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Laytime and Demurrage 作者 John Schofield 先生

 航海资料收藏 2024-05-25 发布于河南

   前几天,非常震惊听闻John Schofield先生于2024520日星期一去世。作为LMAA的正式会员,John Schofield出生于1942年,是一名彻头彻尾的航运和商业人士。他在达特茅斯的不列颠皇家海军学院接受过培训,在海船上服役过。在获得商法硕士学位之后,获得了律师资格,并在伦敦保赔协会担任过助理董事。随后,他加入了一家集团的伦敦办事处,担任董事,该集团运营着大约 30 艘船舶,包括油轮、干散货船和客船。

      John Schofield是波罗的海交易所和伦敦金融城弗里曼会员,于 1999 年成为全职仲裁员。他于1989 年作为支持会员加入 LMAA,并于1993 年当选为正式会员。

   在船东、承租人、律师和仲裁员中,John Schofield作为涉及船舶延误的经典专著Laytime and Demurrage的作者而广为人知,该书目前已出版第八版。该专著“因其无与伦比的覆盖范围和清晰的写作风格而广受赞誉”。

   魏长庚船长等人翻译了第七版,装卸时间和滞期费,在中文圈得以更好地传播。可以说Laytime and Demurrage影响了无数航运从业人员,当然包括笔者--从一张白纸,到现在可以整天和船东/租家吵架不落下风的中年油腻男,Laytime and Demurrage这书陪伴走过了几十个春夏秋冬。

   想说的是作为一航运前端的租船、操作/调度人员,如果没认真看过Laytime and Demurrage这本经典专著,想在航运市场中混得如鱼得水真的会非常困难。不单单吃亏的时候无法反驳,感觉力不从心,更多的时候是不知道自己吃亏了,被人卖了还帮人数钱。

John Schofield先生安息!

天堂里没有车来车往

张恒

她,一个爱唱歌的小姑娘。
曾天真地对我说:
'
老师, 送我一首歌好吗?'
我愉快地答应了。
那个时候九月的阳光
正温柔地照射她甜甜的笑脸。
谁知,
那一次谈话 竟成了永别。
那天下午,
那个阳光灿烂的九月的下午,
那个她背着书包
匆匆走向学校的下午,
她被城市汹涌的车流
无情地淹没了。
那一天,
她刚满十三岁。

九月的天空
依稀晴朗
阳光下许多故事
缓缓酝酿
车来车往
车来车往
十三岁的小姑娘
背着书包去课堂
那个下午有风在 轻轻流淌
孩子你难道听见
一种声响
车来车往
车来车往
最后你是否看见
天使在飞翔
月儿高高
黑夜很长
空气中吹拂着
命运的方向
亲爱的孩子
什么是吉祥
车来车往里有没有
神的光芒
你对我说起
你死去的爸爸
你说你梦里时常
会见到他
爸爸我来了
爸爸我来了
牵着我的小手
你不要太悲伤
孩子你的书包在 我的胸膛
你说你喜欢学校 喜欢课堂
匆匆你走了
匆匆你走了
那个世界里你要
好好学习天天向上
月儿高高
黑夜不长
孩子睡着 了我为你歌唱
你找到了
你的爸爸
那遥远的地方
没有车来车往
女声:(月儿高高
黑夜很长
空气中吹拂着
命运的方向
亲爱的孩子
什么是吉祥
车来车往里有没有
神的光芒)
月儿高高
黑夜不长
孩子睡着 了我为你歌唱
你找到了
你的爸爸
那遥远的地方
没有车来车往
那安静的地方
小河在流淌
那洁白的地方
命运没有方向

前段时间帮朋友处理一个关于等泊时间是否算laytime的问题,供参考。

1. It has long been accepted that this is not a literalist exercise focused solely on a parsing of the wording of the particular clause but that the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning. See Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited [2017] UKSC 24, per Lord Hodge at [10].

