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Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit—if it appears at all close, we quitclaim. 控制型股票的投资结果应该以几年为基础来衡量。花费时间适度购买。如果需要，强化管理，改变资本的使用方向，或许造成满意的资产清理或者并购等等，所有这些因素道指这个应该用数年而不是数月为基础来衡量。出于这个原因，在控制型股票中，我们寻求更高的超额收益——如果这看起来需要不惜一切代价，我们就放弃这个可控制的权力。 Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts. 控制型的股票买进阶段同道指有着很强的相关性。在后期，它们的表现就要远超投机型购票。 You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the “Bigger Fool Theory”) is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results. 你可能有兴趣了解我们之前购买的控制型股票，登普斯特轧机制造看起来做的很好。这实现了我们的预期并且结果令人满意。投资运作指望最厚的买家做出无价值的交易（在华尔街他们叫做“更大的傻瓜理论”）实在是不可靠的。如果以令人满意的低价格买入股票，那么只要是平均的心理波动就会带来令人满意的结果。 As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why a single year’s performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously. 在过去我曾提到过，我们投资组合在这几种类型股票的占比是很大程度上有随机因素导致。所以，在每个年份对于低估值型、投资型和控制型的股票的占比都是机会的问题，并且这样易变的因素会对我们相对于道指的表现产生很大的影响。这就是解释如下问题的原因之一：单独一年的表现好或坏不应该被看得很重。 To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows: 为了举例说明机遇对不同种类股票持有比例的重要影响，我引用了过去三年的数据。我们运用与衡量BPL整体状况完全不同的方法来估算，平均每月投资于股票市场的价值被分类计算，取出借入资金和营运费用等等的影响（这给了每组对照数据在精确的基础，但是不能反映BPL整体水平），低估值型股票（两种都包含在内）、投机型股票和道指都如下列示：
Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories. 很显然投机型股票（同控制型股票）拯救了我们1962年的表现，并且如果我们持有投机型股票数量很少，那么我们的结果就会更加差，虽然考虑到当年股票市场行情表现也是非常不错的。我们今年对投机型股票的持有比例会减少，我们的决定不是根据任何市场的意图变化去决定。然而，值得注意的是1962年我们的投资组合是非常幸运的。 In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn’t our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations. 在1963年我们有一个非常好的投机类股票，它大幅的影响了我们的结果，并且低估值型购票也在股票市场向好的一年有着不错的表现。如果投机类品种表现平常（像是1962年的水平）我们相对于道指的表现就不会这么好。这时并不是我们的主动混合的投资比例造成了我们的高收益，而是出色地市场表现帮了我们一把。 Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don’t play the game in retrospect. 最后，在1964年投机型股票给我们的总体表现拖了后腿。这对于任何一年有着像1964年表现的股票市场来说是正常的，但是它们比我们根据经验数据预期的拖后了我们更多。回顾往事，我们如果全部持有低估值的股票我们的手一挥更好，但是我们不玩回顾往事的游戏。 I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables—some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category. 我希望上面的表格说明了一年中的表现受控于很多变量的影响——部分决定于我们的不能控制或洞察的因素。我们认为这些分类都是好的生意，并且我们非常高兴我们以来的是多类型的股票而不是单一类型。这建立于每个类别之间的显著差异，这会帮助我们降低由于单个类别的整体运营损失而带来的风险。 Taxes 税收 We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners’ tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank. 对于今年合伙人的税负问题我们非常的满意。当然，如果纳税申报表不是空白，我们还是要交税的。 More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of “tax considerations” than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher- maintains that a majority of life’s errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainly the case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes enters the picture (I have another friend - a noted East Coast philosopher who says it isn’t the lack of representation he minds - it’s the taxation). 其他的聪明的投资人很可能会因为“税收的考虑”而不是其他原因而犯下更多的投资罪恶。我的一个朋友-一个在西海岸著名的哲学家-总结说人生大部分的错误都是由于忘记了自己要做什么造成的。这就是那种情况，当一个像税收这样感觉上过分收取的情况出现。（我有另外一个朋友—一个东海岸著名的哲学家，他说并不是缺少思想上的表现而是税收导致。） Let’s get back to the West Coast. What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn’t, the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case. 让我们回到西海岸。一个人真正想再投资世界干的是什么？并不是为了达到最少的税收，虽然这可能是为了达到最终目标所要考虑的因素。方法和终点不应该被混淆，但是，终点是要追求最大的税后复合增长率。很明显的是，如果两种保证产生相同的税前增长率，一种要交税而另一种不用交税，后者的增长率高更快。但是我们发现这种事情是非常少发生的。 It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices. And, with 3, 000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change). 要在3000只股票中选出20只股票做成适宜的投资组合并且保证目前最优而在一年后表现出非常好的价格增长（包括可选的股票和可替换的股票）并且在日后继续高增长是极度不可能的。如果我们的目标是创造最大的税后复合增长率，我们只需要简单地买入现在的价格最具有吸引力的股票。因为有着3000个快速变化的变量，所以变化是必须的（希望是“税收产生”的变化）。 It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to “get even” in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year. 不管你是否拥有这只股票，他在去年或者上个月的表现在本质上是显然没有意义的。显然，一只股票经过下跌后能够有能力再涨回去也是不重要的。显然，因为去年的收获而使得现在的内在热度的增长对决策今年是否将其纳入最有证券组合没有价值。 If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates). 如果取得收益，那么改变投资组合就会需要缴税。除了一些少数不正常的情况外（我很可以的承认会有那些情况），如果投资组合的预期收益有巨大的差别，那么缴税的多少就会没有太大意义。我始终无法理解为什么这么多人看待税收像是一记重拳，虽然长期资本成本来看它比许多激进的行为要低（税收政策表明深度挖掘此事不如缓慢地持有股票权证更可取）。 