchcomparativejudgmentsisanecessary
conditionofpracticallyreasonedsocialreform.Forintheabsenceofsomeactual
comparisons,inpointofjustice,betweensaypresentconditionsonthegroundand
anachievablereform,adesiretoseekandsupportjusticewouldbewithoutreasoned
practicalimport.Thus,weareinvitedtothinkthatpursuingthequestionina
Rawlsian—ormoregenerallycontractualist—fashionwillmilitateagainstrealizing
neededsocialreform.
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice?213
Twoquestionsnaturallyarise.First,whatexactlyisthenatureoftheproblem
forthecomparisonposedbytherelevanttheoreticalperfectionism?Second,isthe
Rawlsianframeworkperfectionistortranscendentalistinthatsense,andisitthereby
worsethanuselessforthinkingcomparativelyaboutsocialjusticehereandnow?
Sen’sanswertothesecondquestionis‘Yes’.Iwilltakethisupbelowandshowthat
thisisamistakenanswer.Sen’sanswertothefirstofthesequestionsappearstobeas
follows:first,anytheorythataimsatcompletelythoroughlydescribingthejustsociety
andatmakingoutanideallycompleteandusefulsetofpracticalprinciplesforrealizing
andmaintainingjusticeisperfectionist(or‘transcendental’)intherelevantsense.And,
second,aimingatthisterriblyambitioussetofgoalsissubstantivelymistaken.
ThereseemtobetwoconsiderationsthatSenisrelyingoninsupportofthis
secondclaimjustabove.Ontheonehand,hethinksthatsocialjusticeisintrinsically
pluralisticincharacter,soitwilloftenmakeinconsistentdemands.Heclaimsthat
thereare“genuinelyplural,andsometimesconflicting,generalconcernsthatbearon
ourunderstandingofjustice.”(SeeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.57).Andthefactthat
thereisasortofdeeppluralisminthedemandsofjusticeisthelessonnaturallydrawn
fromSen’sparableofthefluteandthethreechildren(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,
pp.12-13andp.106).Ifthatiscorrect,theresimplywillbenocoherentlyunifiedstory
totellaboutthosedemands,evenwhere,asinthesocialcontractmodel,everyone’s
impartialreasonsarebeingfullyexpressedandfairlyconsulted.Onemightpresume
againstthisthatthereissomeunifiedanswertothequestionofwhatsocialjustice
requiresinandperhapsbetweencontemporarysocieties,albeitperhapsexpressible
onlyasaveryabstractsetofnorms,insomeorderofpriority.Thisistheassumption
ofmostphilosopherswhoinquireintothenatureofsocialjustice.Therearetwoissues
worthconsideringjusthere.
First,Sendoesnotgiveadecisiveargumentforthecontroversialviewthatjustice
isintrinsicallypluralisticevenataquitegenerallevel,andthejuryappearstobeout,
maybepermanentlyso,onthatquestion.Second,ifhewererightaboutthis,that
shouldnotbeparticularlycomfortingforthereform-mindedtheoristofjusticeof
theproposednewcomparativestyle.Forinthateventuality,thingswouldbeeven
murkierthanonthecompetingmonisticpicture.Wewouldbeintheunenviable
positionofweighingmultiplecompetingdemandsofthevariousjusticesalongwith
allthefamiliarotherpossiblycompetingdemandsimposedonusbysuchalleged
socialvirtuesas:securityagainstinvasion,theveryefficientprovisionofbasic
materialgoods,highratesofgrowthinGDP,highaveragelivingstandard,or,ina
morephilosophicalgear,maximalwell-being.Toputitsimply,ifsocialjusticeitself
genuinelypullsusinmultipleandevenopposeddirections,theremaybenogrounds
formakingevenroughcomparisonsofrelativejusticeandinjusticeassuch.Pointing
outthatwecananddomakechoicesincircumstanceswhereinweweighgoodsthat
cannotthemselvesbemadefullycommensurateisnotagooddefencehere(seeSen,
TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.241).Inshort,ifSenleanstooheavilyontheallegedfactof
robustpluralism,thenheunderminesthegroundsforthinkingthattherecouldbea
comparativetheoryofjusticeatall.
