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1996年6月，伯克希尔的主席，沃伦·爱德华·巴菲特面向A级股和B级股股东发布了名为“股东手册”的小手册。手册的目的是解释伯克希尔的基本经营投资原则。以下是一份修正并补充后的新版本。 股东相关的商业原则OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES在1983年当我们收购蓝筹印花时，我写下了13条股东相关的商业原则，目的是为了让新股东了解我们的管理方法。正如名字所提到的“原则”，这13条在如今依然有效，并且将在这里以斜体字标明。 At the time of the Blue Chip merger in 1983, I set down 13 owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach. As is appropriate for “principles,” all 13 remain alive and well today, and they are stated here in italics. 1. 虽然我们的结构是公司，我们的态度是合伙人制度。查理芒格和我将我们的股东视为有限合伙人，而我们则是一般合伙人。（虽然如果考虑到由于我们的持股比例，我们也是有限合伙人。）我们不将公司本身视为公司资产的最终持有者，而是将公司作为我们的股东持有资产的载体。 1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as ownerpartners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets. 查理和我希望你不会将股票认为是价格不断浮动的一张纸，在某些会让你紧张的经济或者政治事件出现时你就会抛售。我们希望你能够将自己视为公司的永久股东，就像是你和家庭成员共同买入一套公寓或者是一片农场时那样。对于我们而言，我们不会将伯克希尔的股东认为是毫无差别的，不断变化的人群，而是一群共同投资者愿意将会影响他们未来的资金放在我们手中。 Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives. 有证据证明大部分的伯克希尔股东都接受了这样的长期合伙的概念。每年的百分比周转率相比于其他大型美国公司的股票来说相当低，即使不考虑我持有的那一部分股份。 The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation. 在效果上，我们的股东对于伯克希尔股票的处理方式就像是伯克希尔对于她所投资的公司的处理方式一样。比如说，作为可口可乐或者是美国运通的股东，我们认为伯克希尔是这两个优秀公司的有限合伙人。我们衡量我们投资成功的标志是长期以来的公司的进展，而不是每个月的股票价格变动。实际上，即使在未来几年内不允许股票交易，没有股票报价，我们也完全不会在意。如果我们对长期的发展感到乐观，短期的价格变化除了能带给我们以优惠价格追加更多股份的机会以外，对我们来说没有意义。 In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price. 2. 和伯克希尔股东为导向的理念相契合的是，我们的经理的大部分净值都属于我们旗下公司们的股份。我们和股东站在同一战线上。 2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking. 查理家庭的大部分净值属于伯克希尔的股票；我自己则是98%。额外的，我的许多亲戚，我妹妹们和堂表兄弟姐妹，大部分的净值属于伯克希尔股票。 Charlie’s family has the majority of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have more than 98%. In addition, many of my relatives – my sisters and cousins, for example – keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock. 查理和我对于这种将鸡蛋放在一个篮子里的情况习以为常。我们认为伯克希尔商业质量和多元化有独特优势，无论她涉及的成员公司的持股多寡。 Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance. 查理和我无法承诺投资收益。但是我们可以保证你未来的收益和我们会是一样的结果。我们对于丰厚的薪酬或者是股权，或者是从股东身上获益没有兴趣。我们想要赚钱的情况是我们的股东也能按比例获利。更多的，假如我做了某些愚蠢的决定，我可以从你们也在按比例的损失这件事中获得一些心理安慰。 Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours. 3. 我们的长期收益目标（存在一些后面会提到的例外情况）是最大化伯克希尔每股的内在商业价值的平均年化收益。我们并不从伯克希尔整体的规模的表现或者是经济影响力考虑，而是着重于每股的变化。我们认为在未来，每股的收益表现会逐渐减弱。当管理的资金额度增加时，这种情况会浮现。但是，我们觉得如果未能超出美国大型企业的收益平均值是一件令人失望的事情。 3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future – a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation. 