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编者按：中国投资者对巴菲特以及其经典的投资心得耳熟能详。但实际上，这个世界仍然有大量可以与巴菲特比肩的投资大师精心撰写的投资心得，但多以英文或者其他语言撰写，国内几乎没有介绍。格隆汇特意组织力量开始制作《精译求精系列》，力求将这些含金量十足的大师心得，呈现在广大会员眼前，体现他们的价值，为大家的投资，保驾护航。 本文的作者是纽约大学金融系教授Aswath Damodaran在其博客上发布的投资心得。文章主要讨论了科技公司的生命周期！
The corporateaging theme is one that I have returned to repeatedly in my posts, and I havelooked at how the aging process creates dysfunctional responses on the parts ofmanagers, who want to find ways to reverse it, and investors, who make bets onsuch reversals. It was the under pinning for my last post on Yahoo, and in thatpost, I argued that technology companies have compressed life cycles, i.e., agein dog years, relative to non-tech companies. In this post, I would like toprovide a rationale for why this may be the case and set the stage for my nextpost on what the implications are for managers and investors.
公司衰老化这一主题曾反复出现在我的博客中。我也曾探讨过公司的衰老化进程如何让期望反转局面的管理者和投资者束手无策。在此基础上，我写了一篇剖析雅虎的文章，并在文中说到科技公司的生命周期有被压缩的迹象，如：公司往往刚步入辉煌期就开始走下坡路。在这篇博客中，我将对这一现象的根源进行理论分析，以此做为下一篇文章的铺垫，进一步探讨公司管理者和投资人可从中得到何种启示。
The Corporate Life Cycle
公司生命周期
The corporatelife cycle follows a familiar pattern. It begins with an idea, that developsinto a product, which evolves into an operating business, that matures, andeventually dies.
公司的生命周期往往都有模式可循。它由一种理念发展出产品，然后演化到业务经营，进而步入成熟期，最后走向衰败。
I have alsohighlighted the transitions that determine whether a company moves to the nextstage and the mortality rate especially early in the life cycle is high. Thereare wide differences across companies in how long they take toclimb the life cycle, how much time they spend as mature companiesand how quickly they decline. As legal entities, corporations do have a littlemore give in the process, i.e., the capacity to slow or even reverse theprocess for periods, than individuals do, but not as much as they (and theirstrategic advisors) think that they do. The one reality that I think isincontestable is that even the most exceptional companies will age and thatwhether they deal with that aging gracefully is what determines how theirstockholders will do during the process.
我曾强调过，我们应当重视公司从一阶段转向另一阶段的过渡期、以及公司的衰亡率，尤其是早期的衰亡率。不同公司生命周期的上升期、成熟期，和衰亡期时间跨度差别很大。作为合法实体，公司在这一过程中能做的其实比个体更多，比如：公司有减缓、甚至是逆转过程发生的能力。不过公司能做的并不像他们自己(或者战略顾问)估计的那么多。唯一无可争辩的，就是最优秀的公司也会衰老，而公司是否能优雅地度过衰老阶段，决定了股东在这一过程中的行为。 Determinants ofthe Life Cycle 生命周期的决定因素
To get a sense of what drives differences acrosscompanies and how the life cycle evolves, I tried to take a look at thedeterminants of each phase of the cycle in the graph below:
为了弄清楚为什么公司间存在差异，以及公司的生命周期是如何演变的，我尝试着针对每一阶段分析其决定因素，如下图所示： 
When you start up, your focusis survival, and that will depend on (a) how much access youhave to capital, (b) how much you need to invest to enter the market and (c)the time lag before you have a product or a service. Your chances of survivalimprove, if you have access to more capital and don't have to wait very long before you have a functioning product. functioningproduct.
在起步期，您应关注企业的生存问题，这取决于（a）您手头有多少资金，（b）需要多大投资才能进入市场（c）生产产品或服务所需的时间。如果您手头有更多资金，并且无需在产品正常运作之前等待很长时间，那么公司的存活几率就更大。
The speed of yourgrowth will depend on (a) how quickly the overallmarket is growing, (b) the ease of scaling up your operating and (c) how muchinertia there is on the customers side. You will be able to grow faster, if theoverall market is growing exponentially, scaling up is easy and you are dealingwith customers who are willing to switch from incumbent products/services.
