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巴菲特论价值投资系列2

 卷美书香 2017-12-07


问:能否给大家聊聊你那几只所谓的'必须持有股'的内在价值?
Q: Could you comment on the matter of intrinsic value as it applies to some of the Inevitables?

好的,但我不愿给它们一个具体的价格。这些企业都是非常棒的,并由杰出的经理们经营着,并且目前的股价高于过去大多数时间的股价。无论是从现在的角度看,还是从未来几年的角度看,现在的价格都物有所值。吉列从来不回购股票……,而可乐经常回购。

Well, we won't stick a price on it. They are absolutely wonderful businesses run by sensational people, and they are selling at prices that are higher than they've sold at most of the time. But they may well be worth it, either in present terms, or they may be a couple of years ahead of themselves. Gillette doesn't repurchase their shares ... Coke consistently repurchases their shares.

一般情况下,我比较喜欢那些经营着好生意且爱回购自己股票的公司。但多数回购自己股票的公司所存在的问题在于它们本身的生意非常一般,它们回购股票的目的不是为了增进股东在好生意中所占的权益。

We generally like the policy of companies that have really wonderful businesses repurchasing their shares. The problem with most companies repurchasing their shares is that they are frequently so-so businesses and they are repurchasing shares for purposes other than intensifying the interest of shareholders in a wonderful business.

在我们所生活的世界里,明智地使用资金并不容易,但是可口可乐在运用资金方面非常聪明,特别是在世界范围内完善装瓶业务网络这一点上。了解到这一点,你就会觉得多买些像可口可乐这样的公司(会感觉很棒)。

It's hard to do things intelligently with money in this world and Coke has been very intelligent about using their capital, particularly to fortify and develop their bottler network around the world, but there's only so far you can go with that, and to enhance the ownership of shareholders in a company like Coca-Cola [is great].

(备注:后面的故事也非常重要。中国远洋(601919)现在的困境就与缺乏商业远见和合同签订方面缺乏技巧有关。在景气周期签下长期租船合同,却在合同上没有租金方面的灵活条款,导致货运价格降低时期的长期亏损。远洋若不是国企,估计早就破产了。)

其实,装瓶业非常有意思……, 在19世纪80年代末,Asa Canver以2000美元的价格把可口可乐全买下来了,这恐怕是有史以来最明智的一笔买卖了。

The bottling is actually kind of interesting ... Asa Canver back in the late 1880's essentially bought the whole Coca-Cola company for $2,000, and that may be the smartest purchase in the history of the world.

此后,在1889年,几个来自 Chattanooga的小伙子来找他,那个时候软饮料还是通过分销方式销售的,小伙子们对他说:装瓶业务还是有一定发展前景的,你现在忙于生产可乐,那么为什么不把装瓶业务交给我们来发展呢?我猜那时候的Canver先生也不太在乎装瓶业务,于是他就与那几个小伙子签了合同,让他们永久负责几乎所有美国境内的装瓶业务,还许诺他们可以永远以固定价格购入可口可乐原浆。所以,Asa,用2000美元做了最划算生意的人,竟然又签了世上最蠢的合同。

Then in 1889, a couple of guys from Chattanooga came along, and in those days soft drinks were sold over the counter, and they said bottling's got a future and you're busy with the pump side of the business, so why don't you let us develop the bottling side of the business. And I guess Mr. Canver didn't think much of bottling, so he gave them a contract that gave them the rights, in perpetuity for almost all of the United States, and gave them the right to buy Coca-Cola syrup at a fixed price forever. So Asa, who had scored with his $2,000 in a major way, seems to have made one of the dumbest contracts in history.

装瓶业务很快成为可乐销售网络的关键环节,此后多年,可口可乐公司不得不面临定价缺乏灵活性而又无法终止合同的窘境。当然,每一个装瓶商都会在临终时把子孙叫到床前,并拼尽最后力气嘱咐他们“千万别把装瓶合同交出去啊!”

And the Coca-Cola company was faced over the years with the problem of having this bottling system which soon became the dominant system of distribution for Coke, being subject to a contract where there was no price flexibility and where the contract ran for perpetuity. And of course every bottler on his deathbed would call his children and grandchildren around, and he would prop himself up, and he would croak out in his last breath, 'Don't let 'em screw with the bottling contract.'

所以,该问题一直困扰了可口可乐公司数十年,这期间他们都拿这块业务没办法,Roberto和Don Keough以及其他一些人总共花了20到25年的时间才理顺这块业务……这确实是一个规模宏大的工程,但是随着时间的推移,这一块业务还是发生了巨大的变化,这就是我常说的聪明的资本。他们清楚将这个错误纠正过来不是一朝一夕的事,但是他们知道必须解决这个问题,于是他们花钱把事情解决了。但是他们花钱并不仅限于回购股票,这非常聪明,也许就在我们说话的这个时候他们正在回购股票呢。

So the Coca-Cola company faced this for decades, and they couldn't really do anything about the bottling system for a long time, and Roberto and Don Keough and some other people spent 20, 25 years getting that rationalized ...it was a huge, huge project, but it made an enormous difference over time, and that's what I mean when I talk about intellectual capital. You know you're not going to get results on that in a day or a month or a year, but they decided that to get the job done they had to do this, and they used capital to get that job done, but they used capital beyond that to repurchase shares, and it's been very smart, and they're probably repurchasing shares even as we talk.

(查理芒格:我一直觉得可口可乐是商业史上最有趣的案例之一,这家公司值得花更多的精力去研究。在可口可乐公司发展史上,有很多很多的经验教训需要总结。但显然,可乐公司的故事太多,今天一天也讲不完。)

[CM: I do think the Coca-Cola company is one of the most interesting cases in the history of business, and it ought to be way more studied than it is. There's just lesson after lesson after lesson in the history of the Coca-Cola company. But it's too long a story for today.]

