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OVHcloud 火灾事故报告：SBG2 数据中心有木制吊顶，无自动灭火，也无电源切断装置 OVHcloud fire report: SBG2 data center had wooden ceilings, no extinguisher, and no power cut-out March 04, 2022 Peter Judge 去年，深知社第一时间带来OVH数据中心火灾技术分析。时隔一年，业内人士普遍关心的火灾事故原因调查报告终于出炉。火灾事故的惨痛教训给数据中心建筑设计、电气设计从业者敲响了警钟，也给数据中心未来的设计提供了宝贵的经验。 一年过去了，下莱茵省消防局得出了事故调查结论 One year on, the Bas-Rhin fire service has concluded its investigation 在摧毁斯特拉斯堡OVHcloud 数据中心的毁灭性火灾发生一年后，当地消防局发布了一份报告，严厉批评了这家法国运营商的设施。 One year after the devastating fire which destroyed an OVHcloud data center in Strasbourg, the local firefighters have issued a report with strong criticism of the French operator's facility. 下莱茵省消防部门表示，SBG2数据中心没有自动灭火系统，也没有总电气切断开关。该设施还有一个木制吊顶，其耐火时间等级仅为1小时，并且还有一种自然冷却设计，成为增强火势的“烟囱”。 The Bas-Rhin fire service says that the SBG2 data center had no automatic fire extinguishing system and no general electrical cut-off switch. The facility also had a wooden ceiling rated to resist fire for only one hour, and a free-cooling design that created 'chimneys' that increased the fire's ferocity. 整个建筑于2021年3月10日起火，现场其他数据中心也遭到破坏。130多名客户参与了针对OVH cloud公司的集体诉讼，指控OVH cloud公司不履行其职责，对遭受损失的企业也没有给予足够的赔偿。该公司尚未透露起火原因，称必须等待官方报告。 The whole building went up in flames on March 10 2021, and other data centers on the site were also damaged. More than 130 customers have joined a class-action suit alleging that OVHcloud failed its responsibility and has not given enough compensation to businesses that suffered. The company has not revealed the cause of the fire, saying that it had to wait for official reports. 根据报道，现场消防员发现动力室门周围闪过一米多长的电弧，由于没有通用断路器，用了三个小时才切断了电源。 According to the report firefighters on the scene found electrical arcs more than one meter long flashing around the door to the power room, and it took three hours to cut off the power supply becuase there was no universal cut-off. 报告称“弧闪令人印象深刻，噪音震耳欲聋”。动力室有一个设计耐火性能为1小时的木制吊顶，而且电气管道也不绝缘。' The flashes were impressive and the noises deafening', says the report (Google translation). The power room had a wooden ceiling designed to wirthstand fire for one hour, and the electrical ducts were not insulated.
火灾发生于凌晨 00：40，当地公用事业公司“斯特拉斯堡电气”于01:20抵达现场，但据 JDN 报道，“在切断电源时遇到了困难”，因此长达3小时无法切断现场供电，直到 03:28，仍有电流流入电力系统的逆变器。这表明一些OVH 客户发现他们的服务器在火灾发生后仍然在继续运行。 The fire broke out at 12:40 am, and the local utility Electricité de Strasbourg arrived on the scene at 1:20 am, but 'encountered difficulties in cutting off the electricity', reports JDN, and was unable to cut the site off for three hours, until 03:28, with current still flowing into the power systems inverters. This meant that some OVH customers found that their servers continued running after the fire started. 当大火从动力室逸出，火势迅速蔓延。该报告称，两个内庭院扮演了“烟囱”的角色。JDN 声称，该站点的自然冷却设计可能加速了火势蔓延，该设计旨在加强外部空气通过建筑物以冷却服务器。 Onece the fire escaped from the power room, it grew rapidly. The report says that 'the two interior courtyards acted as fire chimneys'. JDN claims the spread of fire may have been accelerated by the site's free cooling design, which is designed to encourage the flow of outside air through the building to cool the servers. SBG2和其他数据中心布局图如下：
SBG2结构图（右为示意图）：
翻译： 何海 DKV（DeepKnowledge Volunteer）计划创始成员
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