七五六
Brecht: “An die Nachgeborenen”: “Was sind das für Zeiten, wo: Ein Gespräch über Bäume fast ein Verbrechen ist: Weil es ein Schweigen über so viele Untaten einschliesst!”[1] (Gedichte, hrsg. Elisabeth Hauptmann und Benno Slupianek, Aufbau Verlag, 1961, Bd. IV, S. 148). These terrifying & searching lines were written before 1937.[2] Sartre’s “Présentation des Temps Modernes” in 1945 may serve as their exegesis: “Serions-nous muets et cois comme des cailloux, notre passivité même serait une action. Celui qui consacrerait sa vie à faire des romans sur les Hittites, son abstention serait par elle-même une prise de position. L’écrivain est en situation dans son époque: chaque parole a des retentissements. Chaque silence aussi. Je tiens Flaubert et Goncourt pour responsables de la répression qui suivit la Commune parce qu’ils n’ont pas écrit une ligne pour l’empêcher”[3] (quoted in Maurice Nadeau, Le Roman français depuis la guerre, p. 198)[4]. Brecht’s quatrain in Deutsche Kriegsfibel: “Die Oberen sagen: / Es geht in den Ruhm. / Die Unteren sagen: / Es geht ins Grab” (Ib., S. 14) is paralelled by the final lines in his translation of Ts’ao Sung’s “Ein Protest”: “Ein einzigen Generals Reputation / Heisst: Zehntausend Leichen” (S. 161: 一將功成萬骨枯).
Johnson’s Preface to Shakespeare: “Shakespeare approximates the remote & familiarises the wonderful” (R.W. Chapman, Selections from Samuel Johnson, p. 254). I wonder whether anyone has ever noticed the similarity between this view of Shakespearean art & Coleridge’s purpose in the Lyrical Ballads (“My endeavor should be directed to persons & characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest & semblance of truth” etc. — Biog. Lit., ed. J. Shawcross, II, p. 6). Wordsworth’s share in that joint endeavor, on the other hand, can be described in Brechtian terms as an attempt of Verfremdungs-effekt. In the Preface to the second edition, Wordsworth says: “... ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual aspect” (Poems, Oxford ed., p. 935); Coleridge explains: “MrWordsworth... was to propose to himself as his object, to give the charm of novelty to things of every day... by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom” (loc. cit.); cf. The Friend, “General Introduction”, Essay XV: “So to represent familiar objects as to awaken the minds of others to a like freshness of sensation concerning them — this is the prime merit of genius” (Complete Works, ed. W.T. Sheed, II, p. 104). Cf. Maupassant, Pierre et Jean, “Preface” [Flaubert’s advice]: “Il s’agit de regarder tout ce qu’on veut exprimer assez longtemps et avec assez d’attention pour en découvrir un aspect qui n’ait été vu et dit par personne. Il y a, dans tout, de l’inexploré, parce que nous sommes habitués à ne nous servir de nos yeux qu’avec le souvenir de ce qu’on a pensé avant nous sur ce que nous contemplons. La moindre chose contient un peu d’inconnu.” Cf. John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, p. 10: “... compared with other theorists, philosophers are particularly good at forgetting familiar facts, perhaps just because the facts they forget are so familiar that they are never explicitly before the mind as facts. ‘One is unable to notice something — because it is always before one’s eyes (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 129) — or ‘before one’s eyes’ in a certain sense although not in another sense. Cf. Rousseau: ‘Il faut beaucoup de philosophie pour savoir observer une fois ce qu'on voit tous les jours.’” Proust, À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs on the painter Elstir: “L’effort qu’Elstir faisait pour se dépouiller en présence de la réalité de toutes les notions de son intelligence... qui avant de peindre se faisait ignorant, oubliait tout par probité (car ce qu’on sait n'est pas à soi)...” (À la recherche du temps perdu, Bib. de la Pléiade, I, p. 836); also Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, Bd. II, Abt. I, §200: “Original. — Nicht dass man etwas Neues zuerst sieht, sondern dass man das Alte, Altbekannte, von jedermann Gesehene und Übersehene wie neu sieht, zeichnet die eigentlich originalen Köpfe aus. Der erste Entdecker ist gemeinhin jener ganz gewöhnliche und geistlose Phantast — der Zufall” (Werke, hrsg. K. Schlechta, I. S. 814). Goethe also said to Eckermann: “Man sage nicht, dass es der Wirklichkeit an poetischem Interesse fehle; denn eben darin bewährt sich ja der Dichter, dass er geistreich genug sei, einem gewöhnlichen Gegenstande eine interessante Seite abzugewinnen” (Gespräche, 18 Sept. 1823, Aufbau Verlag, 1956, S. 62). In other words, as Hegel was fond of stressing: “Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt” (Phänomenologie des Geistes, “Vorrede”, hrsg. J. Hoffmeister, Akademieverlag, Bern, S. 28; Philip Reklam Verlag, Bd. I, S. 21; cf. S. 77: “Das Analysieren einer Vorstellung... war nichts anderes als das Aufheben der Form ihres Bekanntseins”; again Novalis: “dephlegmatisiren”; cf. Wissenschaft der Logik, “Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe”: “...wie ich anderwärts gesagt, was bekannt ist, darum nicht erkannt”【my marginalia to the passage】). Cf. J. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 267: “When old & familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination”; R. Wellek & A. Warren, Theory of Literature, Rev. 3rd ed., “Peregrine Books”, p. 242 on Viktor Shklovsky’s formula for poetic art: “making it new”, “making it strange” (The French rendering in T. Todorov, ed., Théorie de la Littérature: Textes des formalistes russes, 1965, is “la singularisation”); Reinhold Grimm’s article on Verfremdung inRevue de littérature comparée, Avril-Juin, 1961, pp. 210-3.【Pascoli, Il sabato: “La poesia è nelle cose... Il poeta... presenta la visione di cosa posta sotto gli occhi di tutti e che nessuno vedeva” (quoted in Momenti e Problemi di Dtoria dell’ Estetica, IV, p. 1637).】【Cf. 六七三則 on Collingwood.】【Dickens, Memorandum Book: “Representing London — or Paris, or any other great place — in the new light of being actually unknown to all the people in the story, & only taking the colour of their fears & fancies & opinions. So getting a new aspect, & being unlike itself. An odd unlikeness of itself” (quoted in J. Hillis Miller, Charles Dickens: The World of His Novels, 1959, p. xv).】【Shlley on poetry as stripping “the veil of familiarity from the world”; Rossetti: “The constant unison of wonder & familiarity so mysteriously allied in nature” (Collected Works, 1901, I, 444).】
Dominique Bouhours, Les Entretiens d’Ariste et d’Eugène, Entretien II: “Mais comme les langues ressemblent non seulement aux statues dont l’on retranche toûjours quelque chose pour les achever; mais encore aux tableaux où l’on ajoûte toûjours quelque chose pour les finir” (Librairie Armand Colin, 1962, pp. 51). An allusion to Michelangelo’s famous distinction: “Io intendo scultura quella che si fa per forza di levare: quella che si fa per via di porre, è simile alla pittura” (G. Milanesi, Le lettere di Michelangelo Buonarroti, 1875, p. 522). Cf. Rivarol: “Si l’art du sculpteur consiste à écarter de la statue le marbre qui n’en est pas, de même le goût ordonne de simplifier un sujet et d’exclure d’un événement les temps qui n’en sont pas. Le grand écrivain repousse donc la foule des incidents étrangers ou disparates qui distraient le sentiment et qui sont comme les parties mortes d’un événement” (Écrits politiques et littéraires, choisis par V.-H. Debidour, p. 54); W.H. Auden, The Dyer’s Hand & Other Essays, p. 287: “The difference between journal & free verse may be likened to the difference between carving & modeling; the journal poet, that is to say, thinks of a poem he is writing as something already latent in the language which he has to reveal, while the free verse poet thinks of language as a plastic passive medium upon which he imposes his artistic conception.”