214?IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment
Sen’sotherreasonforthinkingthatthecompletedescriptionofsocietaljustice
(anditsrealization)isaninaptaimhastodowiththethoughtthatitwouldbesucha
difficulttasktocomplete.Thisisquiteclearinthefollowing:
Howcompleteshouldtheassessmentbe?Inthe“totalist”approachthat
characterizesthestandardtheoriesofjustice,includingRawls''incompletenesstends
toappearasafailure…Indeed,thesurvivalofincompletenessissometimesseenas
adefectofatheoryofjustice,whichcallsintoquestionthepositiveassertionsucha
theorymakes.Infact,atheoryofjusticethatmakessystematicroomforincompleteness
canallowonetoarriveatquitestrong…judgments,withouthavingtofindhighly
differentiatedassessmentsofeverypoliticalandsocialarrangementincomparisonwithevery
othersucharrangement(forexampleaddressingsuchquestionsas:exactlyhowmuchtax
shouldbeputonthesaleofpetrolinanyparticularcountry,forenvironmentalreasons?)(Sen,
TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.103,emphasisadded).
Senseemstobethinkingthatacompletetheoryofjusticeisonethatwilladdress
everypracticalscenariogeneratinganeedforcollectiveorcooperativedecisionthat
mightcomeupinthehumancircumstancesofjustice.Suchatheorywouldnotonly
descryacoherentsystemofsocialinstitutionsbutwouldprovideadetailedconceptual
structuresuitablefordeterminingwhatjusticecallsfor,inactions,institutions,and
policiesgivenwhatevercircumstanceswefindourselvesin,andwithwhatever
preferenceswemighthave.Itseemsthatthetheorywouldcontainbothahighly
detailedmodelofthejustsociety,andalsoreliableproceduresforgettingthereand
formaintainingjusticeonceitisachieved.Sensuggeststhatthissortof(hopelessly)
extremecomprehensivenessispreciselywhatthetranscendentalapproach,ashecalls
it,aimsat,thatis,itaimsat“acompleteresolutionofalltheexistingdecisionalissues
aboutsocietalorganization.”(SeeSen,“WhatDoWeWantfromaTheoryofJustice?”,
2006,p.236.)Thisisagrandaimindeed.Iaminclinedtoaccept,withSen,thatthis
aimisindeedfartoograndtobeseriouslypursued,andthatitreflectsconfusion.But
isonestuckwiththisaimmerelyinpursuingthequestioninviewintherelevant
fashion?Thatdoesnotseemtobethecase.
LetusnowconsiderRawls''workinthisconnection,foritisSen’sparadigm
case.Rawls''dominantfocuswasindeedthetopicofsocialjusticeinmodernmass
democraciesandSenisonsolidgroundtocounthimaspursuingaversionofthe
grandquestionbyappealingtoadevelopmentoftheideaofthesocialcontract.
Yet,inseveralplaces,Rawlsalsoexplicitlydeniesthathehastheaimofsettlingin
advance,bymeansofhistheory,everypracticalquestionthatmightpossiblyarisein
thecircumstancesofjustice,evenforthoseimperfectcontemporarydemocraciesthat
histheoryspeakstomostdirectly.Hesimplyisnotaimingatthatsortofabsolute
theoreticalcomprehensiveness.Considerthefollowinglatediscussionofthepolitical
conceptionofjusticeandtheconceptionofthebasicstructure.
Theroleofapoliticalconceptionofjusticehoweverisnottosayexactlyhow
thesequestionsaretobesettled,buttosetoutaframeworkofthoughtwithinwhich
theycanbeapproached.Werewetolaydownadefinitionofthebasicstructure
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice?215
thatdrawssharpboundaries,notonlywouldwegobeyondwhatthatroughidea
couldreasonablycontain,butwewouldriskwronglyprejudgingwhatmorespecific
orfutureconditionsmaycallfor,thusmakingjusticeasfairnessunabletoadjustto
differentcircumstances.Forourjudgmentstobereasonable,theymustusuallybe
informedbyanawarenessofthosemorespecificcircumstances(SeeRawls,Justiceas
Fairness:ARestatement,2001b,p.12).
