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以前看过一篇转载传阅很多的文章《巴菲特和芒格谈估值》，今天终于找到的了原版英文的出处。 来自于1997年伯克希尔股东大会下午场的第2个问题。 原文确实非常非常精彩，值得反反复复阅读。 对于这种非常经典的文章，我是一定要去阅读英文原版的。 另外， 雪球用户“乐趣”在2012年的时候就结合茅台写过读后感，同样非常经典。 下面第一部分是原版英文以及对应的中文翻译，特别感谢雪球@一朵喵 的精彩翻译。 第二部分是@乐趣 的原版文章，放在一起，方便学习查阅。 $贵州茅台(SH600519)$ $格力电器(SZ000651)$ ============================================= 2、如何购买一门生意（★★★） 股东：我是弗雷德·库克，来自科罗拉多州博尔德。 这是一个关于内在价值的问题。这个个问题希望你俩都能回答，过去你们曾写过关于这个问题的答案，这次也许你们会想出不同的答案。 你写了很多关于内在价值的东西，并且表明你试图在年度报告中给股东提供足够的工具，这样他们就能做出自己的决定。 我希望你们能在此基础上再扩展一下。首先，你认为在伯克希尔年报或其他你审阅过的年报中，决定内在价值的重要工具是什么? 其次，您在应用这些工具时使用哪些规则、原则或标准? 最后，这个过程，也就是这些工具的使用、标准的应用，是如何与你之前描述的筛选标准联系起来的呢? AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’m Fred Cooker (PH) from Boulder, Colorado. And this is a question about intrinsic value. And it’s a question for both of you because you have written that, perhaps, you would come up with different answers. You write and speak a great deal about intrinsic value, and you indicate that you try to give shareholders the tools in the annual report so they can come to their own determination. What I’d like you to do is expand upon that a little bit. First of all, what do you believe to be the important tools, either in the Berkshire annual report or other annual reports that you review, in determining intrinsic value? Secondly, what rules or principles or standards do you use in applying those tools? And lastly, how does that process, that is the use of the tools, the application of the standards, relate to what you have previously described as the filters you use in determining your valuation of a company? 巴菲特：如果我们能够洞悉任何企业的未来——比方说——100年或者企业灭亡时在企业和股东之间的现金流入以及现金流出，然后以适当的利率——这个我等会再谈，并将其折现到现在，我们就会得到内在价值的数值。 WARREN BUFFETT: If we could see, you know, looking at any business, what its future cash inflows or outflows from the business to the owners — or from the owners — would be over the next, we’ll call it, a hundred years, or until the business is extinct, and then could discount that back at the appropriate interest rate, which I’ll get to in a second, that would give us a number for intrinsic value. 这和计算一张贴着许多息票、100年后到期的债券的价值很相似。如果你知道息票有多少，就能通过以适当的风险利率折现来计算它的内在价值。 或者你可以将息票率为5%的债券与息票率为7%的债券进行比较。每张债券的价值都不一样，因为它们的息票率不同。 In other words, it would be like looking at a bond that had a whole bunch of coupons on it that was due in a hundred years. And if you could see what those coupons are, you can figure the value of that bond compared to government bonds, if you want to stick an appropriate risk rate in. Or you can compare one government bond with 5 percent coupons to another government bond with 7 percent coupons. Each one of those bonds has a different value because they have different coupons printed on them. 其实企业也有息票，这些息票未来会发生变化，只不过没有印在股票上。因此，企业未来的息票要由投资者自己来估计。 就像我们以前所说的那样，像高科技企业这样的公司，我们一点都不知道其未来的息票是多少。 Businesses have coupons that are going to develop in the future, too. The only problem is they aren’t printed on the instrument. And it’s up to the investor to try to estimate what those coupons are going to be over time. As we have said, in high-tech businesses or something like that, we don’t have the faintest idea what the coupons are going to be. 