Ethics and language in Wittgenstein
Vera Fisogni
I. 1. Introduction
Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, can clarify the propositions of
natural sciences but – as well as theoretical activity – it can’t pretend to say anything
about the problem of life. It follows therefore that, in the domain of language – everyday
language – there’s no place for propositions dealing with ethic-moral (Wittgenstein, as
we’ll see in the next paragraph, uses these terms as synonyms) or metaphysical
issues. As his friend and master Bertrand Russell noticed in the famous introduction to
the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, all the ethic matters are located by Wittgenstein in
1
the region of “mystic” and ineffable .
But Russell himself couldn’t help expressing, at the same time, his “intellectual
discomfort” because Wittgenstein, in spite of his main idea of an ethics that “cannot be
put in words”, nevertheless, was able to “communicate his ethical opinions”. The
disconcert expressed by Russell – probably shared by many readers of the Tractatus
at least in a very intuitive way – should be accurately re-considered, in order to throw a
new light on morality in Wittgenstein and, perhaps, on moral philosophy in general.
We argue that, in the Tractatus (as well in the Notebooks), the ineffability of ethical
propositions doesn’t mean an ineffability of ethics at all. In fact, as we’re going to prove
in the next paragraphs, the necessity of a correct speech/language expressed by the
Tractatus propositions – basic condition to deal with the world and its sense – is not
2
only the core of Wittgenstein’s moral philosophy but it gives back a sort of “effability” to
the ineffable ethics.
In Wittgenstein’s thought we face two levels of ethics:
? the one of ethical propositions, that can only be shown but not said and cannot put
into words
? the one of moral-ethical use of language, marked by formal and logical correctness.
Our interpretation doesn’t intend to point out a contradiction in Wittgenstein’s lesson,
but to reconsider the main issues of ethics and mystic. We could face a contradiction
1
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus was published for the first time in 1921. The
German version was titled “Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung” and appeared on the “Annalen
der Naturphilosophie”. The English translation came the following year, 1922. Version by Frank
Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930) and Charles Kay Ogden (1889-1957). Wittgenstein disapproved
Russell’s introduction. A recent analysis of Russell’s intellectual disconcern may be read in Vera
Fisogni, “Morale e linguaggio in Wittgenstein. Il riscatto della metafisica”, in A Parte Rei, Madrid,
July 2001. (http://aparterei.com/page25.html)
2
The word effability is not included in the Oxford advanced dictionary of current English, by A.
S. Hornby. Anyway the sense it easy to understand: it means the opposite of ineffable. Poet T.
S. Eliot uses “effable” in The poem of classical cats. “When you notice a cat in profound
meditation/the reason I’ll tell you is always the same/his mind is engaged in a rapt
contemplation/ of the thought of the thought of the thought of his name/his ineffable, effable,
effineffable/deep and singular inscrutable name”.
http://aparterei.com 1Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
only if we’d intend the word “mystic” in religious terms: in fact, if we consider the mystic
as the experience of a union with God, it comes out that ethics is not only ineffable, but
also not of this world. But that’s not exactly what Wittgenstein expressed in the
Tractatus and, some years before, in the Notebooks.
Mystic notably refers to the concept of over-substantiality, a logical-metaphisical-
teological idea that shows similarities with Pseudo-Dyonisian thought, as we’ll show by
comparing the two authors. In this perspective (and logic at the same time) it is easy to
understand why ethics – as it arises from the reading of the Tractatus – offer itself both
as transcendent structure of world-language as well as transcendental condition of it. It
is ineffable on the front of language, but at the same time a fundamental root of the
language and the world’s representation.
I. 2. Speaking as a moral act
The Tractatus logico-philosophicus ends with a proposition as famous as difficult to
understand and open to a wide range on interpretations (“Wovon man nicht sprechen
kann, darüber muss man schweigen”-“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
3
silent”, translation by Frank Plumpton Ramsey and Charles Ogden, 1922) . We move
from it to go through ethics in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Our argumentation is aimed at
these three goals:
th
1) going further the most current explanations of the 7 proposition (traditionally
4
considered as the de profundis of classical metaphysics) ,
2) showing that the ineffability of ethical propositions, firmly declared by Wittgenstein
is not acceptable at all, because – as I intend to prove – every speech for the
Wiener thinker is ethical in its proper making, when it is correctly performed,
3) this conclusion is based on a crucial argument: the possibility of a speech is given
only when there are the condition to speak (“one must be silent” if these condition
are not given).
th
Beyond any particular interpretation, in an intuitive sense, the 7 proposition
demarcates two kinds of “objects”, a) the one we can speak about from b) the ineffable.