Rawls,aswecansee,isindeedpursuingthegrandquestion,whileself-consciously
explicitlyabjuringtheambitioustheoreticalaim.Sen,however,takesthisaimtofollow
fromthatpursuit.ItfollowsthatifRawlsiscorrectaboutthenatureofhisowntheory,
andifhisprojectisroughlycoherent(asitseems),Seniswrong.Itispossibletopursue
thegrandquestionwithoutaimingatabsolutetheoreticalcomprehensiveness.
Perhapsitwillbethoughtthatsincetheabovepassageappearsrelativelylatein
Rawls''scareer,itmaynotreflectthetruthabouttheviewinitsdominantform.Perhaps,
asSenputsit,Rawlshastelling“secondthoughts”onthisscore,theimplicationsofwhich
arenotfullyworkedout(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.58).Iamnotconvinced.It
seemsclearfromthecanonicalexpressionoftheviewinATheoryofJusticethatRawls
neverembracedthesortoftheoreticalcomprehensivenessthatSenattributestohim.5
Moreover,Ithinkthatthereisgeneralreasontodoubtthatpursuingthe
grandquestionrequiresonetoembracetheaimoftotal(practical-)theoretical
comprehensiveness.Supposethatsomephilosopherembracesasubstantialtheoretical
modestywhenitcomestoethicsandpoliticalphilosophy,or,ingeneral,thedemands
ofpracticalreason.Wemightimaginethatshehasbecomeconvincedthatpractical
wisdomisuncodifiable,andaccordinglyalsoconvincedthattherelevantideaofa
completetheoryofperfectsocialjusticeisamisleadingchimera.6Doweinsistthat
thisphilosophersomehowcontradictsherselfifshenonethelessvigorouslypursues
thegrandquestioninacontractualvein?Istheresomethingself-defeatingabout
combiningmoral-theoreticalmodestywiththepursuitofthegrandquestionofjustice
inthestyleofRawls?Iseenoreasontothinkso.Suchaphilosopherperhapswill
insistontheimportanceofattendingtodetailsifwearetouncoveranythingusefulfor
action.Shewouldremindusthatthegeneralprinciplesofjusticearealwayssubject
torevisionandoftenrequiresupplementation,orfillingin,inordertoexpressthe
relevantprovisionalpracticaltruth,orthatreflectiveequilibriumisalwayssomewhat
provisional.Butbeingcommittedtothissortoftheoreticalmodestyisnotinany
tensionwiththevigorouspursuitofthegrandquestion.
Despitetheseconsiderations,Sencouldyetconceivablynonethelessbecorrectand
RawlsincorrectabouttheRawlsianview,andmoregenerallyaboutthesocialcontract
approach.Butifthatwereso,wewouldnotexpecttofindprinciplesusefulformaking
comparisonsofrelativejusticenestedwithin,andderivablefrom,thetheoriesthat
thisapproachyields.Yetwedofindsuchprinciples.Andworsestill,forSen’slineof
objection,wefindprinciplesthatmanifestlycalluponustomakecomparisons.