2. Although the court may not dictate to the parties what their bargain should be, in many areas of the law prima facie presumptions have evolved about the meaning or effect of particular provisions. The usefulness of these presumptions is the promotion of commercial certainty, and thus contracts will usually be interpreted in the light of these presumptions. However, a prima facie presumption may be rebutted on a consideration of the contract as a whole and the circumstances in which it was made. Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell.

3. The instrument must be interpreted as a whole in the light of the commercial intention which may be inferred from the face of the instrument and from the nature of the debtor’s business. Detailed semantic analysis must give way to business common sense. See The Interpretation of Contracts, at para.3.179.

4. The primary source for understanding what the parties meant is their language interpreted in accordance with conventional usage. Of course, the particular provision must be construed in the context of the clause as a whole, and the clause itself must be construed in the context of the contract as a whole, which must in turn be considered in its factual matrix or against the circumstances surrounding it. Thus we are engaged in interpreting the meaning of the contract as a whole. There is a general principle of construction that a document which falls to be construed should be read as a whole and its separate parts should be so construed, if that is possible, as to bring rational sense and consistency to that whole. See C v D [2011] EWCA Civ 646, per Rix LJ at [49].

5. Assume the charterers/receiver may recollect that clause 11 B) which also provides, inter alia:

“…All time lost waiting for berth to count as laytime unless time lost is due to Seller/Owners responsibility, in which case time not to count.”

6. Refer to SOF, it’s rather clear that berth was occupied, the vessel was waiting for berth. There is no any responsibility fall on owners’ side.

7. It’s also settled law that the effect of this clause is that any time spent waiting for a berth counts against laytime. See Laytime and Demurrage, 8th ed, Informa Law, at para. 3.466:

Time lost in waiting for berth to count as laytime

3.466 The effect of this clause is that any time spent waiting for a berth counts against laytime.

8. The Laytime Definitions for Charter Parties 2013 provide:

“TIME LOST WAITING FOR BERTH TO COUNT AS LOADING OR DISCHARGING TIME or AS LAYTIME shall mean that if no loading or discharging Berth is available and the Vessel is unable to tender Notice of Readiness at the waiting-place then any time lost to the Vessel is counted as if Laytime were running, or as time on Demurrage if Laytime has expired.”

9. Voyage Charters, 5th ed, Informa law, at para.15.57 provides:

“Time lost in waiting for berth to count as loading or discharging time”

15.57 The purpose of this provision, found in the Gencon charter, is to place the risk of congestion upon the charterer, whether the charter is a port or a berth charter, and whether the usual waiting place is within or outside the limits of the relevant port. The provision is irrelevant where the relevant loading or discharging places agreed in the charterparty are ports rather than berths, and the place where the vessel comes to rest at the end of her approach voyage is a place within the limits of the relevant port, since in such a case the vessel will be an arrived ship, entitled to give notice of readiness at the place where she is waiting, and the risk of congestion will in any event lie on the charterer in the absence of an express exception.

10. In London Arbitration 8/03, the tribunal held a time lost waiting for berth provision was effective, even though they had held that a notice of readiness which had been tendered earlier in reliance on a WIPON provision was invalid.

11. In The Radnor [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.668 (C.A.), another clause provided: “Time lost in waiting for berth to count as loading time.” Singleton LJ rejected the charterers’ argument that the “time lost in waiting” clause could not operate until notice had been given, and that time could not be lost until time (i.e.) laytime had begun to run. He stated:

“In my opinion, the provision as to notice in clause 17 does not affect the question arising under clause 5 of the charterparty, and the lack of a notice under clause 17 does not avoid the owners’ rights in regard to time lost through waiting for a berth. The notice is something which has to be given for the purpose of calculating lay days. That calculation is independent of the provision in clause 5, though the one has to be added to the other to reach the true position under the contract.”

12. The case may also see Summerskill on Laytime, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, at para.6-03.

13. For all reasons and authorities given above, charterers should be bound to follow and the same in our case, all time lost waiting for berth to count as laytime against the charterers.

14. Owners’ all rights are fully and expressly reserved.

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