公司的成长速度将取决于（a）整体市场如何迅速增长，（b）扩大经营的难易程度（c）有多少客户有固定消费惯性。如果整体市场呈指数级增长，公司扩张很容易，所接触的客户也愿意从原先使用的产品和服务转向新型产品，那么公司就可以更快速地增长。
The length of the mature phase willdepend upon the nature of your competitive advantages, how big they are and howlong they last. If your competitive advantages are strong and sustainable, yourmature phase can last for a long time. Consumer product companies with strongbrand names, one of the strongest and most sustainable competitive advantages,have longer mature phases than companies that have a cost advantage, a moretransient and short term competitive advantage.
公司成熟阶段的长短取决于竞争优势的本质，包括优势大小、和持续时间长短。如果公司的竞争优势很强大、且可持续，那么公司就可以长时间内停留在成熟期内。消费品公司凭借响亮的品牌名号——公司最强、最持久的竞争优势之一，比具有短期竞争优势的公司有更长的成熟期。
In decline, the speed withwhich your business will deplete will depend upon (a) how quickly new companiescan enter the market (b) how quickly they can scale up and how willingcustomers are to try new products. In other words, you see that a mirror imageof the qualities that allow for speedy growth also contribute to a quickdecline.
在下降阶段，企业衰败的速度将取决于（一）新公司可以多快进入市场（二）公司可以多快地扩大，以及客户尝试新产品的意愿如何。换句话说，如你所见，促进公司快速增长的因素，反过来也会导致公司的快速衰败。
In the end game, your choicesdepend on what your remaining assets look like and ， whether they can beliquidated, without substantial losses. If they can, your end will be speedyand perhaps even painless. If not, your death throes can be long and painful.
在周期末尾，你的选择取决于剩余资产的形态，以及在没有重大损失的前提下，剩余资产能否被清算。如果答案是可以，那么公司就可速战速决，毫无疼痛地收尾。但如果答案是否定的，这个过程就是垂死挣扎，漫长且折磨。
Tech versus Non-tech 科技公司VS非科技公司
Before we starton a discussion of how tech companies are different from non-tech companies, wehave to think about what separates the two groups, and that separation becomeshazier by the day. In the 1980s, at the start of the tech revolution, the distinctionwas a simple one. If a company’s products or services were computer-related(either personal or business computers), it was classified as a technologyfirm. That distinction allowed us to identify Microsoft, Apple and Atari astechnology firms, and bring in HP, IBM and Digital Equipment as the old guard.That definition no longer works, as almost every product we buy (fromappliances to automobiles) has a computerized component to it, and it has meantthat deciding whether a company is a tech company is a judgment call. Giventhat reality, I would propose that rather than draw hard lines of distinctionbetween tech and non-tech, we consider technology on a continuum, where at oneend you have companies whose products and services are entirely technologydriven (Google, Facebook) and at the other, you have companies that almost notechnology component to them (consumer products and cosmetics companies, forinstance). With this continuum, you can argue that Tesla and Ford are both autocompanies, but that Tesla has a larger technology component than Ford.
在开始讨论高科技公司与非高科技公司的不同之前，我们必须清楚区分两者的是什么，以及这一界线为何日益模糊。在上世纪80年代科技革命之初，区分二者是很简单的，如果一个公司的产品或服务与计算机相关（无论是个人或企业电脑），它就会被列为一个科技公司。因此我们可以确定微软、苹果和雅达利都是科技公司，而惠普，IBM和数码设备公司则被认为是保守派公司。不过这种划分现在已经失效了，因为我们买的每一个产品（从家电到汽车）几乎都有相应的电脑组件，而这也意味着决定一家公司是否是高科技公司完全基于主观判断。鉴于这一现实，我建议不要在科技公司和非科技公司之间强硬划分界线，而可以把科技公司看为一个连续的统一体。在它的一端，是产品和服务完全由科技驱动的公司（如：谷歌，Facebook）；在另一端，是那些几乎没有任何科技成分的公司（如：消费产品和化妆品公司）。用这种连续的眼光看，你就可以说特斯拉和福特都是汽车企业，但是特斯拉公司的科技成分比重更大。 Why do we careabout these distinctions? First, they have practical implications for analystsand portfolio managers. Sell-side equity research analysts are usually put intosector silos and asked to keep their focus on the companies that they areassigned. With companies like Amazon, Netflix and Tesla, high profile names tofollow, I have noticed that thereare big differences across banks. Some assign these companies to thetechnology analysts, some to the businesses that these companies operate in(Tesla in autos, Netflix in entertainment and Amazon in retail) and some createnew sector groupings just for these gray area companies. Second, for better orworse, the categorization of a company can affect its pricing. Tesla,classified as an auto company, will look expensive, compared to other autocompanies, but classified as a young tech company, it may look cheap. That isperhaps why companies seek out the tech label for themselves, even iftechnology is only a small component of their offerings.