ConsiderRawls''differenceprinciple,whichroughlyholdsthatsocialandeconomic
inequalitiesaretobearrangedtothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantagedmembers
216?IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment
ofsociety(seeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,1971,p.302).Thebasicimplicationisthatany
societySwillcountasjustonlywhenthesocialandeconomicinequalitiesaresuch
thatthepositionofthoseworstoffrelativetotheothermembersofS,arebetteroff
inabsolutetermsthanaretheworstoffmembersofeveryfeasiblealternative:S,S,
etc.Thisisnotasufficientconditionofsocialjustice,accordingtoRawls,butitisin
hisviewanecessaryone.Now,notonlycanwenotapplythedifferenceprinciplein
assessmentofthejusticeofsomesocietySexceptbymakingcomparisonswithother
possibleoractualsocieties,wecannotreallyunderstandthedifferenceprincipleexcept
ascallingforcomparativejudgments.ThisissosinceRawlsviewstheprincipleasa
guidingchoicebetweenfeasiblealternatives,oneofwhichmaybeactual.Manifestly
then,onecanpursuethegrandquestion,andinsodoing,developtheconceptual
materialsformakingcomparativejudgmentsofjustice.Sengrudginglyadmitsas
muchatonepointinTheIdeaofJustice(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.97).
Considernextthethoughtthatsomeexplicitlycomparativeapproachabjuring
thegrandquestionistherebytobepreferredtothetranscendentalapproach.Sen
supportsthisbyarguingthatachievingtheaimofthetranscendentalapproachis
neithersufficientnornecessaryforproducingtherelevantcomparisons(seeSen,The
IdeaofJustice,2009,pp.98-102.)Letusconsiderthis.
Asamatteroflogic,itistruethatpossessingevensomeideallycompletetheory
ofthejustsocietydoesnot,byitself,rankanygivensetofsocietiesinpointofjustice.
Evenachievingtheaimofthetranscendentalapproach,asSendescribesit,were
thatpossible,wouldnotautomaticallygeneratecomparisons.Butthisisequallytrue
ofaccountsofjusticeexplicitlyfocusedoncomparisonandwhicharedesignedto
accommodateincompleteness!Itisofcourseonlywhenitisconjoinedwithsome
relevantinformationaboutthosesocieties—theirhistoricalandculturalcircumstances,
andsoon—thatanytheorycanprovidethecognitivematerialsneededtomakethe
relevantjudgments.Onceconjoinedwithrelevantinformation,atheorygeneratedby
eitherapproachmaybequiteusefulformakingcomparisons.Forillustration,consider
againRawls''sjusticeasfairnesswithitstwoprinciplesofjustice,inlexicalorder.7
Recallthatthefirstprinciplecallsfortheequalprotectionofthebasicliberties,
andthattheseconddemandsbothprotectionforequitableopportunitytocompete
forattractivepositions,andthatanyremaininginequalitiesservetheadvantageof
theleastwell-offmembersofsociety,relativetofeasiblealternatives.Supposethat
theconditionsonthegroundareasfollows.Threesocieties—S,S,andS—are
eachapparentlyfeasiblealternativesoftheothers.InsocietyS,therearebarriers
toadvancementandpoliticalparticipation,entrenchedinpositivelaw,directed
againstthemembersofaparticularethnicgrouponthesolegroundsofmembership
inthatgroup.Further,theeconomicinstitutionsofSarerifewithcorruptionand
inefficiency,andshotthroughwithextremesofincomeandwealthinequalitykept
inplacebypervasiveracism.Here,itseemsasifneitherofRawls''sprinciplesismet.
InsocietyS,letussupposethatthefirstprincipleismet,sincethereisafamiliarset
ofenshrinedconstitutionalprotectionsofaversionoftheequalbasiclibertiesthat
arereasonablyeffectivelyenforced.But,letusalsosupposethattheworstoffinS
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice?217
areplainlynotaswelloffasaretheworstoffinsocietyS,thoughbetteroffthanS.8
Onstillfurthersupposition,inS,bothprinciplesarearguablymet,for,asinS,the
constitutionalprotectionsareinplaceandenforced.Letusalsoassumethatthese
arerealisticcasesinthatnoneofthesesocietiesisperfectlywell-orderedunderany
theoryofjustice.