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes
URL: http://www.
Time: 2007
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问:判断风险的能力与计算内在价值的能力是否同样重要?
Q: Is the skill of judging risk just as important as calculating intrinsic value?

我们将风险视为未来对生意产生负面影响的各因素。我们希望能够得到一系列决策的量化风险而不是介入存在一系列具有可见风险的生意。我们希望介入的生意能够存在护城河。同时,我们还希望介入生意的护城河能够得到不断拓宽。不断拓宽的护城河才是好生意的最重要标志。

We perceive risk as items that impair future business. Wants to have mathematical risk on their side over a group of decisions. Not in the business of assuming a lot of risk in business. We look for moats around businesses. We look for castles (businesses) that have a moat surrounding it which is expanding as a primary consideration of a great business.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2000
URL: http://www.
Time: April 29th 2000




问:在估算内在价值时,对于像麦当劳和沃尔格林等资本密集型企业,它们非常健康且不断增长的营运现金流被用在了开新店,这种情况你要怎么估算未来的自由现金流呢?折现率又是多少呢?
Q: When you estimate intrinsic value in capital intensive companies like McDonald's and Walgreens where a very healthy and growing operating cash flow is largely offset by expenditures for new stores, restaurants, etc how do you estimate future free cash flow? And at what rate do you discount those cash flows?

对于不同股票,我们使用相同的折现率。在某些情况下,我们在预测现金流时,可能会更保守一些。

We use the same discount rate across all securities. We may be more conservative in estimating cash in some situations.

并不是因为利率为1.5%,我们就会喜欢2-3%回报率的投资。我们有一个比国家现行利率高很多的投资收益率门槛。当我们考察一桩生意时,我们考虑的是长期持有,我们不会认为利率会一直这么低。

Just because interest rates are at 1.5% doesn't mean we like an investment that yields 2-3%. We have minimum thresholds in our mind that are a whole lot higher than government rates. When we're looking at a business, we're looking at holding it forever, so we don't assume rates will always be this low.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes
URL: http://www.
Time: 2003
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我们没有一个严格的折现率。每当谈起这个问题时,查理总是提醒我还没有准备一个运算表格,但是这样的表格已经在我的脑子里了。

We don’t formally have discount rates. Every time we start talking about this, Charlie reminds me that I’ve never prepared a spreadsheet, but I do in my mind.

我们希望买入的生意,其回报率能够高于政府债券——问题的关键是高多少?如果政府债券的收益是2%,我们不会买入回报率是4%的生意。

We just try to buy things that we’ll earn more from than a government bond – the question is, how much higher? If government bonds are at 2%, we’re not going to buy a business that will return 4%.

我不会每天给查理打电话问他:“我们的收益率门槛是多少?”我们从不使用这个概念。

I don’t call Charlie every day and ask him, “What’s our hurdle rate?” We’ve never used the term.

(芒格:收益率门槛只是一个没有意义的概念,但是很多人在这上面犯了很多严重错误。在考察很多投资时要分别对比每个投资的回报率,我觉得还没有一个好的选择可以代替这种考察方法。)

Munger: The concept of a hurdle rate makes nothing but sense, but a lot of people using this make terrible errors. I don’t think there’s any substitute for thinking about a whole lot of investment options and thinking about the returns from each.

(芒格:问题不在于我们没有(收益率门槛值)——我们实际上是有的——但这来自于逻辑上的对比。如果存在一项投资铁定可以带来8%的收益,那么对于7%的收益率,我们一定会马上拒绝。就像在《邮购新娘》中的情节那样,如果新娘公司给你邮来的新娘携带艾滋病毒,我就不会浪费时间去考虑。一切都是机会成本在起作用。)

The trouble isn’t that we don’t have one [a hurdle rate] – we sort of do – but it interferes with logical comparison. If I know I have something that yields 8% for sure, and something else came along at 7%, I’d reject it instantly. It’s like the mail-order-bride firm offering a bride who has AIDS – I don’t need to waste a moment considering it. Everything is a function of opportunity cost.

巴菲特:我是19个不同董事会的董事,看过无数预测内部收益率的报告。如果董事会把这些数字都烧掉,他们也许会更富有。那些内部收益率数据都是基于CEO的意愿得出来的,数字是人编的。

Buffett: I’ve been on 19 boards and seen a zillion presentations projecting a certain IRR [internal rate of return]. If the boards had burned them all, they’d have been better off. The IRR is based on what the CEO wants. The numbers are made up.

(芒格:我有一个向投资者推销私募的年轻朋友,他所提供的那么高收益率很难实现。我问他:“你提供的收益率是多少?”他说:“20%。”我说:“你如何实现这样的收益率?”他回答道:“如果说得太低,他们不投资啊!”

Munger: I have a young friend who sells private partnership interests to investors, and it’s hard to get returns in that field. I asked him, “What returns do you tell them you can get?” He said “20%.” I said, “How did you come up with that number?” He said, “If I told them anything lower, they wouldn’t give me the money.”

巴菲特:资金量大时,世界上根本没有人能够取得20%的收益率。养老基金和其他投资者真是太容易上当受骗了。他们太期望20%的收益了,以至于相信那些不可能发生的事。

Buffett: There’s no one in the world who can earn 20% on big money. It’s amazing how gullible pension funds and other investors are. They want it so badly that they’ll believe even total nonsense.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes
URL: http://www.
Time: 2007

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