Wittgenstein, always very careful in the use of each word, does not write “Whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one would be better not to speak”. He intentionally uses “must”
(muss), the verb employed for command and rules, that expresses the main idea of
obligation.
What does it mean? Using the imperative form “must be (silent)” Wittgenstein has sent
an unequivocal message: the speech – the language in use in general – for having a
proper sense, but also dignity (moral dimension) must deal with some special
5
grammatical and logical rules . Whenever these conditions are not respected, moral
3
The Tractatus is comprehensive of 526 propositions or S?tze. Some of these – from 6.4 to
6.522 – are especially focused on the ethical theme. The central role of ethics in Wittgenstein’s
life and thought is underlined by the philosopher himself in a letter (1919) sent to Ludwig von
Ficker, publisher of the “Brenner” german-language review. “The sense of the book” (the
Tractatus) “is an ethical sense”.
4
Wittgenstein’s ethical thought is deeply investigated in Kurt Studhalter, Etik, Religio und
Lebensform bei Ludwig Wittgenstein, Innsbruck, Kommissionsverlag der Osterreichischen
Kommissionsbuchhandlung, 1973. Some first hand information about Wittgenstein’s attitude
towards metaphysics and ethics are given by his biographer Norman Malcom, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press, 1984.
5
The role of the rules in language is clarified in three crucial paragraphs of the lectures held in
Cambridge: L. BX, 2 and moreover L.BX, 3 and L. CXI. In Wittgenstein’s Lectures. Cambridge
1930-32, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980. In the Italian version, the one I could examine, they
correspond to the pages 68, 69 and 112. Who wants to go further into this aspect of
Wittgenstein’s doctrine, ought to read also A.G. Conte, “Paradigmi di analisi della regola in
http://aparterei.com
2Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
rules have been broken too. In conclusion: speaking or not speaking doesn’t mean only
to respect linguistic patterns, but it refers also to morality. It follows that any right or
correct speech (logic) is a good (moral) discourse.
The seventh proposition of the Tractatus is based on the proximity of the possibility of
saying something (“Whereof cannot speak”) and the necessity not to say anything that
can’t be said (“thereof one must be silent”). This moral conception of language is
probably due to the Hebrew culture in which Wittgenstein was grown in Wien, a culture
based on the Law par excellence, the Torah, where the respect for social-religious
rules and precepts played a central role, social as well as ethical and metaphysical. He
could be also influenced – as well as some scholars argue – by the Wiener poet Karl
6
Kraus and its doctrine of ethicity of language .
The path of our reflection is now taking us to notice a moral/ethical dimension of the
th
speech itself: it comes to surface with a less than superficial reading of the 7
proposition of the Tractatus. Before moving on with our reflection, it is important to
focus the proper sense of ethics in Wittgenstein and ask: what did the Wiener thinker
exactly mean by using this word?
I. 3. Ethics, morality and logic: the ought of a correct speech
The originally common root of ethics and morality (ethos in Greek means social habits
and mos, in Latin, expresses the same idea) is responsible of their use as synonyms,
although the distance existing in their linguistic use. Ethics, in fact, deals properly with
behaviors that respect social-professional habits and morality is more aimed to the
internal dimension of consciousness. With no doubt morality – more than ethics – is
7
deeply related with the concepts of necessity and will .
In the Tractatus and in the Notebooks Wittgenstein takes the word ethics in the widest
possible sense of both:
? a system of moral principles
? and internal law of consciousness, in the Kantian sense of moral imperative
Anyway he shows more propensity towards this second meaning when – for
instance in 6.422 T. and in N. 30.7.16 – he talks about “ethical law” in terms of “You
must…” and put on theme the problem of “the consequences of an action”, classical
topics of moral philosophy in a rigorous sense (as the branch of philosophy concerning
principles for right and wrong). Ethics used in the meaning of morality is furthermore
evident in N. 2.8.16, where Wittgenstein writes about “ethical judgement” posing the
question of what is good and what is wrong: but such a judgement, properly, may be
only “moral”, because it is a judgment that moves a moral action.