Whenmadeawareoftheseempiricalconditions,theRawlsiantheoristissurely
inacognitivepositiontorankthethreesocietiesinpointofjustice.Ifshehashadher
morningcoffee,shewouldrankSasjust,Saspartlyjust,andSasunjust.Noticethat
intheabsenceofhergraspofRawls''sspecifictheory,shemightwellbeunabletorank
SandSdifferentially,inpointofjustice,thatis,hergraspofthetheoryallowsherto
judgethatSismorejustinsofarastheinequalitiesareorganizedtothebenefitofthe
leastadvantaged.ThegraspofthetheoryisperhapsusefullythoughtofasanINUS
conditionformakingthecomparativejudgments.Thatis,perhapsitisanindividually
insufficientbutnon-redundantpartofasetofconditionsthatarejointlyunnecessary
buthereandnowsufficienttoproducethecomparativejudgments(seeJ.L.Mackie,
TheCementoftheUniverse,1980).Inanyevent,itisclearthatSen’soriginalclaimthat
no“transcendentaltheoryofjustice”evenif“entirelysuccessfulinansweringthat
classicquestion…would…yield—directlyorindirectly—acomparativeframework…
neededfortheactualassessmentofjustice”isfalse(seeSen,“WhatDoWeWantfrom
aTheoryofJustice?”,2006,p.236).
Butperhapsthereaderisunimpressedwithmyhypotheticalandterriblyabstract
exampleoftheRawlsianapparatusinaction.Supposeonethinksthat,inpractice,
socialcontractphilosophy,bothgenerally,andinitsspecificallyRawlsianversion,
islikelytoleadonedownunproductivepathsfromthepointofviewofrealizing
justice.Againstthisempiricalclaim,considertheworkofThomasPogge,adoctoral
studentofRawlsandaneminentpoliticalphilosopherinhisownright(seePogge,
WorldPovertyandHumanRights,2008).Poggehasbeenworkingtowardsrealizinga
Rawlsianconceptionofjusticeformanyyears.Heisparticularlyinterestedinissues
ofglobaljustice,andissympatheticinplacestotheideaofaglobalanalogueofthe
RawlsianhypotheticalOriginalPosition(OP),onethattakesindividuals—andnot
peoples—tobetherepresentedparties(see,forexample,Pogge,“AnEgalitarianLaw
ofPeoples”,1994,pp.195-224).Verysimply,Poggetakesitthatthereasoningexhibited
bytherepresentativesintheglobalOPwouldlicenseattheveryleastthejusticeofa
globaltaxontheextractionofnon-renewableresources,withtheproceedsintended
tobenefitthegloballyworst-off.Morerecently,hehasbeenworkingoninstitutionally
realizingtheideaofaHealthImpactFundtoreducetheburdenofpreventivedisease
ontheworld’spoor,andingeneral,onissuesofglobalpovertyrelief.Itseemstobe
obviousthatinPogge’scase,hisRawlsianismhasproductivelyanddirectlyinformed
hiswork,justifyingcontroversialclaimsaboutjustice,thoughithas,ofcourse,not
beensolelydeterminative.Senis,ofcourse,familiarwithPogge’swork,butitgets
extremelyshortshriftinTheIdeaofJustice.Sen’scriticalcommentonPoggethat“the
ideaofoneglobalexerciseofsocialcontractfortheentireworldpopulationwould
appeartobedeeplyunrealistic”doesnotbearmuchscrutiny.9
218?IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment
Itisobviouslytruethatoneneednothaveapreciselyandelaboratelydetailed
completetheoryofjustice(intherelevantsense)inordertohavesomebasisformaking
comparativejudgments.WeshouldacceptSen’sviewthatthissortoftheoryisnot
anecessaryconditionforcomparison(andsoforachievingreasonedreform)here
andnow.Butwhatdoesoneneedandhowshouldoneproceed?Ifoneisinterested
inthinkingsystematicallyaboutthebasicdemandsofjusticeandthencomparing
somesetofsocieties’relativedistancesfrommeetingthosedemands,itremainsclear,
Sen’sargumentstothecontrarynotwithstanding,thatagoodwaytobeginiswiththe
pursuitofthegrandquestion.
