《装卸时间与滞期费》的装卸时间条款-连载（三十二）

《装卸时间与滞期费》第6版

Laytime Clauses 装卸时间条款

Commencement of the obligation to load/discharge 

装/卸货义务的开始

2.229 In a charter providing for customary laytime, it may still be necessary to determine when the approach and carrying voyages come to an end. As will be seen shortly, however, the question as to when the vessel concerned becomes an Arrived ship may be of less significance in this type of charter than in one providing for fixed laytime. 

2.229 若在租船合同中规定了习惯装卸时间，还有必要确定预备航次和载运航次何时结束的时间。然而，很快会发现，在这类租船合同中，有关船舶何时变成抵达船舶这一问题要比固定装卸时间租船合同中的要求次要得多。

2.230 Whilst general principles have been established similar to those applying to fixed laytime, they may be varied by the parties to the charter. As was said by Viscount Cave in United States Shipping Board v. Strick & Co Ltd:  

. . . these rules like all other rules of construction, must yield to the express terms of the contract entered into between the parties; and if the contract contains terms which are inconsistent with the application of the general rules of construction, the contract and not the rules must prevail. 

2.230对于习惯性时间所适用的一般性原则，也类似于固定装卸时间条款中所确立的那些原则，也可能被租船合同双方改动。正如Cave子爵在United States ShippingBoard诉Strick & Co Ltd —案中所说的那样：

……这些解释合同的原则同其他所有的原则一样，都必须让位于当事双方在合同中所订立的明示条文；而且，如果合同中的条文与一般性的合同解释原则相互矛盾时，应该是该合同优先，而不是那些原则。

2.231 Thus, in Bargate Steam Shipping Co Ltd v. Penlee & St Ives Stone Quarries Ltd,  the charter provided that time for discharging was to count from high water at or after arrival at or off the discharging berth. However, such an express provision is comparatively unusual. What is more common is for the charter to specify a berth, dock or port. 

2.231因此，在Bargate Steam Shipping Co Ltd v. Penlee St Ives Stone Quarries Ltd案，租船合同规定：卸货时间从高潮开始计算，无论船舶是在泊、抵达后靠泊或不在泊位上。当然，像这种明示条款相对来讲还是比较少见的。较普遍的租船合同就是订明泊位、码头或港口，即泊位租船合同、码头租船合同或港口租船合同。

2.232 As with a fixed laytime charter, in the case of a berth charter, the vessel must reach her loading or discharging berth before she can be said to have arrived at her specified destination. In Good & Co v. Isaacs,  the Court of Appeal went further and said that a vessel cannot properly be said to be in her berth unless she occupies it by the direction of, or with the assent of, the appropriate harbour authority. If, though she has arrived there, she is not permitted to remain for the purpose of loading or unloading, but is directed by the port authorities to another place, she cannot be said to have arrived so as to impose an obligation upon the charterer. 

2.232若是固定装卸时间的租船合同，如果是泊位租约，船舶必须有在抵达装货或卸货的泊位时才算抵达其指定的目的地。在Good & Co v. Isaacs —案中，上诉法院进一步明确说：船舶只有按照有关码头当局的指示，或者经其批准靠泊后才算抵达泊位，如果，她虽然已到了那里，但却不允许她接着进行装卸货作业，反而港方又安排她移往另一个地方的话，该轮就不能被视为已抵达以至于去强加给承租人卸货的责任。

2.233 In Nelson v. Dahl in the Court of Appeal,  Brett LJ made a detailed analysis of the earlier cases relating to when the voyage ends, both under fixed and customary laytime charters. He concluded that, under both types of charter, the specified destination was reached when the vessel concerned entered the dock. It was not, however, necessary for the vessel to berth within the dock for this to happen. 