It is probably to find in Wittgenstein’s own life the reason of the deep correspondence
of ethics and morality, where moral rules must be applied in an ethical behavior.
Everybody knows how radical was the investigation made on himself: her elder sister
Hermine wrote, for example, that Wittgenstein wouldn’t have been able to practice
Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein”. Momenti di una critica del sapere, curavit R. Egidi, Guida, Napoli,
1983, pp 37-82
6
The influence played by poet and writer Karl Kraus (1874-1936) on Wittgenstein’s thought was
investigated by Aldo G. Gargani in the introduction to Wittgenstein, Diari segreti, Bari, Laterza,
1987.
7
For a better understanding of the difference between morality and ethics it may be useful to
th
read the analysis of G.M. Chiodi in the 6 chapter of Equità. La regola costitutiva del diritto,
Torino, Giappichelli, 2000., pp 69-71. The Italian philosopher points especially out the “rigorous
distinction in the linguistic use” followed to Hegel and imposed by German classical philosophy.
In Philosophy of right, the State is the “ethical totality” (Sittlichkeit), or the morality embodied in
institutions. Morality (Moralit?t), indeed, is a simple, individual intuition of good.
http://aparterei.com
3Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
philosophy if he wouldn’t have solved the ethical and personal “problem” of his
8
character . The philosopher, nevertheless, left many traces of his ethical obsession in
his notebooks, in the collected lectures and in the Geheime Tagebücher, a sort of
manifesto of this moral challenge (“in sich selbst heruntersteigen”).
This ethical attitude goes along with the idea of the role played by grammatical-
linguistic rules. “Rules” is a key word in Wittgenstein’s thought after the Tractatus and,
in some way, it takes the place of ethics in his following philosophical investigations. It
was a natural consequence of the deep relationship existing, in the Tractatus, between
ethics and logic (“… only a logical necessity” exists, 6.375). Not only because both
these structures of world are shown and cannot be said: moral necessity (expressed by
ethics) is the same as logical necessity. The moral imperative (You must) – the basic
core of morality – remains at the center of Wittgenstein’s ethics, but it locates
good/right and wrong in the language region, not in metaphysical one. This is a crucial
point for our argumentation: it means that Wittgenstein tributes the dimension of
necessity (distinctive aspect of moral) at least to the language, so that ethics/morality is
non ineffable at all, as we argued before. If cannot be ethical propositions (6.42 T) and
ethics cannot be said (6.421), the moral imperative (the necessity of a correct/right
speech) continues to be part of speech.
We go further. If we pay attention to Wittgenstein’s doctrine, the two propositions 6.42
and 6.421 – that would seem to put the word end on “effability” of ethics – do not deny
ethics a proper space. Both statements seem moreover to criticize the traditional
values of moral philosophy. By assuming that only the logical necessity exists, the
moral imperative “You must” is moved from a field (internal consciousness) to another
(language), but the obligation – focal point of whatever ethical discourse – still
maintains its integrity.
We have now to solve a problem. Is logic – the character of necessity – the custodian
of ethics, too? The answer seems to be affirmative, because ethics and logic present a
close similarity, as it comes out from proposition 6.13 and 6.421 (“Logic is not a
doctrine, but a specula image of the world. Logic is transcendental” – “… Ethics is
transcendental”). We need to stop and reflect. If we consider logic as the domicile of
the “must be” of language, we nevertheless should recognize that any speech – that
respects the language rules – is first of all a moral behavior, an essentially ethical act. It
follows therefore that ethics, in spite of its proper characters (to be transcendent and
transcendental) cannot be completely ineffable. In conformity with this conclusion, we
could say that any act in which a thought comes to word – of course, when it is logically
respectful – should be considered an ethical act.
As we noticed before we don’t see a contradiction with Wittgenstein’s doctrine (in
particular, with the propositions before taken in consideration).