Senisundoubtedlycorrectinthinkingthatitispossibletogivereasonsfora
choice,andeventosecuresomeagreement,withoutpresupposingtotalunanimityof
well-orderedpreferences,orcompleteknowledgewithinacommunityofchoice.But
partofthestrengthoftheRawlsianperspective,andofthataffordedtousbythesocial
contractmodegenerally,istogetsomesignificanttractiononthequestionofsocial
justicethatrisesaboveempiricallygivenpreferences.Thesearedevicesformodelling
reflectivelysoundreasoning.Itseemstomethatthereisnogoodreasonforthinking
thatthepartialsocialorderinggeneratedbyacongruenceof,say,amajorityofagiven
group’ssetofpreferenceorderingsispersetobegivenspecialweightwhenthinking
aboutwhatjusticerequires.Inthediscussionintheconcludingpagesofhisbook,Sen
gesturestowardsconsiderationsofpublicreasonsandimpartialityasnecessaryfilters
forarrivingatasensibleinference(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,pp.398-99).Yetthis
seemstopushustowardsaRawlsianmodel.
Allowmetobrieflyconsidersomeoftheremainingchargeslevelledinthebook.
First,considerwhatIcallproceduralparochialism.Inamovepartlyinspiredbyhis
loveforSmith’ssocialthought,Senarguesthatanimpartialoutsideobservermaybe
inabetterpositiontosortoutwhatjusticerequiresinsomeconcretesocialsettingthan
isapersonwhoselifeandlivelihoodareboundupinthatlocale.Thus,ifanactual
groupweretoembarkonanattempttoengageinpublicreasonabouttherulesof
thegameforthemselves,theviewsofanoutsidermightbeusefulforblockinglocal
prejudiceorpersonalandpotentiallydivisiveinterestfromplayingthewrongsortof
role(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.70).Thismightbecorrectinanyparticularcase,
thoughitseemslikeanentirelycontingentmatter.Butitdoesnotamounttoasound
criticismofRawlsorofallcontractualistwaysofframingtherelevantissues.After
all,theverypointoftheRawlsianmodel,withitsideallywell-informedbutcrucially
ignoranthypotheticalrepresentatives,istoemphasizetheimportanceofimpartiality.
Rawlsandrelatedthinkersarealsochargedwithbeingwronglynarrowlyfocused
oninstitutionsasthesiteofsocialjustice.Thethoughthereisthatifwefocusnarrowlyon
ourfavouredinstitutionsasmanifestationsofjustice—forexample,properlyregulated
relativelytransparentmarkets,formaldemocraticelectoralprocedures,formalequality
beforethelaw—oncetheseinstitutionsaresomehowconcretelyrealizedintheworld,
wemayfailtotakeaccountoftheeffectsthatthesemaybehavingonactualperson’s
lives.AsInotedabove,Senistobecommendedforemphasizing,asfundamental,
therealizationofvaluedformsoffunctioning.But,again,thisisnotaparticularly
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice?219
devastatingcriticismofRawls.Thelatterattendstothebasicstructureofsocietyasthat
overwhichtheprinciplesareproperlyauthoritativepreciselybecauseinhumansocial
life,thenatureoftheoverallinstitutionalstructurehasthoroughgoingeffectsonthe
livesofactualpeople.ItisforthisreasonthatRawlsfavoursmaximinasatheoryof
principlechoice,ratherthansomeothermorefamiliarandlessrisk-aversestrategyof
choiceunderuncertainty.10SoitseemsperversetochargeRawlswithneglectingthis.11
TheallegedpopulationalplasticityproblemisthefinalonethatIwillconsider.