4. 我们的首要的投资偏好是直接持有一系列多元化的，能够产生资金并且能持续提供超出美国平均值资本收益率的公司。我们的第二备选是通过我们的保险公司在公开市场上买入拥有这种特性的公司的一部分股票。股票的价格，市场成交量，以及保险公司的资金需求决定着每一年的资产分配情况。 4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation. 在近些年我们进行了一系列的收购。虽然未来有些年份的收购事件不会像现在这么多，我们期望在未来数十年收购的频率会增加，并期望会出现大型的收购事件。如果这些收购的质量能和历史上曾发生过的相似，那么伯克希尔足以能够从此颇为获益。 In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served. 对于我们的挑战是在我们已经快速产生了现金流之后如何以相同速度找到新的投资想法。在这一点看来，一个表现低迷的股票市场会对我们产生巨大的优势。原因之一，这些时期内完全收购公司的价格会降低。原因之二，低迷的市场能让我们的保险公司以优惠的价格买入优秀的公司的股份，这也包括增持已有的股份。原因之三，历史上，优秀公司一直都是自己的股票的长期买家，这意味着我们能像他们一样都能从低价中受益。 The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses – including additional pieces of businesses we already own – at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy. 总体来说，伯克希尔和他的长期股东将会从一个低迷的股票市场中收益更多，就像是去超市买食品的人能从折扣中获益。当股市剧跌时 - 而这会经常发生 – 别恐慌或者哀悼。这对伯克希尔是好事。 Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets – as it will from time to time – neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire. 5. 因为我们双管齐下的投资策略，以及传统会计方法的限制，合成财务报表的收入可能反映的并不是我们真实的财务表现。查理和我，既是有限合伙人又是一般合伙人，基本上不在意合成财务报表的数据。尽管如此，我们会通报每一个控股的大型的公司的收益。那些我们认为非常重要的数据。这些数据，和其他一系列我们投资的公司的信息，应该能够帮助你了解他们的经营情况。 5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them. 简单来说，我们将会给你那些重要的年报的数据和其他重要数据。查理和我会仔细留意我们的公司的表现，我们也会努力了解每个公司的背后的市场经济情况。比如说，我们的子公司中所处的行业是否出现了利好或利空的情况。查理和我需要了解哪种情况占多数，并且以此调整我们的市场预期。我们也会将我们的结论公布给股东。 To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you. 长期来看，绝大部分的子公司的表现都超出了我们的预期。但是有时候我们也会发现一些令人失望的情况，我们会尽可能坦白这些信息，就像我们和你们坦白我们的好消息一样。当我们使用了非传统的计量方法记录我们的进展时 – 比如说，你会在我们的年报中读到关于浮存金的信息 – 我们会尽可能解释这些概念，并且告诉你们为什么这些信息很重要。换一句话说，我们相信，通过告知你们我们的分析方法，你们不仅可以能够评估伯克希尔子公司的质量，而且能够评估我们的管理和资产分配方法。 Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress – for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float” – we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation. 6. 会计上的结果并不会影响我们的经营或者资产分配的决策。当收购成本是相似的，我们宁愿收购那些，无法被财务报表记录的，但能带来2美元的收益的公司，也不愿意收购那些，能被财务报表记录，但只能带来1美元收益的公司。这其实是我们常常在收购中需要面对的选择题，因为完全收购一家公司（收益能够完全被财务报表记录）比起部分买入时（收益大部分无法被记录）的收购成本要按比例高出一倍。总体来看长期而言，我们期望未计入财务报表的收入能以股票的价格上涨的形式反映在我们的内在价值中。 6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains. 我们发现长期来看，来自我们的被投资公司的净利润不论是否分配的，从总体上对于伯克希尔都是同样有利的，尽管如果分配到伯克希尔就意味着能够记录在伯克希尔的财务报表中。这样优异的结果源自于我们的大部分被投资公司都是能够将资本完善利用的优秀公司。他们要么将资本用于自身经营，要么用于回购自己的股份。很显然，并不是每一次资本的决策都能有利于作为股东的伯克希尔，但是总体上我们从他们留存收益中获得的收益远高于留存收益本身。我们因此将纸面收益认为是符合事实的年度经营收益反映。 We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations. 7. 我们不常举债，但当我们确实需要贷款时，我们尝试着使用长期，固定息票利率的债券。我们宁愿错失机会也不想过度使用杠杆。