但是当我们找到一家我们认为自己相当懂的企业时，我们就会努力考察它的未来，并计算它未来的息票是多少。事实上，我们可以说是试图现在就把这些未来的息票打印出来，这就是我们判断一家企业10年或20年后的价值所采取的方法。 When we get into businesses where we think we can understand them reasonably well, we are trying to print the coupons out. We are trying to figure out what businesses are going to be worth in ten or 20 years. 当我们于1972年买下喜诗糖果的时候，我们当时不得不在以下方面得出结论：我们能否弄明白经营的竞争环境、喜诗糖果的优势以及劣势、今后10年、20年或30年这家企业的情况会如何。 如果你试着评估内在价值，就会发现全都与现金流有关。 When we bought See’s Candy in 1972, we had to come to the judgment as to whether we could figure out the competitive forces that would operate, the strengths and weaknesses of the company, and how that would look over a ten or 20 or 30-year period. And if you attempt to assess intrinsic value, it all relates to cash flows. 当前在任何一个投资对象中投入现金的唯一原因，是你期待将来可以取出现金，不是通过将投资卖给他人(因为这是一种十足的狗咬狗[who beats who]游戏)，而是通过你投资的资产的产出。 购买一座农场是这样，买一套公寓也是这样，购买一家企业同样如此。 The only reason for putting cash into any kind of an investment now is because you expect to take cash out. Not by selling it to somebody else, because that’s just a game of who beats who, but, in a sense, by what the asset, itself, produces. That’s true if you’re buying a farm. It’s true if you’re buying an apartment house. It’s true if you’re buying a business. 你提到了我们的筛选标准。我们不知道有些企业10年或20年后价值几何，甚至连一个有把握的猜测也提供不了。 显然，我们不认为我们对企业价值的估算能够精确到小数点后第二位或者第三位。不过，对于某些企业，我们还是十拿九稳的。 And the filters you describe. There are a number of filters which say to us we don’t know what that business is going to be worth in ten or 20 years. And we can’t even make an educated guess. Obviously, we don’t think we know to three decimal places, or two decimal places, or anything like that, precisely what’s going to be produced. But we have a high degree of confidence that we’re in the ballpark with certain kinds of businesses. 我们设计筛选标准的目的就是为了确保我们投对企业。我们基本上使用无风险的、期限较长的政府债券的利率作为折现率。 投资就是今天投出去钱，为了在将来收获更多——不是通过将投资的资产卖给其他人，而是通过资产自身的产出。 The filters are designed to make sure we’re in those kinds of businesses. We, basically, use long-term, risk-free government bond-type interest rates to think back in terms of what we should discount at. And, you know, that’s what the game of investment is all about. Investment is putting out money to get more money back later on from the asset. And not by selling it to somebody else, but by what the asset, itself, will produce. 如果你是投资者，就会关注你所投资的资产——对我们而言是企业——未来的表现。 如果你是投机者，主要关注的是资产的价格未来将会怎样，而不管资产自身的未来表现。而投机不是我们的游戏。 If you’re an investor, you’re looking at what the asset — you’re looking at what the asset is going to do — in our case, businesses. If you’re a speculator, you’re primarily focusing on what the price of the object is going to do independent of the business. And that’s not our game. 我们知道，如果我们对企业的判断是正确的，将会赚很多钱。如果判断是错误的，就不会有任何希望——我们不指望赚钱。 说到评估伯克希尔的价值，我们试着告诉你们尽可能多的关于我们企业的信息，所有关键的因素。 我们在年报中介绍我们企业所使用的方法和指标，与查理和我在考察其他企业时所用的一样。 