? Ethics, as well as logic, can’t be expressed in linguistic terms because its
transcendental nature poses (in a Kantian sense) the conditions to formulate a
proposition.
th
? Wittgenstein’s 7 proposition could be re-written in these terms: ethics statement
qua talis are not to be said, but it is possible to formulate propositions that possess
an ethical structure because of their conformity to the logical necessity and
grammatical rules (we are allowed to say what it is possible to say, we are not
allowed to say what is shown)
We assert now that is also correct to talk about a morality of language/discourse in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus for the strict link existing between speech/language/
/propositions and ethics. In fact, although its logical roots, the “ineffable” ethics remains
–for Wittgenstein– the center of some absolute values. The “good” –the fundamental
8
Hermine Wittgenstein, My brother Ludwig, in Recollections of Wittgenstein, R. Rhees curavit,
Oxford, 1984
http://aparterei.com
4Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
core of Western classical moral philosophy, the aim to which actions move– remains
the core of Wittgenstein’s ethical doctrine, although in the sense of a good speech. On
the opposite, “wrong” is the ethical uncorrected linguistic action. That’s why somebody
is obliged to be silent (imperative with moral implication) when it is impossible to be
respectful of any grammatical-logical rules. Italian philosopher Petrosino throws light to
the meanings of speaking correctly and may help us to a better comprehension of what
has been briefly outlined before. “.. in the proper experience of the subject the condition
of being loquens always affirms itself according the form of the must be eloquens.
From this point of view the subject, because he/she speaks, and speaking has always
to choose among the words, each subject is necessary called to the obligation of a
“correct speaking” (…) In this sense the act of speaking (…) is for its nature, a moral
9
act” .
II. 1 The over-substantiality of the mystic
After having brought ethics back to linguistic region, another problem comes out and
asks for our attention because of its structural link with the moral question in the
Tractatus. It is the idea of mystic that arises from the distinction between
saying/showing (6.522 T.). Obscure and never properly clarified by Wittgenstein in the
texts written after the Tractatus, the idea of mystical has been differently interpreted by
scholars and still remains a sort of enigma to investigate. Before discussing our
interpretation, we would like briefly to remember the features that directly address the
mystic, as well as they result from “A Wittgenstein Dictionary”:
? “It is the paradigm of what is inexpressible and shows itself; it is the content of an
10
attitude, experience or feeling; it is the existence of the world” .
With no doubt, the idea of mystic is comprehensive of all these aspects and more, but
we want especially to underline the coherence of the mystical theme with logical-ethical
dimension. We ought to remember propositions 6.41, 6.42, 6.421, in which
Wittgenstein writes that the sense of the world must be out of the world itself and
ethical propositions cannot express anything higher and located over. The mystical is
exactly this higher and over-reality (see 6.432 and 6.44 T.) that is very close to God but
it doesn’t identify with God. There is no ambiguity in proposition 6.44: the Mystic is
“what” the world is, not “how” the world is; it is the vision of the world sub specie
aeternitatis (in this definition clearly resounds Spinoza’s Ethics, an opera well known by
Wittgenstein, although not easily understood ). It comes that mystic is not a content, an
object: it’s a sort of feeling.
But we believe incorrect to interpreter mystic in a religious way or simply as a feeling of
the existence of God, although Wittgenstein deeply felt – since 1914 – the influence of
Tolstoi’s and Kirkegaard’s thought. The interpretative key of the multisense word is
given by the expression higher: it means that mystic is both transcendent and
transcendental, as well as ethics and logic (in the Philosophical investigation, he
definitely tributes logic the character of a over-order/über-Ordnung among the over-
9
Silvano Petrosino, L’esperienza della parola , Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1999, pag. 18.
10
See the voice Mysticism in A Wittgenstein’s Dictionary, ed. Hans-Johann Glock, Oxford,
Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries, 1996. A recent interpretation, deep and profound about
ethics and mysticism in Wittgenstein is given by Piergiorgio Donatelli, Wittgenstein e l’etica,
Bari, Laterza, 1998. He has investigated the origin of the ethical attitude of the Austrian
philosopher and exanimate the different phases of the ethical theme from the Tractatus to the
last lecture, focusing on the most valuable interpretation of international scholars. The sense of
the ineffability of mystic may be read at the pages 79-82.
http://aparterei.com
5Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
11
concepts/über-Begriffe) . As well as those two peculiar ideas, mystic shows itself but
cannot be put into word; it is a fundamental structure of world: the most basic because
of its being higher. To understand the world, the readers of Tractatus are required to
move higher, to transcend and go over the propositions. Only following this way, they
are allowed to “see” rightly the world (6.54). But this “ultimate knowledge”, that is also
the deeper for human being, cannot be said, as results from the following proposition,
th
the 7 , in which the whole sense of the Tractatus is resolved. To go higher – then – it
means to see the world sub specie aeternitatis and accept the intellectual limits of
human being. Here is – probably – the origin of that “feeling” that springs from the
mystical vision of the ineffability of the world-structure (logical, ethical, philosophical,
metaphysical), that however cannot be identified with the mystic itself.
