这是我近期读过关于巴菲特的最佳读物之一：不是巴菲特的股东信、股东大会，甚至也不是他的演讲，而是一篇他多年前亲笔写就的文章——发表于1979年的《福布斯》。没错，这是一篇已经“44岁”的老文章，可能比许多读者还要老——但我相信这篇文章依然值得一读，里面对于估值、市场、机构、宏观的讨论依然值得今天的投资者深思。有意思的是，那一年巴菲特还只有48岁，他已经挺有市场影响力，但显然还没有那么“出圈”。一个显著的证据就是，《福布斯》的编辑甚至需要在文章开头，特别介绍一下作者是谁：“沃伦·巴菲特是一位48岁的脚踏实地的人，他喜欢在他的家乡奥马哈工作，而不是在华尔街的峡谷里，但专业人士认为他可能是现存最成功的资金管理者，是传奇人物本·格雷厄姆的直系“后裔”，他曾在格雷厄姆门下学习。”这篇文章值得推荐的另一个原因是，1979年的美股处于很特别的宏观和市场环境：1970年代通胀高企（通胀率最高达到13%），报纸时不时出现大新闻，投资者深刻感受到未来的不确定性，股票备受投资者们厌恶。1979年的美股氛围是低迷和悲观的，因为美国经济正处于滞胀的困境，通胀率高达13.3％，失业率也达到5.8％，经济增长缓慢。美联储为了遏制通胀，采取了大幅加息的措施，导致市场利率飙升，债券价格下跌，股票投资失去吸引力。同时，美国还受到了第二次石油危机的冲击，石油价格翻了一番，能源供应紧张，对经济造成了巨大的负担。 1979年的一个标志性事件是，《商业周刊》在8月发表了一篇著名的封面故事——《股票之死》，文中说到：“不论是好还是坏，接下来，美国经济必须考虑把股票之死视为是一个永远存在的条件，也许有天这个状况会反转，但不会很快发生。”在这样的氛围里，中年巴菲特写下这篇：《You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus》，批评短视的机构投资者们（养老基金），明知道股票很便宜，却因为一些奇怪的因素，而痴痴地等待确定性。未来从来都是不明确的；在股市中，你要为一片欢腾的共识付出很高的代价。不确定性实际上是长期价值买家的朋友。
The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.以下是这篇文章的全文，同时附上中文译文——由AI进行翻译（综合New Bing、ChatGPT 3.5），我略作调整。如对中文有疑问，请以英文为准。
You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery ConsensusPension-fund managers continue to make investment decisions with their eyes firmly fixed on the rearview mirror. This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.养老金基金经理们在做投资决策时，仍然只顾着看后视镜。这种打仗总是打上一场战争的做法，在过去已经造成了很大的代价，而且这一次也很可能同样代价惨重。Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds. Yet pensions managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please ('whose bread I eat, his song I sing'), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.现在的股票价格水平应该能产生远远优于债券的长期回报。然而，养老金基金经理们，通常受到他们必须讨好的企业赞助者的鼓励（“谁给我饭吃，我就唱谁的歌”），正以创纪录的比例把资金投入到债券中。Meanwhile, orders for stocks are being placed with an eyedropper. Parkinson--of Parkinson's law fame--might conclude that the enthusiasm of professionals for stocks varies proportionately with the recent pleasure derived from ownership. This always was the way John Q. Public was expected to behave. John Q. Expert seems similarly afflicted. Here's the record.与此同时，对股票的订单却是少得可怜。帕金森（出名的帕金森定律的作者）可能会得出这样的结论：专业人士对股票的热情与最近从持有股票中获得的快感成正比。这种行为一直是我们所期待的约翰·Q·普通人的表现。约翰·Q·专家似乎也同样受到了影响。以下是记录。In 1972, when the Dow earned $67.11, or 11% on beginning book value of 607, it closed the year selling at 1,020, and pension managers couldn't buy stocks fast enough. Purchases of equities in 1972 were 105% of net funds available (i.e., bonds were sold), a record except for the 122% of the even more buoyant prior year. This two-year stampede increased the equity portion of total pension assets from 61% to 74%--an all-time record that coincided nicely with a record-high price for the Dow. The more investment managers paid for stocks, the better they felt about them.1972年，道琼斯指数赚了67.11美元，相当于607美元的期初账面价值的11%，年底收于1020美元，养老金经理们急着买入股票。1972年的股票购买额占净可用资金的105%（即卖出了债券），除了前一年更为繁荣的122%外，创下了历史新高。这两年的狂奔使得养老金总资产中的股票部分从61%增加到74%——与道琼斯指数创下历史新高的价格相得益彰。投资经理们为股票付出的越多，他们对股票就越满意。And then the market went into a tailspin in 1973-74. Although the Dow earned $99.04 in 1974, or 14% on beginning book value of 690, it finished the year selling at 616. A bargain? Alas, such bargain prices produced panic rather than purchases; only 21% of net investable funds went into equities that year, a 25-year record low. The proportion of equities held by private noninsured pension plans fell to 54% of net assets, a full 20-point drop from the level deemed appropriate when the Dow was 400 points higher.