这种保守的投资方式对我们的收益产生了一定影响，但是这是我们唯一能够接受的方式。这是考虑到了我们对于保险客户，债权人，以及投入大量资本的股东的代理人义务（一位印第安纳波利斯500英里比赛的冠军车手曾说过：“想要第一个到达终点，第一你必须得到达终点”） 7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”) 查理和我使用的投资策略使得我们并不会牺牲睡眠质量而获得高上几个百分比的收益。我从不愿意冒着失去我家人和朋友所需要的事物的风险而争取他们并不需要的。 The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need. 此外，伯克希尔有两个低成本低风险的融资渠道来形成财务杠杆，用以持有远比我们的权益资本更高的资产：递延所得税和保险浮存金。保险浮存金是我们的保险公司暂存的客户的资金，因为保险公司需要预收客户的保金以备未来的索赔。这两个融资渠道一直都在快速的增长，目前总价值已经达到了大约1680亿美金。 Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $168 billion. 更好的一点是，这些融资到目前为止都是无成本的。递延所得税义务不存在利息。而只要我们能在保险行业做到收支平衡，经营过程的产生浮存金也是无成本的。不过他们两者都不属于权益，而被会计准则记为义务。但是他们都是不存在契约条件或者是截止日期的。在效果上，他们提供了债务般的优势 – 让更多的资产为我们服务的能力 – 但是不存在债务那些令人不快的缺点。 Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its drawbacks. 当然了，这并不意味着我们也能在未来以零成本的方式使用我们的保险浮存金。但是我们认为我们能够使用浮存金的机会和其他保险公司一样多。我们不仅在过去达到了这样的目标（尽管你们的董事长犯下了多次重要的错误），由于我们在1996年对于政府雇员保险公司的收购，我们在未来能够达到这个目标的可能性也很大。 Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future. 我们目前的经营方式让我们能够在公共事业以及铁路公司进行使用额外的，不存在追索权的贷款。所以我们将继续倾向于使用长期，固定利率贷款。 In our present configuration we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad businesses, loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire. Here, we will favor long-term, fixed-rate loans. 8. 管理层不会做出为满足个人愿望而牺牲股东利益的事情。我们不会以多元化为理由，溢价完全收购对股东们并没有长期收益的公司。我们将你们的资本视为自己的资本，在公开市场上进行多元化投资是出于为你们的投资组合带来附加价值为前提的。 8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market. 查理和我只会收购会增加伯克希尔股票的每股内在价值的公司。我们的工资和伯克希尔的公司规模无关。 Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet. 9. 我们认为重大决策都应该进行周期性的评估。我们评估是否派发股息的标准是，分析我们留存的每一美元是否带来至少一美元的股价变化。在目前为止，伯克希尔能够通过这项测试。我们将在未来持续进行这种对于过去五年的累计业绩评估。虽然，在我们净值不断增加后，能够有效地使用留存收益就变得愈发困难。 9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely. 我应该换一个“过去五年”的说法。这是我一个直到2009年股东大会上遇到一次相关的提问后才意识到的错误。 I should have written the “five-year rolling basis” sentence differently, an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the 2009 annual meeting. 当股市出现连续五年的下跌，有时候我们的股票价格相对于账面价值的溢价会减小。在这种情况出现时，伯克希尔的将无法通过之前提到的检验。实际上，在我1983年写下这些原则之前，在1971-1975年期间，我们的股价曾远低于账面价值。 When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk. And when that happens, we fail the test as I improperly formulated it. In fact, we fell far short as early as 1971-75, well before I wrote this principle in 1983. 五年测试应该是这样：（1）在这段期间内我们的账面价值增长超过了标准普尔的增长，以及（2）我们的股价是否能持续的高出每股账面价值，意味着每1美金的留存收益是否能带来超出1美元的价值？如果这些测试能够满足，不派发股息的行为是合理的。 