Wittgenstein’s idea of mystic presents many similarities with the idea of greek epiousia
(super-substantia) expressed in Dyonisius Ariopagitae (or Pseudo-Dyonisius) opera.
There is no proof that the Wiener thinker had read anything of this greek-writing
mysterious author, so famous during the early Middle Ages, especially for the so called
negative way to God or negative theology (we can express about God only in negative
terms because of His being over everything and also reason). Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that the concept of mystical is about the same both in Wittgenstein
and Dyonisius (St. Bonaventura called him “master of mystic”) and brings to the same
consequences:
1) the impossibility to speak about what is over and higher the level of everyday
reality and
2) the possibility to see the world with a transcendent point of view, that means
the have a comprehensive view of the whole in an intuitive form (T.6.45), sub
specie aeternitatis.
Intuition (Anschauung) in Wittgenstein’s perspective has nothing to do with
Husserlian (intuition of the essence) or Kantian thought (intuition as a priori forms of the
mind), but – as a way to the discovery of ethical contents – seems to have something
12
in common with Scheler’s intuition of values , although the two philosophers don’t
share any other theoretical issues.
The idea of a mystic-intuition of an higher and over reality, anyway, it is closer
rd
to Spinoza’s knowledge of the 3 way and Pseudo-Dyonisius than classical Christian
13
mysticism (St. Juan of the Cross, St. Therese of Avila) . In fact it expresses the idea of
intus-ire (to go into the things) in the reality “as a whole” and brings to light an
intellectual, absolutely not rational, knowledge. That’s why mystical attitude requires to
do without speech and reason but gives a further intelligence of what is higher and
over. As it happened for ethics and logic, it seem that Wittgenstein –with mystic– gives
metaphysics a new opportunity. It can’t be expressed with words and reason, but
nevertheless it can be reached at least with the intuition.
11
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, 1953, I, sez 97.
12
In Scheler’s thought, value is the pure object of an intuition. His moral doctrine may be read in
M. Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik un die materiale Wertethik, in Max Scheler im
Gegenwartsgehen der Philosophie, curavit Paul Good, Fracke Verlag, Bern-Muenchen, 1975,
nd
2 volume.
13
See B. Spinoza, Opera, im Aufrag der Heilderberger Akademie der Wissenschaften,
herausgegeben von Carl Gebhard, Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitaetbuchhandlung, 1924, 4
volumes.In Ethica the propositions XLV-XLVI-XLVII are especially focused on the knowledge of
the third way – sub specie aeternitatis –. See also M.G. Hubbeling, The third way of knowledge
(intuition) in Spinoza, in “Studia Spinoziana”, II (Spinoza’s Epistemology), 1986, pp 219-229 and
P. Cristofolini, La scienza intuitiva in Spinoza, Morano, Napoli, 1987.
http://aparterei.com
6??
Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
After these reflections, we can read some passes of Pseudo-Dyonisian opera, to have
14
at least an idea of it .
? The first one is a paragraph of Theologia mystica (III, 1033C), in which is very well
expressed the link existing between the ineffable and the ascension to the higher
grade of knowledge:
“… and now the speech, when becomes higher, becomes shorter; and, when
the ascension ends, it will become completely silent and it will be one with the
Ineffable”.
? In Divini nomines, the idea of ineffable is furthermore explained as something
higher in an absolute sense (DN II 4, 641 A), in which oppositions are put together
in a highest conciliation.
“Ineffable, what can be expressed with many names, what is impossible to
know and perfectly comprehensible, the affirmation and the denial of anything
that is over each affirmation and any denial”.
? What is further an higher is the origin, the Cause of everything (DN, I 6-7, 596 C):
“And, then, to the Cause of everything that is superior to everything, does not
suit any name and does suit all the names of the things existing. The name of
the Cause is superior, higher than any other name (DN I, 6 596 A):
“Why do you ask my name? It is admirable. Isn’t perhaps, an admirable name
that is located over any name”.