然后市场在1973-74年间陷入了低迷。尽管道琼斯指数在1974年赚了99.04美元，相当于690美元期初账面价值的14%，但它在年底收于616点。便宜货？唉，这样的便宜货却引发了恐慌而不是购买；那一年只有21%的净可投资资金投入到股票中，创下25年来的最低纪录。私人非保险养老金计划持有的股票占净资产的比例下降到54%，比道琼斯指数高出400点时认为合适的水平低了整整20个百分点。By 1976, the courage of pension managers rose in tandem with the price level, and 56% of available funds was committed to stocks. The Dow that year averaged close to 1,000, a level then about 25% above book value.到了1976年，随着价格水平上升，养老金基金经理们的勇气也随之增长，56%的可用资金被投入到股票中。那一年道琼斯指数接近1000点，大约比账面价值高出25%。In 1978, stocks were valued far more reasonably, with the Dow selling below book value most of the time. Yet a new low of 9% of net funds was invested in equities during the year. The first quarter of 1979 continued at very close to the same level.1978年，股票估值更加合理，道琼斯指数大部分时间都低于账面价值。然而，在那一年只有9%的净可投资资金投入到股票中。1979年第一季度的水平也非常接近。By these actions, pension managers, in record-setting manner, are voting for purchase of bonds--at interest rates of 9% to 10%--and against purchase of American equities at prices aggregating book value or less. But these same pension managers probably would concede that those American equities, in aggregate and over the longer term, would earn about 13% (the average in recent years) on book value. And, overwhelmingly, the managers of their corporate sponsors would agree.通过这些行为，养老金基金经理们以创纪录的方式投票支持购买债券——利率为9%到10%——反对购买美国股票，价格总体上相当于或低于账面价值。但是，这些养老金基金经理们可能会承认，那些美国股票，总体上和从长期来看，能够在账面价值上赚取大约13%（近年来的平均水平）。而且，他们的企业赞助者的管理者们也会同意。Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?事实上，许多企业经理对股票表现出一种精神分裂的态度。他们认为自己的股票非常有吸引力。但同时，他们又批准了拒绝购买普通股的养老金政策。而老板，在戴着收购帽子的时候，会急切地以150%到200%的账面价值竞标典型的美国企业，但在戴着养老金帽子的时候，却会轻视以账面价值投资类似公司的做法。他自己的才能难道是如此独特，以至于他既有理由以每美元200分的价格购买一家企业，如果他能掌控它的话；又有理由拒绝以每美元100分的价格作为不明智的养老金投资，如果它必须留给他在Business Roundtable的同伴运营？A simple Pavlovian response may be the major cause of this puzzling behavior. During the last decade, stocks have produced pain--both for corporate sponsors and for the investment managers the sponsors hire. Neither group wishes to return to the scene of the accident.But the pain has not been produced because business has performed badly, but rather because stocks have underperformed business. Such underperformance cannot prevail indefinitely, any more than could the earlier overperformance of stocks versus business that lured pension money into equities at high prices.一个简单的巴甫洛夫式反应可能是这种令人困惑的行为的主要原因。在过去的十年里，股票给企业赞助者和他们雇佣的投资经理带来了痛苦。两者都不愿意回到事故现场。但是造成痛苦的原因并不是因为企业表现不佳，而是因为股票表现不如企业。这种表现不如企业的情况不可能永远持续下去，就像早些时候股票表现超过企业而吸引养老金资金以高价购买股票一样。Can better results be obtained over, say, 20 years from a group of 9 1/2% bonds of leading American companies maturing in 1999 than from a group of Dow-type equities purchased, in aggregate, at around book value and likely to earn, in aggregate, around 13% on that book value? The probabilities seem exceptionally low. The choice of equities would prove inferior only if either a major sustained decline in return on equity occurs or a ludicrously low valuation of earnings prevails at the end of the 20-year period. Should price/earnings ratios expand over the 20-year period--and that 13% return on equity be averaged--purchases made now at book value will result in better than a 13% annual return. How can bonds at only 9 1/2% be a better buy?比如说，从一组美国领先公司的9.5%债券中，到1999年到期，能否获得比从一组以账面价值购买的道琼斯指数类型的股票中获得更好的结果，这些股票在账面价值上的平均收益率大约是13%？这种可能性似乎非常低。只有在两种情况下，选择股票才会证明是劣势：要么是出现了持续的股本回报率下降，要么是在20年期结束时，盈利的估值非常低。如果市盈率在20年期内扩大，而股本回报率平均为13%，那么以账面价值购买的股票现在将会获得超过13%的年回报率。