So we figure if we’re right about the business, we’re going to make a lot of money. And if we’re wrong about the business, we don’t have any hopes — we don’t expect to make money. And in looking at Berkshire, we try to tell you as much as possible as we can about our business, of the key factors. Those are the things that Charlie and I — With the things we put in our report about those businesses are the things that we look at ourselves. 所以，如果查理和伯克希尔一点关系都没有，但他在看了我们的财报之后，得到的内在价值肯定和他在伯克希尔待了这么多年得出的结果差不多一样，至少我是这么认为的。 在评估伯克希尔内在价值方面，该有的信息都有了，我们给你们的信息也是——假如我们的位置调换的话——我们想从你们那里得到的信息。 So if Charlie had nothing to do with Berkshire but he looked at our report, he would probably, in my view, he would come to pretty much the same idea of intrinsic value that he would come to from being around it, you know, for X number of years. The information should be there. We give you the information that, if the positions were reversed, we would want to get from you. 像可口可乐、吉列以及迪斯尼这样的企业，你所需的信息在年报中也是应有尽有。你需要了解它们的业务，在日常生活中就可以获得这方面的知识。 这一点在一些高科技企业中是做不到的，但在有些企业中你可以做到。然后，你就可以坐下来，描绘这些企业的未来蓝图。 查理？ And in companies like Coca-Cola or Gillette or Disney or those kind of businesses, you will see the information in the reports. You have to have some understanding of what they’re doing. But you have that in your everyday activities. You’ll get that kind of knowledge. You won’t get it, you know, in terms of some high-tech company. But you’ll get it with those kind of companies. And, then, you sit down and you try to print out the future. Charlie? 芒格：我认为，投资筛选标准是机会成本是一个简单的理念。 如果你已经有了一个可以大笔下注的投资机会，且与你看到的其他98%的机会相比，你更喜欢这个机会，你就可以把其余98%的机会剔掉，因为你已经知道更好的机会了。 因此，有很多机会可供投资的人获得的投资通常比机会较少的人好，使用机会成本这个理念来筛选可以作出更好的投资决策。 CHARLIE MUNGER: I would argue that one filter that’s useful in investing is the simple idea of opportunity cost. If you have one opportunity that you already have available in large quantity, and you like it better than 98 percent of the other things you see, well, you can just screen out the other 98 percent because you already know something better. So the people who have a lot of opportunities tend to make better investments than people that don’t have a lot of opportunities. And people who have very good opportunities, and using a concept of opportunity cost, they can make better decisions about what to buy. 持有这种态度，你会得到一个集中度非常高的投资组合——这个我们不介意。我们的做法如此之简单，可是效仿我们的人却很少，我不明白这是为什么。伯克希尔的股东倒是普遍效法我们。他们全都学会了这一点。 但它不是投资管理行业的标准做法，甚至连一些伟大的大学和聪明的机构也不这么做。 这就引出了一个非常有趣的问题：如果我们是对的，为什么大错特错的著名企业是如此之多?（笑声） With this attitude, you get a concentrated portfolio, which we don’t mind. That practice of ours, which is so simple, is not widely copied. I do not know why. Now, it’s copied among the Berkshire shareholders. I mean, all of you people have learned it. But it’s not the standard in investment management, even at great universities and other intellectual institutions. Very interesting question. If we’re right, why are so many eminent places so wrong? (Laughter) 巴菲特：关于这个问题，有几个可能的答案。(笑声) 态度很重要——我的意思是——如果有人向我们推销一家企业，我们脑子里想到的第一件事是，“我们更愿意买人这家企业，还是更愿意增持可口可乐?我们更愿意购买这家企业，还是更愿意增持吉列?” WARREN BUFFETT: There are several possible answers to that question. (Laughter) The attitude, though — I mean, if somebody shows us a business, you know, the first thing that goes through our head is would we rather own this business than more Coca-Cola? Would we rather own it than more Gillette? 