I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that’s a little too ultimate for me—even the zealots would have to view this “cure” with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away -.you certainly don’t pay any taxes this way, but of course you don’t pay for any groceries, rent, etc. , either; and (3) lose back the gain - if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you - you certainly have the courage of your convictions. 我的读者的大部分是实用主义者，所以我最好丢下理想主义的教棒。有3种方法去避免最终的税务支出：（1）跟资产一起灭亡——这是有点超越我的极限了——即使是最狂热的人看待这个方法时也是抱着复杂的心情。（2）将资产送人——这种方式下你肯定不用缴税，但是当然你也不会为杂货、房租等等支付金钱。（3）将受益再赔回去——如果你的这种节税人，我必须佩服你，你肯定有足够的勇气来坚持你的信念。 So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury - at the lowest rates the rules will allow. 所以下面继续说明BPL达到最大的投资收益的策略，不是最小化税务支出。我们会尽我们的所能以规定内的最低利率为我们的国库创造最大的额收入。 An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-a-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called “swap funds” which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company’s shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund’s shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates. 在最后的几年中，在整个生意的税务和投资管理展现出了有趣的一面。这个的兴起来源于所谓的“互惠基金”，它是由投资公司创造的用投资公司的股票换取普通股票市场潜在投资者持有的证券。主导销售学说认为当交易一种股票来代表一个多样化的投资组合时推延（推延，当被热情的销售人员宣称时，有时候在语言上非常接近消除）了资本利得税。税务支出只有当互惠基金被赎回时才会发生。如果幸运的话，当在第二段提及的令人欣喜的所有的备选股票都有很好的结果那么税务支出将完全被避免。 The reasoning implicit in the swapee’s action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn’t really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn’t jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually 4% up to $100, 000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio, they have a chance to back out, but I understand a relatively small proportion do so. Swapee的行为隐含的原因更加的有趣。他显然不想持有他现在持有的股票或者他不会抓住机会去拿这些股票（并且支付一个合理的佣金—通常4%到10万美元）交换其他对税收麻木的投资者持有的烫手的山芋。完全公平的看，我要指出的是虽然被邀约人已经提出他们的股票置换要求，也有可能看一下推荐的投资组合，他们仍然有可能退出，但是我理解只有一小部分人这样做的原因。 There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over $600 million. All of the funds retain an investment manager to whom they usually pay ? of 1% of asset value. This investment manager faces an interesting problem; he is paid to manage the fund intelligently (in each of the five largest funds this fee currently ranges from $250, 000 to $700, 000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn’t own shares in the swap fund in the first place. 据我所知自从这个想法1960年起源，有12个这样的基金成立，现在有更多的基金在从事这样工作。自从销售规模超过6亿这个概念就没有缺乏过吸引力。所有这些资金被一个投资经理控制，这将花费0.5%-1%的资产价值支付给投资经理。这个投资经理面对着一个有趣的问题；他被花钱雇来聪明的管理这个基金（在最大的五家基金中这个费用目前每年从25万美元到70万美元见波动），但是由于证券提供者继承来的低税率基础，实际上他每次的运作都会带了资本利得税的负担。并且，当然，他知道如果他引发了这样的债务，他在为投资人做的事情，而这些人很可能是对税收嫉妒敏感的人，如果不是这样他们就不会把互惠基金放在投资的首要位置。 I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual’s combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes. 我坚强有力的展现了它的全部，并且我相信会有一些情形下互惠基金可以更好的解决个人投资者的税务和投资问题。然而，我感觉他们提供了一个很有趣的试管来测量那些非常受尊重的投资顾问的能力——当他们努力管理资金时要想着不能支付太多的税金。 The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One of these, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis which makes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar year comparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and Westminster Fund (respectively first and third largest in the group) are managed by investment advisors who oversee at least $2 billion of institutional money. 三家最大的互惠基金成立于1961年，合计拥有资产大约3个亿。其中之一，多样化基金，他的会计年度编制基础使得他与可比数据很难按年份比较。其余两个，联邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（各自是这个小组中第一和第三资产规模的基金）被投资顾问管理着，并且他们管理的资金理论上至少有20亿美元。 Here’s how they shape up for all full years of existence: 下面列示了他们几年的成果：