The five-year test should be: (1) during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P; and (2) did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book, meaning that every $1 of retained earnings was always worth more than $1? If these tests are met, retaining earnings has made sense. 10. 我们增发普通股的情况只会是我们能够获得的价值能和我们牺牲的价值一样多。这个法则应用于所有类型的增发 – 不仅包括并购或者公开募股，也包括股债转换，股权，以及可转换证券。如果这一行为无法带来更大的价值，我们不会将公司的部分价值卖给外人 – 在股票增发时这种情况会发生。 10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance – not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company – and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to – on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise. 当我们在1996年售出B级股时，我们声明伯克希尔的股票并没有被低估，但是有些人并不相信。但他们本不应该。他们应该在我们的股价被低估的时候对增发感到惊讶。管理层在公开募股的时候明示或者暗示股价被低估，要么是对于事实的不重视或者是对于股东资产的不重视：如果将实际价值1美元的资产以80美分卖出，这对股东来说是一笔不公平的损失。我们在售出B级股的时候没有犯这种错误，在将来我们也不会。（但是，我们也未曾在增发时提到过我们的股票被高估，这些言论来自于很多媒体在报道时的误解。） When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued – and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.) 11. 你应该完全注意到了查理和我有着一种对于投资收益表现不利的投资态度：不管别人给出怎么样的价格，我们对于伯克希尔持有的绩优公司都没有卖出的打算。我们也非常不愿意卖出表现不好的公司，只要他们能够至少产生一定现金，而且我们对他们的管理层和劳务关系依然感到满意。我们希望自己不会重复那些会让我们买下表现不佳的公司的投资错误。我们对于那些认为表现欠佳的公司在大量的资本投入以后未来经营会改善的观点也相当谨慎。（有些预测听起来很合理，提出这一理论的人们也是发自内心的，但是，在最后，大部分在夕阳行业中的额外投资就像是在流沙中挣扎。）尽管如此，金拉米牌式的管理方式（每一轮抛弃一个表现最差的子公司）并不是我们的风格。我们宁愿牺牲一部分总体平均收益，也不愿进行这种行为。 11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior. 我们将持续避免这种金拉米牌式的行为。确实，我们在80年代放弃了挣扎了20年的纺织公司，但只是因为我们认为它将会在未来继续永远处在亏损的情况。我们未曾考虑过出售那些能卖出好价格的子公司或者是抛弃我们那些进展欠佳的子公司，尽管我们会想办法处理那些会导致他们表现欠佳的问题。在这里，我们想澄清一些在2016年出现过的一些误解。我们在这里强调不出售原则是指我们控股的子公司，而不是我们持有的适销证券。 We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag. To clean up some confusion voiced in 2016, we emphasize that the comments here refer to businesses we control, not to marketable securities. 12. 我们会坦陈地向你通报业绩，强调我们所拥有的公司的优与劣。我们的指导方针是告诉你们那些如果换位思考我们会想要知道的信息。这些信息必不可缺。更何况，作为一个持有一家主流的新闻媒体公司的大公司，在通报业绩时使用比新闻工作者向他人报道时更低的精确度，标准，以及深度是不可饶恕的。我们同时相信诚实对于作为管理者的我们是有帮助的：误人者终误己 12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private. 在伯克希尔，你不会遇到巨额冲销的会计操纵手法，或者是重组，或者是任何季度或者年度报告的平滑处理。假如我们是在打高尔夫，我们将诚实说明我们用了多少杆才进洞，并从不会设法摆弄计分板。当我们不得不使用非常粗略的估计数据时，比如保险的准备金，我们会想尽力保证估计方法的一致和保守。 At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach. 我们会以多种方式与你们沟通。通过年度报告，我会努力以合理的篇幅尽可能地详细提供所有公司的价值信息。我们同时也会尽量提供一些已经在网上公布过的简短但重要的季度报表的信息，虽然那些并不是我写的（演唱会一年举办一次足够了）。另一个重要的沟通渠道就是我们的年度股东大会，在那时候查理和我非常乐意用五个小时以上的时间回答关于伯克希尔的问题。但是有一个沟通方式我们办不到：一对一的方式。考虑到伯克希尔上千的股东数量，这种方式不可行。 We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners. 在我们所有的沟通渠道中，我们想公平对待我们所有的股东：我们不想用行业普遍的做法，给分析师或者大股东收益数据或者重要信息的提示。