不拿这些未知的新企业与你非常确定的企业进行比较是疯狂的。你能找到的、未来前景和可口可乐一样确定的公司极少。因此，我们想购买那些确定程度接近可口可乐的公司。然后，我们想弄清楚购买新企业是否比增持我们已经持有的公司更好。 如果每一个管理者都这样做，在收购他们从来没有听说过不相关行业的企业之前，就问自己：“收购这家企业会比回购我们自己的股票更好吗?比购买可口可乐的股票更好吗?”如果他们这样做的话，兼并收购交易将会少很多很多。 It’s crazy not to compare it to things that you’re very certain of. There’s very few businesses that we’ll find that we’re certain of the future about as companies such as that. And therefore, we will want companies where the certainty gets close to that. And, then, we’ll want to figure that we’re better off than just buying more of those. If every management, before they bought a business in some unrelated deal that they might not have even heard of, you know, more than a short time before that’s being promoted to them, if they said, “Is this better than buying in our own stock, you know? Is this better than even buying, you know, buying Coca-Cola stock or something,” there’d be a lot fewer deals done. 但不知是什么原因，他们似乎没有这么做——而我们会这么做，会将新的企业与我们认为我们能够得到的、近乎完美的企业进行对比。 查理，说点啥吧？ But they don’t — they tend not to measure — we try to measure against what we regard as close to perfection as we can get. Charlie, anything? 芒格：过去，内在价值这个概念使用起来要比现在容易得多，因为有许多许多股票的售价在清算价值 的50%以下。 的确，在伯克希尔的历史上，我们购买的有些证券的价格只有清算价值的20%。 过去，本·格雷厄姆的追随者只要用盖革计数器对美国的公司进行计算，就能找到一些让他们心动的证券。只要你对企业的整体市场价格稍微懂一点，就能很容易地发现你的买入价相对于内在价值打了很大的折扣。 不管管理团队有多糟糕，如果你的买价只有资产价值的50%甚或30%，你依然可以赚很多钱。 CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I will say this, that the concept of intrinsic value used to be a lot easier, because there were all kinds of stocks that were selling for 50 percent or less of the amount at which you could’ve easily liquidated the whole corporation if you owned the whole corporation. Indeed, in the history of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve bought things at 20 percent of then-liquidating value. And in the old days, the Ben Graham followers could run their Geiger counters over corporate America. And they could spill out a few things. And you could easily see, if you were at all familiar with the market prices of whole corporations, which you were buying at a huge discount. Well, no matter how bad the management, if you’re buying at 50 percent of asset value or 30 percent or so on down, you has a lot going for you. 但是随着投资者逐渐聪明起来，且随着股票的表现如此之好，好的股票，股价通常会越来越高，以前那种投资方法越来越难赚到钱了。 如今为了找到价格相对于内在价值出现折扣的证券，这些简单的投资方法一般来说不管用了。你需要采用沃伦的思维方式，而这难得多。 And as the world has wised up and as stocks have behaved so well for people, good stocks, generally, have gone to higher and higher prices. That game gets much harder. Now, to find something at a discount from intrinsic value, those simple systems, ordinarily, don’t work. You’ve got to get into Warren’s kind of thinking. And that is a lot harder. 如果你从良好的普通教育中掌握了几个基本的思想，你就能很好地预测一些企业的未来表现。我在南加州大学商学院演讲中说的就是这个意思。 换句话说，根据几个简单的基本因素来抽丝剥茧地进行分析，我们会发现可口可乐是一家很简单的公司。 其实理解好市多也不是那么难。你知道—— 你必须要了解人类的行为。有一些基本的模型，这些模型很简单，比数量机械理论容易掌握多了。你必须得懂一些东西，要真的懂。 