ArelevantpointismadeparticularlyclearlyinDerekParfit’smagisterialReasonsand
Persons,viz.,thatchoicesofsocialpolicyinsomesocietywillaffectthecharacterand
sizeofthefuturepopulationofthatsamesociety(seeParfit,ReasonsandPersons,1984,
pp.355-77).Parfitwasworriedoverthemoralimplicationsofthis,whichhecallsthe
Non-IdentityProblem.Senthinksthataversionofthisproblemarisesinanacute
formforRawlsandrendershisaccountofjusticeincoherent.Thethoughtisthatthe
numberofparticipantsinthehypotheticalassemblyisindeterminateasitisaffected
bythedecisionsofthatveryassembly.Sincethechoiceofprincipleswillaffectthe
basicstructureandthecharacterofthebasicstructurewillaffectthesizeandcharacter
ofthepopulation,themodelispresumedtobeunworkable(seeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,
2009,p.145).Itisadmittedlydifficulttoknowhowtopreciselytaketheinterestsof
potentialfuturepeopleintoaccountwhenthinkingabouttherequirementsofjustice.
Afterall,itisdifficulttoseehowdecisionswetakenowcouldbesaideithertohelp
ortoharmpeoplewhodonotexistandwhoseveryexistenceiscausallydown-
streamfromthosedecisions!Butsurelyitiscoherenttoask,ofthemembersofagiven
presentlylivinggenerationofcitizens,howtheycouldberepresentedtoreasonina
versionoftheRawlsianOP.Wearesimplynotrequiredtoassumethateverypossible
futurepersonbegivenavoiceinthehypotheticalprocedure.
Inconclusion,Seniscertainlycorrecttothinkthatcomparisonsofrelativejustice
andinjusticeshouldconcernthosewhocareaboutactuallymakingtheworldabetter
place.Heisalsoonstronggroundininsistingthataimingatacertainkindoftheoretical
perfectionisquixoticandunnecessaryformakingusefulcomparativejudgments.
ButthesearenotthingsthatRawls,theRawslians,orsocialcontractthinkerswould
generallydeny.Nordoesanyfeatureoftheirgeneralwayofproceedingmakethem
incapableofappreciatingthesepoints.
Thereisonefinalpointtoregister.Iwouldliketoresistcynicismabouttheprospects
ofconcretelyengagedpoliticalphilosophy.Yetitappearshighlyunlikelythatthe
genuinepracticalproblemsposedbytheexistenceofseriousinjustices,andtheirgoing
unaddressed,willberesolvedbysomegeneralparadigmshift—perhapsmoving
awayfromthesocialcontractmodel—inourtheoriesofjustice.Whatmainlykeeps
usfromdoingmoretoreduceinjusticeisnotIthinkanover-utopianorobsessively
perfectioniststreakinourtheoriesofjustice.Instead,itisthedrearilyfamiliarlitany
offactors:ignorance,selfishness,confusionaboutwhatis,onreflection,importantin
life,failuresofwill,thedistractionsoflivinginaconsumersociety,thestrugglesof
keepinglifeandlimbtogether,theideologicalstateapparatuses,thedominanceof
ourpoliticalinstitutionsbythecorrupt,theself-interested,andtheincompetent,and
220?IndianJournalofHumanDevelopment
soon.Inpursuingthegrandquestionpublicly,weopenupthereflectivespaceto
articulateandthentobegintoredressthesefactors.Thatopennessandthesubsequent
articulationofthedemandsofjusticeremainspartofwhatweoughttowantfromthe
activityoftheorizingaboutjustice.
NOTES
1. ForacrisprecentstatementofSen’ssenseofhisownintellectualandpersonalrelationtoRawls,
seehis“ThePlaceofCapabilityinaTheoryofJustice”2010,pp.239-253.
2. SeeJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice,1971.IassumethatreadersarefamiliarwithRawls''account
ofjustice.Inshort,heseekstomodelrelevantimpartialityinthereasonedchoiceofprinciples
ofsocialjustice(viewedasgoverningtheinstitutionallyrealizeddistributionofbenefits
andburdensattendantuponanysociety)byblockingthehypotheticalprocedureofchoice
fromrelianceonreasonswhichhethinksarearbitraryfromthemoralpointofview.One’s
representativecannot,forexample,bargaininaself-interestedwayfromone’splaceinthe
socialhierarchytoasetofprinciples,differentiallyfavouringthoseinthatplace,sincethatsort
ofreasoningisblockedbywhathecallsthe‘veilofignorance’.