为什么要留意这些区别呢？首先，它们对分析师和投资组合经理有现实意义。卖方的证券研究分析师通常被分配到各个部门中，并被要求时时关注所分配的公司。我注意到，亚马逊，奈飞和特斯拉等名号响亮的公司都有着很大差异。根据其中一些差异，可将这些公司划分到的技术分析类别，不过根据另外一些差异，这些公司又可被划分到其所经营的领域中去（如特斯拉属于汽车行业，奈飞公司属于娱乐业，亚马逊属于零售业），也有一些差异使得一些灰色领域公司单独抱团。其次，无论好坏，公司的分类会影响其定价。特斯拉如果被划分为汽车公司，与其他汽车企业相比，它的价格看上去就高了。但如果它被归类为一个新兴高科技公司，它的价格可能就不算太高了。这也许就是企业都想为自己贴上高科技标签的原因所在吧，即便技术只占其产品的小部分。
The Tech Life Cycle
科技公司的生命周期
If you accept myargument that technology is a continuum, then you can perhaps live with mydefinition of “tech” companies as those that get the predominant portion oftheir value from technology. With that definition, I can revisit the corporatelife cycle and its determinants and make the following generalizations (and Iam sure that you can think of exceptions with each one):
如果你认同科技是连续体这一观点，那么你可能也会认可我对科技公司的定义：一个公司，若其绝大部分价值都来源于科技，那么它就是科技公司。带着这个定义，我们去回顾公司生命周期及其决定因素，可以得出以下概括性结论（不过我相信每一点概括里都能挑出特例）
Scaling up is easy: Tech companiesoften operate in businesses where entry is not restricted, the up frontinvestment is minimal and scaling up in easy. If market conditions arefavorable, they are aided and abetted by access to capital and by lesssticky customer preferences in their markets. Not surprisingly, tech companiescan grow quickly.
发展容易：科技公司的业务范围往往不受限制，前期投资资金需求量很小，发展起来很容易。如果市场条件有利，公司能获得资本和低粘性客户对其的市场偏好，从中得到帮助和支持。
Holding on is tough: Once techcompanies reach the mature phase, they don't get to have long harvest periods. Theircompetitive advantages are fleeting and quickly deplete.
坚持较难: 一旦科技公司进入成熟期就意味着它过了可长期获利的时间段，竞争优势很快消失殆尽。
Decline is rapid: The sameforces that allow technology companies to grow, i.e., unrestricted entry, easeof scaling up and customer switching, also make them vulnerable to new entrantsseeking to take their business away from them.
衰落迅速：促进科技公司高速发展的力量，如：无门槛进入，易于扩张，客户转移，也使它们更易于让新的竞争公司夺走业务。
And there is little left inthe end game: Unlike other businesses, which accumulate physicalassets as they grow and thus have a liquidation potential, with technologycompanies, there is little of substance to fall back, once earnings power isexhausted.
公司在周期末一贫如洗：与其它公司不同，科技公司并不会像其它公司那样在成长过程中积累有形资产，也并无清算潜力，一旦盈利衰竭，公司就并无什么资产可依靠。
Here, for instance, is my contrast between the life cycleof the typical tech company, contrasted with a typical non-tech company.
如下，是典型的科技公司与典型的非科技公司生命周期对比图：
有什么证据可以证实这确是市场上发生的事情呢？我觉得黑莓公司算是一个例子，但是转念一想，用这种轶事来当证据好像也不太好。不过，即便证据分散，它也确实是存在的。首先，有证据表明小科技公司（通过首轮测试的）就利润增长而言比其他公司（至少是对小型科技公司而言）上升更快。
Is thereevidence that this is what happens in the market? I could use Blackberry as anexample, but I would then be guilty of using anecdotal evidence to advance mytheory. Instead, I will argue that the evidence exists, albeit in scatteredform. First, there is evidence that the small tech firms (that survive thefirst tests) are able to scale up faster in terms of revenue growth (at least)than small non-tech firms. The fact that they often lose money while doing sois as much a function of the accounting inconsistency of treating research andproduct development costs as operating expenses, as it is a function ofoperating weakness. The second is that these tech firms, once established, havea more difficult time maintaining growth. The third is that decline, once itstarts at tech firms, is more difficult to reverse and quicker to accelerate.All of these points are made in this McKinsey article on growth attech companies.