9.5%的债券怎么会是更好的选择呢？Think for a moment of book value of the Dow as equivalent to par, or the principal value of a bond. And think of the 13% or so expectable average rate of earnings on that book value as a sort of fluctuating coupon on the bond--a portion of which is retained to add to principal amount just like the interest return on U.S. Savings Bonds. Currently our 'Dow Bond' can be purchased at a significant discount (at about 840 vs. 940 'principal amount,' or book value of the Dow. Figures are based on the old Dow, prior to the recent substitutions. The returns would be moderately higher and the book values somewhat lower if the new Dow had been used.). That Dow Bond purchased at a discount with an average coupon of 13%--even though the coupon will fluctuate with business conditions--seems to me to be a long-term investment far superior to a conventional 9 1/2% 20-year bond purchased at par.暂时把道琼斯指数的账面价值想象成等同于票面价值，或者是债券的本金。把对账面价值的预期平均收益率（大约13%）想象成一种波动的债券票息–其中一部分被保留用来增加本金，就像美国储蓄债券的利息回报一样。目前我们的“道琼斯债券”可以以较低的折扣购买（大约840美元对940美元的“本金”或道琼斯指数的账面价值。这些数字是基于旧的道琼斯指数，在最近的替换之前。如果使用新的道琼斯指数，回报率会稍微高一些，账面价值会稍微低一些。）。这种以折扣购买的、平均票息为13%的道琼斯债券–即使票息会随着经济状况波动–在我看来是一种远远优于以票面价值购买的传统9.5% 20年期债券的长期投资。Of course, there is no guarantee that future corporate earnings will average 13%. It may be that some pension managers shun stocks because they expect reported returns on equity to fall sharply in the next decade. However, I don't believe such a view is widespread.当然，未来的企业收益能否平均达到13%并没有保证。也许有些养老金经理避开股票，是因为他们预计未来十年内，股本回报率会大幅下降。不过，我不认为这种观点很普遍。Instead, investment managers usually set forth two major objections to the thought that stocks should now be favored over bonds. Some say earnings currently are overstated, with real earnings after replacement-value depreciation far less than those reported. Thus, they say, real 13% earnings aren't available. But that argument ignores the evidence in such investment areas as life insurance, banking, fire-casualty insurance, finance companies, service businesses, etc.相反，投资经理通常提出两个主要的反对意见，认为股票现在不应该比债券更受青睐。有些人说，目前的收益被夸大了，以重置价值折旧后的实际收益远低于报告的收益。因此，他们说，实际上没有13%的收益可得。但这种论点忽略了诸如人寿保险、银行、财产保险、金融公司、服务业等投资领域的证据。In those industries, replacement-value accounting would produce results virtually identical with those produced by conventional accounting. And yet, one can put together a very attractive package of large companies in those fields with an expectable return of 13% or better on book value and with a price which, in aggregate, approximates book value. Furthermore, I see no evidence that corporate managers turn their backs on 13% returns in their acquisition decisions because of replacement-value accounting considerations.在这些行业中，重置价值会计会产生与传统会计几乎相同的结果。而且，人们可以在这些领域中挑选出一些大公司，它们的账面价值预期回报率为13%或更高，而且它们的价格总体上与账面价值相当。此外，我没有看到任何证据表明，企业经理在他们的收购决策中会因为重置价值会计的考虑而拒绝13%的回报率。
A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn't it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: 'Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved,' etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.第二个论点是，关于近期的前景，有太多的问号；不是等到事情有些明朗化再行动更好吗？你知道这种说法：“在目前的不确定性解决之前，保持购买储备”，等等。在诉诸这种支撑之前，面对两个令人不快的事实：未来从来都是不明确的；在股市中，你要为一片欢腾的共识付出很高的代价。不确定性实际上是长期价值买家的朋友。