Maurice Blanchot, La Littérature et le Droit à la Mort: “La négation est liée au langage. Au point de départ, je ne parle pas pour dire quelque chose, mais c’est un rien qui demande à parler, rien ne parle, rien trouve son être dans la parole et l’être de la parole n’est rien. Cette formule explique pourquoi l’idéal de la littérature a pu être celui-ci: ne rien dire, parler pour ne rien dire. Ce n’est pas là la rêverie d’un nihilisme de luxe” (quoted in Maurice Nadeau, Le Roman français depuis la guerre, p. 222)[5]. The similarity of this view of language to Heidegger’s is obvious: “Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille” (Unterwegs zur Sprache, S. 30). Mutism of speech or verbalisation of silence has long been a commonplace among the mystics, cf. supra 第二○四則 on Cassirer, Language & Myth, 第七五一則 on《老子》), but it is a new thing that the “nihilisme de luxe” should be paradoxically made the “idéale de la littérature”, the art of speech par excellence. Ingeborg Bachmann’s endeavour to express or communicate in poetry what is ultimately “unsayable” is part of the same tendency: “Das Unsägliche geht, leise gesagt, übers Land” (“Früher Mittag”, in Die gestundete Zeit, S. 26). Although the “Dharma-Bummelei” of the Beatniks need not be taken seriously, nor much importance be attached to Henry Miller’s allegiance or professed affinity to Lao-tse & Zen (Lawrence Durell & Henry Miller, A Private Correspondence, ed. G. Wickes, pp. 21, 151, 153, 262), to Dieter Bassermann’s suggestion “die grundsätzlichen Aussagen und Verhaltensweisen des späten Rilke... mit Grundtatsachen der Methode und Zielsetzung in Zen in Parallele zu bringen” (Der anderer Rilke, hrsg. Hermann Mörchen, 1962, S. 203); or to John Senior’s characterizatio of some of Mallarmé’s poems as koans & of a prevalent type of modern poetry as “linguistic yoga” (The Way Down & Out, quoted in Frank Kermode, Puzzles & Epiphanies, 1962, p. 43), it is undeniable that in its attitude towards the use of language, the most characteristically “modern” Western literature shows a streak of deeply ingrained mysticism which can be called Taoism, Zenism, Neo-Platonism or what you will. Cf. W. Muschg’s scathing essay “Zerschwatzte Dichtung” in which Bassermann’s exegesis of Rilke with the significant title “Am Rande des Unsagbaren” & Heidegger’s exegesis of Hölderlin based on the principle that “Das Gedicht eines Dichters bleibt ungesprochen” (Die Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur, 3te Auf., S. 215 ff.) are singled out as typical examples of the fashionable kind of “interpretation” which makes intricate by explication. Cf. Samuel Beckett: “Three Dialogues”: “There is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express.”