? The understanding of the higher level of knowledge can be reached only with
contemplation, that’s to say without the use of ration (DN I 4-5, 592 D)
“… stopping intellectual activity we run at, for how it is possible, the super-
substantial Ray, in which all limits of all cognition are preexisting in a more than
ineffable way”.
As well as Pseudo-Dyonisius, Wittgenstein seems to look at mystic as a type of
knowledge. The ineffable, in fact, always reveals a cognitive content, although in a
negative sense. “What is inexpressible is nevertheless something that can be affirmed
15
in ways that are not the one of the propositional knowledge” .
III. Conclusions
As well as Pseudo-Dyonisius did with theology, Wittgenstein traced a negative way to
ethics. He argued that ethics cannot be said into words, but his work – especially the
Tractatus – was deeply implicated with moral themes. This double-faced attitude
towards ethics is at the origin of the Bertrand Russell’s intellectual discomfort. Anyway
the obscurity of Wittgenstein’s thought, not really easy to interpreter and in many cases
highly aporetic, shows a profound coherence with his doctrine. He also revitalizes and
brings to the final consequences the premises of classical moral philosophy:
14
Dionigi Aeropagita, Tutte le opere, traduzione di P. Scazzoso, Milano, Rusconi, 1981.
Dyonisian mysticism has deeply influenced the religious and theoretical thought of Middle Ages
since late IX century. Echoes of his thought may be found in the masterpieces of Bonaventura
(De reductionem artium ad sacram theologiam) and Tommaso d’Aquino (Questiones disputatae
de veritate, I 1, 63 and Summa Theologiae).The idea of a God ineffable, whose characters
should be said only in an analogical way, has also determined one of the fundamental structure
of modern conceptual languages: the apofatic one. This thesis is argued by G. M. Chiodi,
Teoresi dei linguaggi concettuali, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2000.
15
Piergiorgio Donatelli, Wittgenstein e l’etica, pag. 76
http://aparterei.com
7Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni A Parte Rei 28
- the Kantian idea of an internal imperative (You must) that gives orientation to will
(in W. not reason but intuition of an higher level of reality is what moves will towards
good)
- the idea of good and wrong (in W. these two principles are not posed on a
metaphysical level because they depend on the correctness or the un-correcteness
of language; it follows that good and wrong are not principles external the person,
depending on the power of God, but they are in the power of each human being)
- the distinction from ethics and morality (we could say that in W. ethics is applied
morality, because the moral rules – grammatical and linguistic in general – have a
sense only when they’re applied, when they are put in action; W. has outlined, an
personally lived, an ethics of making, where doing is more important than any kind
of knowledge)
- the existence of an higher level of reality that supports and justifies the lower grade
(the mystic, that is given by intuition, allows human being to see what is ineffable)
Wittgenstein’s ethical revolution arises from a linguistic ground. He looks at the world
not from the point of view of God (medieval moral philosophy) or from the existential-
gnoseological one (modern philosophy). It’s the language at the origin of his
speculation: in this perspective, good and wrong must not be seen from other point of
view than propositions (the images of world). Immediately it comes out a problem: not
everything can be said, because in some way (it’s the case of logic, ethics, metaphysic)
the sense of the statement go further the grammatical structure of the proposition
themselves. Coherence requires – and Wittgenstein does it – not to put into words
such mental “objects”. What could he do? He couldn’t help remarking the Kantian
imperative: You must not (put into words propositions that cannot be said). But this way
brings to a radical consequence: the impossibility of any ethical-moral discourse.
Wittgenstein has solved this apory by distinguishing ethical propositions (ineffable)
from the moral making of the language, respectful of a number of rules (this is the
speech that Must be said). It follows that morality (obligation, imperative) is first of all
ethics: a system of principles to be put in action, in language as well as in life. That’s
why Wittgenstein seems “to confuse” ethics with morality. The two levels – internal
(morality) and external (ethics, correct behavior) – are moreover two faces of a same
reality. Which one? They are structure of the world, transcendent and transcendental at
the same time. They both are mystical, in the sense that they are part of a higher and
over dimension. I don’t think that moral philosophy, under Wittgenstein’s influence,
should see morality as religious. Because mystic is not to be confused with a
theological dimension. God does not reveal Himself in the world (6.432 T.). Mystic at
least shows itself (6.522). With coherence, Wittgenstein cannot arrive to God if he
moves from a linguistic ground.
http://aparterei.com
8 |
|