我们的目标是让所有的股东同时获得信息。 In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time. 13. 尽管我们的政策强调坦白，我们对于适销证券的信息披露只会停留在法律要求的程度。良好的投资机会，就像是良好的产品和商业收购机会一样，既稀有又珍贵，而且容易被捷足先登。所以我们一般不会公开谈论我们的投资想法。关于这项内容的保密也涵盖我们已经出售的证券（因为我们未来可能还会买）以及大家误以为我们会买的证券。如果我们对于这些谣言予以否决但是对于其他情况表示“无可奉告”，不评论也就变成了承认。 13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation. 尽管我们会继续对个股的选择的公布有所保留，我们愿意公开谈论我们的商业和投资哲学。我从本杰明·格雷汉姆慷慨的知识分享中受益匪浅。他是金融史上最伟大的老师，所以我认为我应该将我从他身上学到知识继续传递给他人，尽管这么做会为伯克希尔产生新的潜在有利竞争者，就像本杰明曾经遇到的情况一样。 Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him. 两个新加入的原则TWO ADDED PRINCIPLES14. 尽可能地，我们希望伯克希尔的股东在股票价值的损益变化是和股东所有权的内在价值的损益变化是一致的。为了能达到这一点，内在价值和市场价值的关系需要保持一致，而我们偏好的关系是1比1。这也就隐含了，我们宁愿看到伯克希尔的股价是处于公允价值而非高价。很明显，查理和我无法控制伯克希尔的股价。但是通过我们的政策和沟通，我们能够鼓励知情达理的股东们共同促成一个理性的价格。我们既不愿意高估和低估股价的方式可能会让某些股东失望。但是我们相信，这能够吸引想要从伯克希尔的商业发展中获利而不是从其他投资者的错误中获利的长期投资者。 14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners. 15. 我们周期性的将伯克希尔的每股账面价值变化和标普500的表现对比。长期来看，我们希望我们能跑赢这个基准。否则，投资者何必选择我们？但是这个衡量方法存在一定的短板，在下一部分会提到。更多的，现在年度的表现的对比没有以前那么有意义了。那是因为我们的持有的股份和标普500的关联越来越小了。同时，标普的收益计算是不考虑成本的，而伯克希尔的收益在考虑税收后只有65%。我们因此期望在市场表现低迷时跑赢标普，在市场表现优异时被标普击败。 15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year. 内在价值INTRINSIC VALUE现在让我们注意力放在之前提到的一个概念，这是你们将在未来的年度报告中持续将会看到的概念。 Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports. 内在价值是一个各方面都非常重要的概念。它是唯一作为评估商业相对投资价值的逻辑方法。内在价值可以被简单定义为：从一个公司中能得到的未来现金流的折现后的价值。 Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. 但是现金流的计算并不是那么简单。我们的定义暗示着，内在价值是一种估计而非准确计算，而且数据需要按利率变化和现金流预测的改变而不断调整。更何况，对于同样的事实，两个不同的人可能会有不同的结论，即便是查理和我都会有所不同。这也是我们不会给你们我们对于内在价值估计的原因之一。不过我们的年报会提供所有我们在计算内在价值时用到的信息。 The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value. 同时，我们会周期性的公布我们的每股账面价值，一个更容易被计算的数据，虽然具体效果并不好。缺点并不存在于适销证券上，适销证券的账面价值直接等于市场价格。账面价值的缺点存在于我们的控股子公司的情况。在这些场合中，有时候账面价值和实际的内在价值的偏离的相当远。 Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values. 这种偏离可以出现在两个方向上。比如在1964年我们可以说伯克希尔的每股账面价值是19.46美金。但是这个数据将大幅高估公司的内在价值，因为公司的所有资源都困在一个并不怎么赚钱的纺织公司里。我们的纺织业资产在持续经营的前提或者是在破产清算的前提下的计算出的内在价值都不等于他们的账面价值。然而，今天，伯克希尔的情况恰好相反，账面价值远远低估了内在价值。这是因为我们拥有的子公司的内在价值远高于他们的账面价值。 The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value. 尽管他们呈现事实的能力有限，我们还是将伯克希尔的账面价值数据展现出来，因为他们依然可以作为粗略的，尽管大幅度低估的，内在价值衡量标尺。换一句话说，账面价值的每年变化率可以被认为合理接近于内在价值的变化率。 Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value. 如果你想要了解账面价值和内在价值的区别，大学教育可以作为一个投资的例子。大学的学费是账面价值。更准确的说法是，它应该还包括读大学期间不能工作而损失的工资。 You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job. 为了方便说明，我们在这里忽略大学带来的非经济性收益，而仅关注经济价值。