This is strictly the management record: No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance. 这是严格的管理层记录：这没有加入对投资者的分红和因为税收导致的投资者的收益减少的影响。 Miscellaneous 各方面的事情 In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 ? square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965; 在12月21日的汽车新闻中报道福特汽车公司打算用7个亿在全世界范围内扩展6,742,000平方英尺的机器设备。BPL从不落后，打算在1965年春天增加227.25平方英尺的办公住所。 Our growth in net assets from $105,100 (there’s no prize for guessing who put in the $100) on May 5, 1956, when the first predecessor limited partnership (Buffett Associates, Ltd.) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 ? square feet, a highly capable man is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott’s time for security analysis which is his forte. I’ll have more to report on this in the midyear letter. 我们的净资产从1956年5月5日的创始有限合伙企业的10.51万美元（猜测谁投入了100美元是没有奖品的）增长到1965年1月1日的2607.4万美元，这也使得我们内部的临时改组有了必要性。所以，与办公场所由从682涨到909.25平方英尺同时，一个非常有能力的人要加入我们的组织，并且负责行政管理（某些其他的）运作。这可以为比尔斯克特腾出更多的去研究股票，而这正是比尔擅长的。我会在年中的信中作更多的汇报。 Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of $298, 749, a very large majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name is being withheld until his present employer has replaced him), along with his wife and children, has made an important investment in the Partnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of $3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1, 942, 592. So we all continue to eat home cooking. 比尔（他继续做着非常出色的工作）和他的妻子在一个合伙企业中有289,749的投资，这占到了他们净资产的一大部分。我们的新同事（他的名字在他现任老板找到替代人选前要保密）和他的妻子和孩子对合伙企业做出了重要的投资。苏西和我现在拥有BPL中的3,406,700美元，这是是我们净资产的全部，但是除了我们持续持有的中陆标签卡片公司，这是一家当地公司，是我在1960年当它的股东不足10人时买入的。另外，我的亲属们，包括我的三个孩子，母亲，两个姐姐，两个姐夫，岳父，四个姨，4个堂兄，6个侄子侄女在BPL中享有利益，间接或者直接的总共1,942,592美元。所以我们都在继续吃着自家做的饭。 We continue to represent the ultimate in seasonal businesses—open one day a year. This creates real problems in keeping the paper flowing smoothly but, Beth and Donna continue to do an outstanding job of coping with this and other problems. 我们继续代表着季节性生意的基本原则——每年开门一次。这给保持报表平滑带来了真实的麻烦，但是贝丝和唐娜继续在这项工作和其他问题方面做着出色的工作。 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has distinguished itself in its usual vital role of finding out what belongs to whom. We continue to throw impossible deadlines at them—and they continue to perform magnificently. You will note in their certificate this year that they have implemented the new procedure whereby they now pounce on us unannounced twice a year in addition to the regular yearend effort. Peat, Marwick和Mitchell在平凡的岗位做出了突出的成绩，他们的工作是找出哪些资产属于谁。我们持续的给他们一些对他们来说不可能的截止日期——他们表现出了持续的卓越。今年你们会注意到他们的证书， Finally - and most sincerely - let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be - by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minute that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier. 最后，最真诚的感谢你们--我的合伙人，你们迅速适当的将信息反映给我，让我有了最充足的时间你干我们应该做的工作—收钱。我非常幸运的可以有大量的时间去思考我们的钱应该投资于哪里，而不是被这么多的经济实体的拖累而停滞不前。我们有一个组织框架可以使得高效是有可能的，更重要的是，我们又一群合伙人使得这变成了现实。出于这点，我发自肺腑的感谢并期待我们共同财富增长。 Our past policy has been to admit close relatives of present partners without a minimum capital limitation. This year a flood of children, grandchildren, etc., appeared which called this policy into question; therefore, I have decided to institute a $25,000 minimum on interests of immediate relatives of present partners. 过去的政策是允许现有的近亲属合伙人以没有最小资金限制投入资本。今年一大批儿子辈和孙辈等等的孩子们使这个政策出现了麻烦。所以，我决定对现有的近亲属合伙人指定一个2.5万美元的增资下限。 Within the coming two weeks you will receive: (1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1964 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes. (2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1964, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account. (3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/65. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit. (4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners. 在接下来的一周你会收到： (1)一封信，关于BPL1964年联邦税务返还的所有信息。这封信只是为了税务目的计算而用。 (2)对Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 和公司1964年的审计报告，列明BPL公司的运营和财务状况和每个合伙人的资金账户。 (3)有我签署的信，列明了你1965年1月1日在BPL的红利状态。这与审计报告中的梳理相同。 (4) A计划表:给合伙企业协议内列示的所有的合伙人寄出。 Let Bill or me know if anything needs clarifying. Even with our splendid staff, our growth means there is more chance of missent letters, overlooked instructions, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc. , so speak up if you have any question at all that we might have erred. My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first half bf this year. 如果有什么需要阐明，让我知道。随着我们的发展，寄错信的概率会增大，一个名字的确实或者字母的错位等等。所以说如果你发现了这样的情况，可能是由于我们犯了错误。 下一封信将会在7月15日概括说明上半年的情况 Cordially, Warren E. Buffett |
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