科技公司在上升时大量流出现金的原因可能在于会计统计不一致——把研发费用当作经营费用，使得公司看上去好像经营不善。第二点就是，科技公司成立后想要维持发展却很难。第三点就是一旦科技公司开始衰败，想要扭转这一局面就更难，而且衰败速度只会越来越快。这些点在麦肯锡探讨科技公司增长的文章中都有强调过。
A LifeCycle Perspective on Disruption 从生命周期的角度看公司分立
Disruption is the new buzz word incorporate strategy, a reason that I listed it as on my list of words that operate asweapons of mass distraction, and is often used to cut offdebate or not talk specifics. From my perspective, the essence of disruption isthat it is a new way of doing business that radically changes the fundamentalsof an established business. In the context of technology-driven disruption, ita company, with a tech model, coming into a non-tech business, characterized bylong growth periods, extended mature phases and elongated declines.
破坏性是公司策略上的一个新术语，我将它列在“大规模杀伤性武器般的词语”名单之上，它通常被用于终止讨论，或者避免细节讨论。我觉得，破坏性的核心在于它是一种全新的经营方式，它会从根本上改变一个已成立企业或者行业的根基。在由科技为主导的破坏性中，一个科技公司往往会出一个严重破坏一个非科技公司的商业模式，从而使科技公司成长期更久，成熟期更长，衰落期也更为平缓。
Consider carservice, i.e., the taxi cab and limo business. The old non-tech model for thisbusiness required regulatory approval (making entry difficult) and substantialinvestment (in cars) in a market governed by customer inertia. Uber and theother ride sharing companies have upended the model by bypassing regulatoryapproval, not investing in cars and breaking through inertia by reaching out tocustomers through their smart phones. The results speak for themselves. Notonly have Uber, Lyft and Didi Kuaidi grown at rates unlike any seen bytraditional car service companies, but each has a market reach that is beyondthe old model. No traditional cab company can afford to operate in 300 cities,like Uber does.
如汽车服务行业中的出租车和豪华轿车业务，这种旧的非技术型公司需要通过市场监管机构的批准（市场监管使得进入行业很困难），也要根据客户的惯性进行大量投资（购买汽车）。Uber和其它一些推行搭乘共享的公司绕开了批准审核过程，不再投资汽车，通过智能手机与客户接触，打破了消费惯性，从而颠覆了传统模式。结果不言自明，Uber、Lyft和滴滴快滴等公司，以不同于任何传统汽车服务公司的速度保持增长，而且这些公司的市场覆盖范围都超出了旧模式范围。我相信没有任何一家传统出租车公司能够像Uber一样在300个城市运行业务。
The effect ofdisruption is that it upends the fortunes of mature companies from the oldbusiness model, coasting in their mature phase, convinced that change is slow.Unprepared for the speed of change emanating from the tech entrants, these oldplayers wait too long to respond, looking to regulators and rule makers forprotection, and not surprisingly, face an implosion. That, in a nutshell, iswhat has happened to the taxi cab and limo business in many cities. The newentrants, though, should not celebrate too quickly, since their tech modeldisruption comes with its dangers. Their models are difficult to mine for cashflows and are themselves susceptible to competition. As I noted in my post onthe future of the ride sharing business, disruption is easy, but making moneyon disruption is hard.
破坏性技术的意义在于它将处于成熟期、并轻视转变的成熟公司从旧的商业模式里拯救出来，从而它们的命运。成熟公司尚不适应科技新贵带来的这一快速转变，即便等得再久，这些老玩家也无法做出任何决定，最后只得诉求市场监管机构的保护，不过不出意外，等着它们的只有内部分裂。很多城市的出租车公司和豪华汽车公司就经历了这样的结局。但是，科技新贵们也别高兴得太早，因为这种破坏性的商业模式也暗含危机，因为这种模式不利于保持现金流，并且其竞争力也值得再考究。就如同我在一篇关于搭乘共享公司的文章里提到的，破坏一个行业很容易，但是破坏后继续盈利就没那么容易了。
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