2.233上诉法院审理Nelson v. Dahl案时，Brett大法官对早期案例中在固定和习惯性装卸时间租船合同中有关航程时间结束的问题进行了更详尽的分析。他总结道：根据这两种形式的租船合同，当有关船舶驶入码头港池时就视为抵达了指定的目的地。而船舶没有必要一定要靠在港池内的泊位上。

2.234 The question of the commencement of the charterer’s obligation to discharge was one of the issues raised in Hulthen v. Stewart & Co,  although the main issue was whether, because the usual time for discharging a timber ship could be quantified in terms of so many days, this meant that the charter was effectively a fixed laytime one, a contention rejected by all the courts that considered the case. 

2.234 在Hulthen v. Stewart & Co案，提出的其中一个争议是承租人的卸货义务从何时开始这一问题。当然，该案的主要争议是：由于木材船通常的卸货时间被量化限定为若干天，这是否就意味着该租船合同属于一份固定装卸时间合同呢？这一看法遭到了所有审理该案的法院的否决。

2.235 The facts were that the Anton, the ship concerned, arrived at Gravesend, having been ordered to Surrey Commercial Docks. Owing to congestion there was a delay before the ship could enter the docks and a further delay before she berthed. The cargo was timber and the customary method of discharge of such cargo was into lighters or onto the quay. All the courts agreed that, although Gravesend was within the Port of London, the Anton was not an Arrived ship on arrival there. At first instance, Phillimore J held that ‘‘she was an arrived ship only when she reached a place at which she could discharge’’. In a later case, it was suggested that this meant that the Anton did not reach her specified destination until she arrived in berth,  although discharge into lighters was a method often used and it would therefore seem that Phillimore J’s criterion would have been met on arrival in dock. However, at the time of this case, the question of when the specified destination was reached in a port charter was one that had still not been finally settled. That happened in Leonis Steamship Co v. Rank (No 1),  which is usually taken as the start point of most modern considerations on the question of the commencement of laytime in a port charter. The case concerned a fixed laytime charter, although many of the earlier authorities considered were customary laytime charters. Neither the Leonis case nor The Johanna Oldendorff,  a more recent decision of the House of Lords, drew any distinction between customary and fixed laytime charters on the question of when a vessel becomes an Arrived ship, and if there ever was any difference, it is unlikely that it still remains. In a customary laytime charter, which is a port charter, the specified destination will be reached when, if she cannot proceed direct to a berth, she anchors within the port limits at the usual anchorage for ships of that sort, so that she is at the immediate and effective disposition of the charterer.  

2.235 该案的案情是：被租用的Anton轮在抵达英国Gravesend港后，又被指示前往Surrey商业码头。由于港口拥挤，在她得以驶入港口之前发生了延迟并且在靠好之前又耽搁了一段时间。该轮装的货物是原木，而这类货物通常的卸货方式是卸至驳船或岸边码头上。所有的审判法庭均认同：尽管Gravesend属于伦敦港的范围，但Anton轮仍然不能视为抵达船舶到达那里。初审时，Phillimore法官判定：‘只有当她抵达了她能够进行卸货作业的地方才能被视为抵达船’。在后来的某个案子中，曾建议说，这意味着Amon轮只有抵达泊位才算抵达其指定的目的地，尽管通常使用的方法是将这种货物卸往驳船，然而好像是在船舶抵达港池就应该是满足Phillimore法官的这一标准。不过，在当初审理该案的时候，在港口租船合同下，船舶何时才算抵达指定目的地这一问题还没有最终定论。这发生在Leonis Steamship Co v. Rank (No.1)—案中，这经常被认为是，在港口租船合同下，对装卸时间起算这一问题进行现代思考的起点。尽管有许多早期判例探讨的是习惯性装卸时间的租船合同，但本案涉及的是固定装卸时间的租船合同。不论对Leonis案，还是Johanna Oldendorff案，还有最近上议院的判决，均未对何时才算抵达船舶这一问题在习惯性和固定装卸时间的租约之间的差异做出区分，而且，即便有差别的话，大概也不可能再存在了。根据习惯性装卸时间的租船合同，如果它是一份港口租船合同的话，当船舶不能直接靠泊，而只能在港口范围内的这类船舶通常的锚泊地拋锚，于是她就处于承租人立即马上和有效的支配之下，她就算是已经抵达了指定的目的地。