七五七
閱亞理斯多德 Organon (“The Loebs Classical Library”) ，因重溫《墨子》書中《上、下經》、《大、小取》。此數篇素號難讀，乾、嘉以來，治《墨》者竭漢學訓詁之能事，參西學格物之緒餘，荊榛稍闢，昏翳漸消，然索解勿得者，仍復連篇累牘，而以《經下》為尤甚。近人譚戒甫畢生盡氣，成《墨辯發微》一書，頗思平章眾說，力破餘地，自矜於學問博究傍通，以攻玉之石，借明之鑑。厥詞甚誇，《老子》所謂“餘食贅行”者。其奮筆改字，亦有鄉先輩王壬秋之風。而不閑文詞，又闇名理，異於慎思明辨、潔淨精微之學，故雖極才力，終歸鄙妄。如將自作先後序文以及他人評騭一一闌入，平生家當，不忍割愛，即《榕村語錄續集》卷十六譏某孝廉著書所謂“算命起課賣膏藥招牌派頭”者是也。兹摘正數事，至光學、重學諸條，末由斷其得失，聊付闕疑。譚釋語動輒千百言，文繁無當，余衹標舉要旨爾。
〇《經上》：“故，所得而後成也。”譚云：“故者，果也。”按明是因，何得曰“果”？譚又云：“此條論因果律 (Law of Causality)。”而不知“大故”所謂“因”者即 cause，“小故”所謂“緣”者即condition 或 occasion (參觀 A. Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 7e éd., 1958, p. 711, art. “occasion”)，或 “non-reciprocating cause” (H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed., pp. 495-6)。蓋雖好援西說、每附英字，都未窺西方哲理門徑，如瞽揣聾說，尚未足語於目瞥耳拂也。
〇《經上》：“慮，求也。”《經說上》：“慮也者，其知有求也，而不必得之，若睨。”譚云：“‘求’也者，思無所注也。‘睨’者，如斜視，未必見物之真。《荀子‧大略篇》：‘今夫亡箴者，終日求之而不得，其得之也，非目益明也，眸而見之也。心之於慮亦然。’‘眸’者，猶云正見。”按心“無所注”，乃萬慮皆空，何得曰“慮”？求則心必有所注，然而求未必能得。有得而未嘗求者矣，未有求而不注者也。此條與下條“知，接也”各明一義。“慮，求也”，乃所謂 Task word；“知，接也”，則所謂 Achievement word (參觀 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 149-152; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1048b, 30-34: “to see”, “to understand” vs. “to walk”, “to build” — The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, p. 827; S. Alexander, Space, Time, & Deity, I, p. 12: “objective accusative”; O. Jespersen, Modern English Grammar, III, pp. 230-3, “Ergebnisobjekt”, “effiziertes Objekt” vs. “Richtungsobject”, “affiziertes Objekt”)。【《管子‧內業篇》：“生乃思，思乃知，知乃正矣。”】“睨”者，《中庸》說“執柯伐柯”云“睨而視之猶以為遠”之“睨”，非《離騷》“忽臨睨乎舊鄉”之“睨”，穿針射靶時，側首斜目以注視是也。《中庸》又云：“有勿思，思之勿得勿措”，《大學》云：“慮而後能得”，皆相發明。《荀子》所謂“眸”者，乃偶然著眼之意，與“睨”不同。譚蒙然不辨，反引以自助，亦見其憒憒矣。
〇《經上》：“信，言合於意也。”《經說上》：“不以其言之當也，使人視城得金。”譚云：“‘意’即億度，‘當’謂合禮義。如億城上有金，乃不合義之言，然使人視城而果得金，則謂之‘信’。此即或然律 (Law of Probability)。”按說迂而鑿。“當”即《經上》“辯勝當也”、《經下》“謂辯無勝必不當”之“當”。譚失之目睫之間，求之千里之外，據《荀子‧不茍篇》楊倞注，釋為合于禮義，真不知言各有“當”者矣。臆測“城上有金”，何不合禮義之有？“不以其之當”者，乃謂傍人聞其言而疑其妄耳。牽引“或然律”，尤可欪笑，蓋耳食此三字，初不解底語也。“或然律”者，每指常然、習然而言 (Frequency, a posteriori calculation of probability)，亞理斯多德早云：“A probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus & thus, is a probability”[6] (Prior Analytics, II. 27, The Basic Works, p. 105; Rhetoric, I. 2: “A Probability is a thing that usually happens”, p. 1332; cf. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, 1967, p. 176: “... every probability judgment is a frequency judgment” etc.; 參觀 Humphrey House, Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 60: “‘Probability’ is ultimately derived from a ‘numerical average of instances’”)。《晏子春秋‧內篇‧諫下》云：“今上山見虎，虎之室也；下澤見蛇，蛇之穴也。”則或然律之謂上城得金，城豈金穴？殆屬偶然而非或然，明矣。《魯連子》（《全上古三代文》卷八）：“古善漁者宿沙，瞿子使漁於山，則雖十宿沙，子不得一魚焉。宿沙非闇於漁道也，彼山者非魚之所生也。”
〇《經上》：“狂，自作也。”《經說上》：“與人，遇；入眾，𢝺。”譚云：“《經說》原作‘佴，與人，遇；人眾，𢝺。’兹改‘佴’為‘狂’，改“人”為‘入’。‘與’，常與也；‘遇’，相得也。狂者志同道合，則相得益彰，若入於大眾，則遁逃之。”按不可通，且必改“與人”為“與狂”而後可。即如所釋，狂而遇狂，各逞己見，予智自雄，不相下而相爭，安能相得乎？“與”字宜作“當”解，參觀《經義述聞》卷十八論“一與一，誰能懼我”條。“遇”者，“迎”也，直前而不却也。狂妄之徒，色厲內荏，見人寡則勇往，見人眾則怯走，與自反而不縮、雖千萬人亦往者，區以別矣。“人眾”不必改為“入眾”。
〇《經上》：“舉，擬實也。”《經說上》：“告，以之名舉彼實也。”譚云：“‘名’即Subject，‘實’即 Predicate，有‘實’有‘名’而成一詞，所謂 Proposition。”按謬甚。“舉”者，所謂Reference；“名”者，所謂 significant, word, name；“實”者，所謂 signifié, referent, thing (參觀 S. Ullmann, Semantics, pp. 55-7)，邏輯學者謂之 Term 及其 Application (the meaning of a term in extension) 與 Signification (the meaning of a term in intension)。此而不解，乃高談辯學，殊可笑詫。【C. Peirce, Collected Papers, V, §484 on “semiosis” as “tri-relatives”.】【陸士衡《文賦‧序》：“恒患意不稱物，文不逮意。”“意”即“舉”，“文”即“名”，“物”即“實”。】《經上》又云：“知、聞、說親，名實合為。”《經說上》云：“所以謂，名也；所謂，實也。名實耦，合也。志行，為也。”譚復申前說，以為：“‘合’者，合而為一‘辭’(Proposition) 也。如云：‘此書是《墨經》’，‘此書’為名，‘《墨經》’為實，是為‘合’(Copula)。”《小取篇》“以名舉實”，譚仍以此詮之，三復而不憚煩，亦見其專愚而不可化矣。《小取篇》此句承上文云：“摹略萬物之然，講求羣言之比”，接以下文云：“以辭抒意”。是“名”者，辭也，羣言之比也，symbol 也；“實”者，意也，萬物之然也，Referent 也；“名實耦”者，言之有物也，控名責實也，adequate, correct 之謂也 (參觀 C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 4th ed., p. 11: “the basic triangles”)。譚氏憑空杜撰“辭”(Proposion) 字，枝節橫生，遂使致知格物之大綱，廢而為比詞綴字之小道。果如所說，則實非《墨經》而名為《墨經》，亦可云“合”矣。
〇《經上》：“必，不已也。”《經說上》：“一然者，一不然者。必，不必也。是、非、必也。”譚云：“即 Ha[sic.]gel’s Dialectic Method。‘然’與‘必’即正，‘不必’與‘不然’即反，正反相持而是非生焉。於是執兩端以為之合，人羣演進，層出不窮，故曰‘不已’。”按按孫仲容《閒話》引《說文》“必，分極也”，譚氏因之，即所謂 Polarity，有正有反而未嘗有合。“以為之合，層出不窮”云云，胥譚氏附會以依託黑格爾者。唯其正反而不能合，是以各執一端，相爭不息，故曰“不已”。《經上》又云：“同異而俱於之一也。”《經說上》云：“二人而俱見是楹也，若事君。”頗類《易‧繫辭》所謂“同歸而殊塗，一致而百慮”，稍近正反而合之旨。孫仲容釋云：“合眾異為一”，是也。而譚忽駁孫謂“同異”應連讀，則此條於全經中獨不界說分疏，而成陳述語氣，實為破例矣。