If anyone can afford to have such a long-term perspective in making investment decisions, it should be pension-fund managers. While corporate managers frequently incur large obligations in order to acquire businesses at premium prices, most pension plans have very minor flow-of-funds problems. If they wish to invest for the long term--as they do in buying those 20- and 30-year bonds they now embrace--they certainly are in a position to do so. They can, and should, buy stocks with the attitude and expectations of an investor entering into a long-term partnership.如果有人能够在做投资决策时拥有这样一种长期的视角，那应该是养老金基金经理。虽然企业管理者经常为了以溢价价格收购企业而承担大量义务，但大多数养老金计划都没有什么资金流动问题。如果他们希望从长期来看进行投资——就像他们现在购买那些20年和30年期限的债券一样——他们当然有能力这样做。他们可以，并且应该以一种投资者进入长期合作伙伴关系的态度和期望来购买股票。Corporate managers who duck responsibility for pension management by making easy, conventional or faddish decisions are making an expensive mistake. Pension assets probably total about one-third of overall industrial net worth and, of course, bulk far larger in the case of many specific industrial corporations. Thus, poor management of those assets frequently equates to poor management of the largest single segment of the business. Soundly achieved higher returns will produce significantly greater earnings for the corporate sponsors and will also enhance the security and prospective payments available to pensioners.那些通过做一些容易的、传统的或者流行的决定来逃避养老金管理责任的企业经理，正在犯一个昂贵的错误。养老金资产可能占工业净资产的大约三分之一，当然，在许多特定的工业公司中，这一比例要高得多。因此，对这些资产的管理不善，往往等于对企业最大的单一部分的管理不善。稳健地实现更高的回报，将为企业的赞助商带来显著更高的收益，也将增强养老金领取者的安全感和预期收入。Managers currently opting for lower equity ratios either have a highly negative opinion of future American business results or expect to be nimble enough to dance back into stocks at even lower levels. There may well be some period in the near future when financial markets are demoralized and much better buys are available in equities; that possibility exists at all times. But you can be sure that at such a time the future will seem neither predictable nor pleasant. Those now awaiting a 'better time' for equity investing are highly likely to maintain that posture until well into the next bull market.目前选择较低的股票比例的管理者，要么对未来美国商业的结果持有非常消极的看法，要么期望能够灵活地在更低的水平上重新进入股市。在不久的将来，可能会有一段时间，金融市场处于低迷状态，股票中有更好的买入机会；这种可能性在任何时候都存在。但你可以肯定的是，在那样的时候，未来既不会看起来可预测，也不会看起来愉快。那些现在等待着一个“更好的时机”来进行股票投资的人，很有可能会一直保持这种姿态，直到进入下一个牛市。Editor's Note: This editor's note accompanied the original publication of this article:Warren Buffett is a down-to-earth man of 48 who prefers to operate out of his native Omaha rather than in the canyons of Wall Street, but the pros regard him as possibly the most successful living money manager, a direct descendant of the legendary Ben Graham under whom he studied. Buffett made a fortune for himself and his clients in the Fifties and Sixties but threw in the towel in 1969 because he could no longer find bargains. Then in late 1974, when the Dow Jones industrials were below 600 and the air was thick with doom, he told Forbes: 'I feel like an oversexed man in a harem. This is the time to start investing.' Within months, the greatest rally in history began, with the DJI running almost 450 points in a bit over a year. What does Buffett think now? In this article, he puts it bluntly: Now is the time to buy.沃伦·巴菲特是一位48岁的脚踏实地的人，他喜欢在他的家乡奥马哈工作，而不是在华尔街的峡谷里，但专业人士认为他可能是现存最成功的资金管理者，是传奇人物本·格雷厄姆的直系“后裔”，他曾在格雷厄姆门下学习。巴菲特在五十年代和六十年代为自己和他的客户赚了一大笔钱，但在1969年他放弃了，因为他再也找不到便宜货。然后在1974年底，当道琼斯工业指数低于600点，空气中弥漫着厄运时，他对《福布斯》杂志说：“我觉得自己像一个在后宫里的过度性欲的男人。这是开始投资的时候了。”几个月后，历史上最大的反弹开始了，道琼斯工业指数在一年多的时间里涨了近450点。巴菲特现在怎么想？在这篇文章中，他直言不讳地说：现在是买入的时候了。
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