I think you can predict the future in a few places best if you understand a few basic ideas that come from a good general education. And that’s what I was talking about in that talk I gave at the USC Business School. In other words, Coca-Cola’s a simple company if it’s stripped down and analyzed in terms of some elemental forces. CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not hard to understand Costco, either, you know — There are certain fundamental models out there that do not take — you don’t have the kind of ability that quantum mechanics requires. You just have to know a few simple things and really know them. 巴菲特：当查理说清算价值的时候，他的意思不是关掉企业清盘后得到的价值。而是其他人为了得到现金流愿意支付的价格—— 芒格：对的。 WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie talks about “liquidating value,” he’s not talking about closing up the enterprise. But he’s talking about what somebody else would pay for that stream of cash, too, I mean — CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 巴菲特：举例来说，你可以看看1974年资本城购买的一些电视台。这些电视台的价值是它们售价的好几倍。这并不是因为你关闭电视台可以得到这么多价值，而是因为它们的收入流值这么多钱。这完全是因为股市一片低迷。 就像我所说的那样，如果协商的话，你可以以几倍于股价的价格出售公司的资产。还免费获得了一支优秀的管理团队。 WARREN BUFFETT: You could’ve looked at a collection of television stations owned by Cap Cities, for example, in the early to mid — well, 1974. It would’ve been worth, we’ll say, four times what the company was selling for. Not because you’d close the stations, but just their stream of income was worth that to somebody else. It’s just that the marketplace was very distressed — depressed. Although, like I say, on a negotiated basis, you could have gone and sold the properties for four times what the company was selling for. And you got wonderful management. 股市会发生这种事情。以后还将发生。但投资和计算内在价值还有一个部分是，当你计算完一项资产的内在价值之后，计算结果告诉你“不要买”，这时你不能仅仅因为其他人认为这项资产的价格会上涨、或者因为你的朋友最近轻松发了一笔横财等与此类似的理由而买入。 你必须丢掉没有通过筛选的投资机会。最近能够赚钱的想法少之又少，你必须得做好准备，不碰任何你不懂的投资，我认为这是一个很大的障碍。 I mean, those things happen in markets. They will happen again. But part of investing and calculating intrinsic values is if you get the wrong answer when you get through — in other words, if it says don’t buy, you can’t buy just because somebody else thinks it’s going to up or because your friends have made a lot of easy money lately or anything of the sort. You just — you have to be able to walk away from anything that doesn’t work. And very few things work these days. You also have to walk away from anything you don’t understand which, in my case, is a big handicap. 芒格：沃伦，如今投资变得更难了，你应该同意我的看法吧，对吗? CHARLIE MUNGER: But you would agree, wouldn’t you, Warren, that it’s much harder now? 巴菲特：对。不过我也认为过去40年来几乎任何时候，在这个舞台上，我们都可以说投资变得更难了。（笑声） 但如今投资更难赚钱，难得多了。 现在更难赚钱的部分原因是我们管理的资金量。如果我们管理的资金只有10万美元，且我们真的需要钱——我们的回报前景将比现在好多了。道理很简单，如果我们管理的资金量较小，潜在的投资范围就大多了。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But I would also agree that almost anytime over the last 40 years that we’ve been up on a podium, we would’ve said it was much harder in the past, (laughs) too. But it is harder now. It’s way harder. Part of it being harder now, too, is the amount of the capital we run. I mean, if we were running $100,000, our prospects for returns would be — and we really needed the money — our prospects for return would be considerably better than they are running Berkshire. It’s very simple. Our universe of possible ideas would expand by a huge factor. 