〇《經上》：“端，體之無序而最前者也。”譚釋筆舌糾繞，略本陳蘭甫、張臯文、孫仲容之說，謂“‘端’最在前，無與相次敘者。”夫“最前”非次敘乎？“無序”就“端”言之：“端”如蘭甫所云“幾何之點”，點無起訖，故無次序。“最前”就“端”之所以為“端”言之：點在綫而成“端”，所謂起點，是“最前”也。【此條當與《經上》“次，無間而不相攖也”，《經說上》“無厚而後可”參觀，同一手眼。運動而分為端，則處處靜止；連貫而分為端，則一一比次矣。皆 Bergson 所謂 “l’habitude de découper” (參觀 La Pensée et le Mouvant, pp. 185-6) 也。《老子》四十三章云：“無有入無間”，言理也；《墨子》“無間”、“無厚”，言形也。貌同心異也。《列子‧湯問篇》“孔周曰：‘吾有三劍，一曰含光，視之不可見，運之不知有。泯然無際，經物而物不覺’”，則“無有入無間”之妙喻也。】
〇《經上》：“彼，不，可。不兩可也。”《經說上》：“凡牛樞非牛，兩也無以，非也。”譚如此斷句，釋云：“‘不，可’猶言‘否，可’。‘樞’即區別。‘以’，用也，猶云不用可、否兩者即非也。”按不知所云。《經說》當讀“兩也”句，“無以非也”句。蓋物之存在，牛為牛，非牛為非牛，兩者區分，各有其是，並立而不能相非。Croce 所謂 “Distinzione”，而尚未達 “Contrarietà” 之境界(Filosofia, Poesia, Storia, pp. 8-9, 48-50)。【Cf. T.K. Seung, Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982), pp. 11 ff. on “binary distinction” & “binary opposition”, & p. 282 referring to Croce.】人之思辨 (cf. R.W. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 118-9)，由彼此而有是非，是此則非彼，不能兩可。故《經說上》又云：“或謂之牛，或謂之非牛，是爭彼也。”葉水心《習學記言序目》卷二論《易》之《睽》“乃不同而非忿鬩，故雖睽而未嘗不合，所謂同而異也，非異而不同也”，即“樞”而非“爭”耳。
〇《經上》：“已，成亡。”《經說上》：“為衣，成也。治病，亡也。”按張臯文曰：“為衣以成為已，治病以亡為已”，深合 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik 所謂 “ein und dasselbe Wort für zwei entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen zu gebrauchen” (Reclams “Universal-Bibliothek”, Bd. I, S. 125) 之旨。“已”之二義乃 “Disjunctive ambiguity”，參觀七五一則論《老子》“反者，道之動”；“反”之二義則 “Conjunctive ambiguity”。
〇《經上》：“名，達、類、私。”《經說上》：“物，達也。有實必待文多也命之；馬，類也，若實也者必以是名也命之；臧，私也，是名也止於是實也。”譚云：“‘達’名為 Genesis [sic.] noun，‘類’名為 Species noun，‘私’名為 Proper noun。茻從四屮，森從三木，此所謂‘文多也命之’。”按信如其說，則“達”名與“類”名何異乎？“類”多不可一一舉其名，故以“達”名概括之，豈重文成字之謂耶？
〇《經上》：“謂，移，舉，加。”《經說上》：“狗犬，命也；狗吠，舉也；叱狗，加也。”譚云：“‘謂’即謂詞，英文‘佛波’(Verb)，‘移謂’乃 noun used as verb，‘舉謂’乃 intransitive verb，‘加謂’乃 transitive verb。”按譚附會西書，誤謬百出，令人代之入地。此條乃其最可笑者，noun used as verb，尤匪夷所思。“犬”字顯非“佛波”，而確為稱狗之“謂”。“謂”者，邏輯學之Predication，亞理斯多德所謂 categories，非謂詞所得而限。“移”與“命”即 what (or substance, genus, species)，“舉”即 what doing (action)，“加”即 what suffering (affection)，參觀 Categories IV (Organon, I, p.17)。此條明以狗為主，故“叱狗”為“加”，“狗吠”為“舉”。使以人為主，則“狗吠”為“加”，人所受於狗也；“叱狗”為“舉”，人所施於狗也。而“移”與“命”當為人，非狗矣。“佛波”云乎哉！