3. ItisnotclearthatthisinsightisthesourceofapowerfulobjectiontoRawls.SeeFootnote3in
JohnRawls,TheLawofPeoples,2001[1999],p.13.
4. SeeinparticularAmartyaSen,“WhatDoWeWantfromaTheoryofJustice?”,2006,pp.215-38.
SeealsoSen,“ThePlaceofCapabilityinaTheoryofJustice”,2010,andhisintroductioninAdam
Smith,TheTheoryofMoralSentiments,2009[1790],pp.vi-xxvi.
5. See,forexample,Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,1971,p.566.“Nowthissequencedoesnotaimatthe
completespecificationofconduct.Rathertheideaistoapproximatetheboundaries,however
vague,withinwhichindividualsandassociationsareatlibertytoadvancetheiraimsand
deliberativerationalityhasfreeplay.”
6. Theuncodifiabilitythesisholdsthatthedeliverancesofpracticalreason(whetherjudgmentsor
actions)are,ingeneral,nottobeunderstoodasconsistingintheapplicationsofarule,every
instanceofwhichcanbecompletelyspecifiedinadvance.Itislinkedwithwhatissometimes
calledanti-theoryinmoralphilosophy.Fordiscussionofandmotivationfortheuncodifiability
thesis,seeJohnMcDowell,“VirtueandReason”,1998[1979].
7. SeeRawls,JusticeasFairness:ARestatement,2001b,pp.42-43.Theideathattheprincipleswould
bechoseninlexicalorderreflectstheconcernthatroughlyweshouldnotsimplytradeoff
economicgainsattheexpenseofsacrificingthebasicliberties.
8. Iamnotassumingthat‘betteroffthan’alwaysnamesarelationstrictlytransitiveatthelevelof
generallogic.SeeStuartRachels,“Counter-examplestotheTransitivityofBetterThan”,1998,
pp.71-83.ButIamassumingthatherethoseworstoffinSarebothmoreworseoffthanthe
relevantthoseinSandwaymoreworseoffthantherelevantthoseinS!
9. SeeSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,pp.140-41.Rawls''originalmodelanditsglobalanalogues
are,ofcourse,hypothetical,anditsimplyisn’tclearwhatsortof“exercise”Senislabelling
as“unrealistic”.Ifthereisasensibleobjectionhere,Senhasnotsucceededinmakingit.
Presumably,heisintendingtosidewithThomasNagelinemphasizingtheideathatatpresent,
thepoliticalinstitutionsthatwouldallowforanimmediateimplementationofambitiousglobal
socialpoliciesrelatedtojusticearesimplynotdevelopedenough.Yet,itisnotremotelyclear
thatthisconstitutesareasoncountingagainsttherelevance,toglobaljustice,oftheRawlsian
apparatus.SeeThomasNagel,“TheProblemofGlobalJustice”,2005,pp.113-47.
10. Toputitsimply,themaximinprincipletellsonetomaximizetheminimumortochoosethe
scenariowiththebestoftheworstachievableoutcomesacrossarangeoffeasiblescenarios.It
expressesahighdegreeofriskaversion.SeeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,1971,pp.152-53.
11. CompareSen,TheIdeaofJustice,2009,p.85andRawls,TheLawofPeoples,2001a,Footnote3,
p.13.
AgainstSenAgainstRawlsonJustice?221
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McDowell,John(1998)[1979].“VirtueandReason”,MindValueandReality,HarvardUniversity
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Nagel,Thomas(2005).“TheProblemofGlobalJustice”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,Vol.33,No.2,
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Parfit,Derek(1984).ReasonsandPersons,ClarendonPress,Oxford.
Pogge,Thomas(1994).“AnEgalitarianLawofPeoples”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,Vol.23,No.3,
pp.195-224.
——(2008).WorldPovertyandHumanRights,(Secondedition),PolityPress,Cambridge.
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Philosophy,Vol.76,No.1,March,pp.71-83.
Rawls,John(1971).ATheoryofJustice,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MA.
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