现在，我们考察的很多投资机会也受到了其他很多人的关注。而在以前，很多时候我们关注的机会，其他人几乎看都不看。 不过过去也有过例外。当我们考察一些投资的时候，全世界对待这些投资就像疯了一样，这对我们来说肯定是一大帮助。 We are looking at things today that, by their nature, a lot of people are looking at. And there were times in the past when we were looking at things that very few people were looking at. But there were other times in the past when we were looking at things where the whole world was just looking at them kind of crazy. And that’s a decided help. ================= 用《巴菲特和芒格谈估值》审视我们的持股 (2012-10-07 ) 今天在@基金行业网 的新浪微博上看到一篇《巴菲特和芒格谈估值》，感觉非常的精彩。尽管其中的绝大多数观点，我早已熟悉，但这并不影响我重温它们时的充实和快乐。据说价值投资人普遍长寿，为什么呢？我想，时常保持的内心宁静和愉悦一定是其中的重要因素。 我还认为，此文可以当做真正信奉巴式价值投资理念的投资人检测自己手中持股的经典范本。于是，我就以身作则，用文中的几个重要理念，来审视我的最重要持仓——贵州茅台。 1、股票类似于100年后到期的债券，不同股票票息率不同。更要命的是不同企业，寿命不同。 我在去年底一篇博文《如意算盘》中提到，茅台在停止成长之后，其股票的属性将类似于一只永不到期的债券。同时我固执地认为：茅台公司的“停止增长”，实际上是“增长等于通胀率”。茅台酒无与伦比的时间属性，使得公司产量销量到达极限之后，其售价的增长一定能跟上CPI的涨幅。 剩下的问题是：茅台公司的寿命会有多长？有人拿地震说事。我说，茅台镇发生地震的概率，和每一个投资人家里发生地震的概率是一样的，所以这个因素可以丢在一边。价值投资人投资一家公司，未必都要持有20年或以上，但一定要有20年以上看公司的眼光。审视我们的持股，问问自己，我持有的公司20年，甚至100年以后还在不在？会如何？ 2、股票内在价值全部都与未来现金流有关。 段永平把价值投资的精髓，浓缩成以下两句话：买股票就是买公司，买公司就是买其未来现金流（的折现）。高人之间，道是想通的。对于茅台股票，我相信自己可以比较清晰地看到现在、将来、甚至遥远的未来，它身上流淌着的澎湃的现金流。审视我们的持股：现金，还是陷阱？ 3、投资的本质不是“狗咬狗”游戏，而是你投资的资产的产出。 把“who beats who”翻成“狗咬狗”有点损，但似乎准确形象。股票交易并不产生新的价值，只有公司的资产的产出才能整体创造额外价值。眼下的市场，趋势投资为什么越来越难做了？一个重要的原因是它的盈利模式是掏别人的口袋。可是，经过一轮又一轮的洗劫，傻子的口袋已经基本空了，而剩下的聪明人，把自己的口袋看得越来越紧了。 4、投资的精髓：确定性。投资者关注的是资产，投机者关注的是资产价格。 确定性其实就是未来现金流的预期的确定。投资茅台股票，我非常在乎我的持股在公司总股本中的占比，也就是说，我首要关注的是我的资产比例，而不是这一资产在股市中时时变动的价格。如果你过于关心自己的“身家”，时刻控制着市值波动的“风险”，天天比较着自己的收益率在市场中的“排名”，那么，就不是巴菲特所认为的“投资者”。从这一点上说，以公墓基金为代表的机构投资人，与“投资”，其实还是有距离的。 5、运用机会成本理念可以更好地进行投资决策。 经济学上的“机会成本”是指：为了得到某种东西所必须放弃的东西。巴菲特芒格最喜欢拿可口可乐股票说事。如果买了其它股票，而不能得到相当于持有可口可乐的收益，那么，这个投资决策就有问题。 今年6月份在我的一篇博文《投资不是技术活》中，主持人问我：我很好奇，那等于您现在的状态是，看了茅台以后，看别的股票都看不上了？我的回答：如果用茅台的确定性、稳定性，成长性以及市盈率作为尺子来衡量，其它个股确实都上不了尺寸。我的这一回答，其实说的就是机会成本的问题。 6、“收购这家企业会比回购我们自己的股票更好吗？比购买可口可乐的股票更好吗？”我们想弄清楚购买新企业是否比增持我们已经持有的公司更好。 前段时间，茅台股东之间的一个热烈讨论话题是“茅台股份是否应该把习酒并进来”？我是持否定意见的。原因很简单：习酒再怎么好，也比不上现在上市的茅台股份。去年一整年，我都在不断地增持二级市场股票，不是我不考虑别的投资标的，而是比来比去，确实觉得与其购买新的，不如增持已有的。 投资者在审视持股时，必须问问自己：还有没有比这些更好的，同时自己也是能搞懂的公司？如果有，那你的持仓就不是最完美的。 7、评估企业价值可以享受知识日积月累的优势，所以我们喜欢不发生变化的企业。 能力圈要求投资者必须搞懂自己所持有的公司。那么，怎么才算搞懂呢？当然是越深入越好。公司的运行，公司的产品最好不要变化，但投资者对公司的认识却是要不断地进步和深入。比如，投资茅台股票的，却从来没有喝过茅台酒，或者喝了也没觉得有什么好，那么这一投资是有瑕疵的。 我的一个朋友说过一句让我称之为“经典并精彩”的话：喝茅台酒的人是不会卖出茅台股票的！另一方面，经常有人指责茅台酒是“买的不喝，喝的不买”。我想说的是：如果说这话的人既不喝，也不买茅台酒，那么他得出的茅台股票高估的结论就很不地道了。 审视我们手中的持股，这些个公司经常发生变化吗？我们对公司的认知需要不断地深入，并且随着我们的深入，对持股公司是不是越来越有信心的呢？若是，OK；若否，有问题。 8、安全边际需要多大，取决于潜在的风险。你对投资的企业越懂，潜在的风险就越小。 在这里，巴式投资的“能力圈”和“安全边际”的两大投资理念被打通了，融合了，也实用了。巴菲特喜欢所投资的企业不发生变化，而我们也景仰巴菲特的投资理念的始终如一，脚踏实际。 9、我犯过的最大的错误或者说错误类型是，当我发现某企业是伟大的企业时，我不肯支付较高的价格，或者在它的股价涨得较高的时候，我没能继续买入。 当“安全边际”PK“伟大企业”时，谁应该退一步呢？巴菲特这一说法给出了答案。 我经常听我认识的人抱怨：茅台的确是好股票，但是现在太贵了，要是象你一样前几年买就好了。我总是笑而不答（因为不叫人买股票是我坚持的原则）。但是，心里相信：今后10年或20年，他们还会不断地重复着这一说法。 10、估值的思维很简单，估值的进行很艰难。 我记得巴菲特说过：价值投资，要么马上领悟，要么一辈子搞不懂。这与智商学识等等，没有关系。 现金流折现的准确估值，几乎是“不可能完成的任务”。但是，不能因为无法精确，就否定思维方式。只要方向正确，距离需要到达的目标只会越来越近，这不就是价值投资者心中的愿望吗？ “买股票就是买公司，买公司就是买其未来现金流（的折现）”。这就是投资的真谛！ |
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