〇《經上》：“同，重、體、合、類。”《經說上》：“二名一實，重同也；不外於兼，體同也；俱處於室，合同也；有以同，類同也。”譚云：“牛羊同為四足之家畜，‘兼’也；同為有角，‘體’也。其角雖不必甚同，然牛羊之‘二’皆為家畜之‘一’，故曰‘不外乎兼’。”按迂曲極矣。此條當與下條《經說》之“不連屬，不體也”及《經上》第二條之“體，分於兼也”合詮之。“體同”者，相連而同屬也。此條循序漸進，由同物異名而同體，以至於異體而同處，終極於異體、異處而同類。譬之頭、尾、蹄、角不相同也，各為牛之一“體”，分於“兼”也，而同屬於一牛之“體”，則又不外於“兼”。言牛若干頭，正與言牛若干尾相同。《大取篇》云：“同類之同，同名之同，同根之同”，“同根之同”即同“體”也。如譚說，則“體同”與“類同”無別矣。
〇《經下》：“景徙，說在改為。”《經說下》：“光至景亡；若在，盡古息。”譚云：“原作‘景不從’，據王壬秋改‘徙’。‘不’字乃衍文。因下句云‘改為’，又云‘亡’、‘盡’，則當曰‘景徙’。莊、列所云，未可據為典要。”按愚妄乃至此耶？唯其“改為”，故可曰“不徙”，後影非前影，新故遞嬗，乃影影之相續，非一影之遷移也。作“從”亦可，謂物動而影未嘗隨之動，以光亡影以亡，而物動如故也。然人則以為影徙，影實不在而以為若在耳。
〇《經下》：“知而不以五路，說在久。”譚云：“‘五路’即五官，‘久’即經驗。”按大誤。“久”，遠也；五官限於耳目所接，唯“知”乃能知遠耳。《經說下》：“久，有窮無窮”，又“行脩以久”，可參觀。
〇《小取篇》：“白馬，馬也；乘白馬，乘馬也。”按以下一大節，皆所謂 “Immediate inference in concreto”。參觀 H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd rev. ed., pp. 247-8)。
〇揮汗書至此，情怠意倦，目瞑手闌矣。
[1] “What kind of times are they, when / A talk about trees is almost a crime / Because it implies silence about so many horrors?” (“To Those Born Later”, trans. John Willett, Ralph Manheim & Erich Fried, Bertolt Brecht: Poems 1913-1956, Routledge, Chapman and Hall).
[3] “Introducing Les Temps Modernes”: “Even if we were as deaf and dumb as pebbles, our very passivity would be an action. The abstention of whoever wanted to devote his life to writing novels about the Hittites would in itself constitute taking a position. The writer is situated in his time; every word he utters has reverberations. As does his silence. I hold Flaubert and the Goncourt brothers responsible for the repression that followed the Commune because they didn’t write a line to prevent it... [No doubt some authors have concerns which are less contemporary, and visions which are less shortsighted. They move through our midst as though they were not there... But they have miscalculated: posthumous glory is always based on a misunderstanding... They have allowed their lives to be stolen from them by immortality.]”
Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956)