首先我们需要评估大学毕业生一生将会获得的工资收入，然后减去如果没有读大学能得到的收入。这个超额的收入，在按照一定的利率经过折现到该学生的毕业日。计算出来的结果就是大学教育的内在经济价值。 For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education. 有些毕业生会发现大学教育的账面价值高于内在价值，也就意味着大学的学费花的不值得。在其他的情况下，教育的内在价值远高于账面价值，这个结果能证明资本被有效的利用了。无论如何，你可以明白账面价值和内在价值的关联并不大。 Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value. 伯克希尔的管理THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE我认为我应该在最后谈一下伯克希尔当前以及未来的管理层结构。就像我们的第一条股东原则说的那样，查理和我是伯克希尔的一般合伙人。但是我们将复杂的管理职责放权给了我们子公司的经理。实际上我们几乎相当于完全弃权了：虽然伯克希尔有36.7万员工，总部只有25位。 I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 367,000 employees, only 25 of these are at headquarters. 查理和我主要关注资本的分配以及经理的管理和生计问题。他们之中的大多数都是偏好自己全权打理公司，这也是我们对于经理的默认管理方法。这将使得他们全权管理公司的经营策略和以及保留收益的额度。当他们将现金交给我们后，他们将不会因为需要管理额外的资金而被诱惑。更多的，查理和我，相对于我们的经理在他们自己的行业内，有更多的投资机会。 Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry. 我们的经理的大部分已经达到了财富自由，这也就需要让我们培养一种能让他们为伯克希尔工作而不是去打高尔夫或者钓鱼的企业文化。这意味着我们需要公平对待他们，设身处地为他们着想。 Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. 而在资产分配这件事上，这是一个查理和我都乐意做而且已经积累了一定经验的事情。一般来说，年龄并不会影响我们的发挥：你不需要非常好的动作协调性，或者是发达的肌肉来管理资本（感谢上天）。只要我们的大脑能够有效的运转，查理和我可以像我们在以前那样继续工作下去。 As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past. 在我死后，伯克希尔的股东结构将会改变，但是不会产生破坏性影响：我的股份都不会用于遗产的分配或者纳税。我的其他财产足以应付遗产要求。所有的伯克希尔股份将会按每年相同数量分配给多个基金会。 On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years. 在我的死后，巴菲特家族不会参与公司的管理，但是作为大股东，将会参与选拔和监督公司的经理。那些经理将会是谁将取决我什么时候离开。但是我可预测管理层的结构将是：基本上我的职责将会被分为两个部分。一个总经理将会成为CEO并且管理日常经营。投资的职责将会交给一个或者多个总经理。如果有新的收购项目，这些总经理在必要时刻，在董事会的许可下，共同作出决策。我们将继续维持以股东为导向的董事会，他们的利益会和你们保持一致。 At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours. 如果处于某些原因，我们需要立刻执行我刚刚提到的管理层结构，董事会知道我在两个部分的候选人是哪些。所有的候选人要么已经在伯克希尔工作，要么随时可以为伯克希尔办公。他们都是我完全信任的人。我们的管理者名单处于史无前例的最佳状态。 Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence. Our managerial roster has never been stronger. 我会持续向董事会报告候选人情况。因为伯克希尔是我的全部财产，而且将会成为日后长时间作为多个基金会的资产，所以你可以放心相信董事会和我认真考虑过并且准备好了候选人的问题。同样你可以相信我们一直以来应用的股东原则将会在领导着我的继承人，我们有效而鲜明的企业文化也将继续维持。作为额外的保障，我相信在我不再是CEO时将巴菲特家族的一名成员作为不收工资的非执行董事成员会是一个好办法。具体是否会采纳将取决于那时董事会的决定。 I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be the case, I believe it would be wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid, non-executive Chairman of the Board. That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors. 尽管我们谈了这么多不愉快的事情，我还是想告诉你们我从未像现在这样感到开心。我热爱管理伯克希尔。如果热爱生活的人会长寿，那么玛士撒拉的长寿记录可能将会被我打破。 Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy. 沃伦·爱德华·巴菲特 Warren E. Buffett |
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