尽管莫斯科使用核武器计划的确切性质尚不清楚,但很明显,俄罗斯领导人对非战略核武器的重视程度相当高。虽然俄罗斯非战略核武器的确切数量是一个秘密,但通常引用的估计数量是2000枚核弹头。11近年来,俄罗斯在新型战区远程两用投送系统上投入了大量资源,包括“伊斯坎德尔-M”短程弹道导弹、“口径”系列巡航导弹和“匕首”高超声速空射弹道导弹。12俄罗斯愿意冒着无视《中程核力量条约》的风险来开发被禁止的陆基弹道导弹SSC-8,这表明俄罗斯领导人认为这些系统值得付出外交和财政成本。这种丰富的次战略核能力系统为俄罗斯提供了有限的使用选项,并且远远超出了西方作家通常设想的示威式打击类型。正如布拉德·罗伯茨(Brad Roberts)所观察到的那样:“根据现有证据,没有理由相信俄罗斯领导人会轻易跨过核门槛。但一旦跨过这个门槛,他们就可以在次战略层面上实施真正独特的多样化和连续性核行动。”13 在与俄罗斯的冲突中北约遭受有限核打击的可能性 【1】Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed., Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 197. 【2】Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, New York:Praeger, 1965, p. 138. 【3】T.C. Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in the Berlin Crisis,” in Mark Trachtenberg,ed., The Development of American Strategic Thoughts: Writings on Strategy,1961–1969, and Retrospectives, New York: Garland,1988, p. 9. 【4】Anya Loukianova Fink, “The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses,” Arms Control Association, July/August 2017; and Paul K. Davis,David Frelinger, Edward Geist, Christopher Gilmore, Jenny Oberholtzer, and Danielle Tarraf, Exploring the Role of Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats in the Baltics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,RR-2871, 2019. 【5】Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces,2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 3, May 4, 2018. 【6】“Rossiia primenit iadernoe oruzhie v sluchae ugrozy ee suverinitetu,”RIA Novosti,February 10, 2010. 【7】Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Vladimira Putina federal’nomu sobraniiu 2018,” Moscow, Russia:Kremlin, March 1, 2018. 【8】Dmitry Adamsky, “Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia,” Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol. 37, No. 1, 2014. 【9】V.I. Levshin, A. V. Nedelin, and M. E. Sosnovskii, “O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voennykh deistvii.” Voennayamysl’, Vol. 3, May 1999,p. 1. For authors arguing that “de-escalation” has limited influence on current Russian doctrine, see Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017; Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russia 'De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Non-Existent Problem,” War on the Rocks, February20,2018. For authors arguing the opposite, see Katarzyna Zysk, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Evolving Military Doctrine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 5, 2017, and Nikolai Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike 'De-Escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,March 13, 2014. 【10】Daviset al., 2019. 【11】Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of Defense, 2018, p. 54. 【12】Kristensen and Norris, 2018; Putin, 2018. 【13】Brad Roberts, The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 2016, p. 135. 【14】Daviset al., 2019. 【15】A 1983 Central Intelligence Agency report on Soviet planning for tactical nuclearwar with NATO noted that “[o]ther than troop safety considerations. nocollateral damage effects are considered in Soviet weapon requirement calculations.Further more, the use of high yields close to the battle zone indicates that Soviet troop safety requirements are less restrictive than NATO’s.” Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe: An Intelligence Assessment, June 1983. 【16】On Russian precision fires, see Radin et al., 2019, Appendix G. 【17】Daviset al., 2019. 【18】Daviset al., 2019 【19】Vladimir Putin emphasized this point in his March 1, 2018, speech,stating that the kind of limited U.S. nuclear strike on Russia postulated in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review would elicit “instantaneous” nuclear retaliation from Russia. Putin,2018. 【20】While Western analysts often postulate that Russian NSNW use would involve low-yield nuclear attacks designed to minimize collateral damage, it is not clear that Russian military planners try to limit harm to civilians. Some civilian casualties might even be a “bonus” from an escalation-control stand point,because they could increase pressure on adversary political leaders to reducethe risk of escalation to general war, incentivizing them to capitulate. In anycase, a militarily effective, limited nuclear strike with negligible collateraldamage to noncombatants against significant NATO land targets is not necessarily physically realistic. |
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