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子曰： 大家抱歉哈，今天又没有音频，还是没有找到，音频这个东西真的让宝宝好纠结啊啊。 唉别看今天是周末，可是这是注定要不平凡的一天，宝宝又要考试啦我已经考试麻痹了hhhhhhh，哈哈，一起好好努力。 今天的文章很不错哦，紧扣中国黑暗官场。 看你们的本事的时候到啦
Chinese economic data 中国经济数据
弄虚作假的官僚主义
The way to get ahead in China is to manipulate statistics 在中国政界取得成功的方法就是篡改数据
Mar 26th 2016 | SHANGHAI | From the print editionIN THEORY Chinese officials receive promotions based on their performance against a range of targets: delivering strong growth, maintaining social stability and, until recently, enforcing the one-child policy. But scholars debate whether the system really rewards those who excel according to these (in any case flawed) metrics. Some believe the emphasis on merit is real, and helps explain China’s stunning economic progress over the past 35 years. Others reckon that connections to the right leaders matter more for those trying to advance their careers. New research, however, suggests a third option: that those who get ahead are adept not at stimulating growth nor at currying favour, but at cooking the books.理论上，中国官员是基于他们一系列的政绩表现获得晋升的，例如：实现强有力的经济增长，维护社会稳定，以及截止到最近的独生子女政策的实施。但是学者们争论是否这个奖励机制真的能够给那些在此度量标准下的优秀执行者相应回报（无论如何这个机制都是有缺陷的）。一些人相信强调功绩是很重要的，并且它是中国在过去35年拥有令人震惊的经济发展速度的原因。其余的人则认为对那些试图在仕途上取得晋升的人来说，和当局领导者维持好关系更重要。然而，新的研究提出了第三种观点：那些取得成功的人既不是擅长促进经济发展的人也不是擅长拍马屁的人，而是擅长伪造数据的人。
A recent paper from America’s National Bureau of Economic Research uses fertility rates as a way to test this theory. Economists have found a relationship between GDP growth in an official’s fiefdom and subsequent promotion, but it is difficult to know how accurate the GDP figures are (a question that haunts anyone following the Chinese economy). Population data are different: in addition to the figures provided by local officials, China conducts a census every ten years, revising population data all the way down to the village level.That makes it possible to pinpoint where bureaucrats have been fiddling the statistics.一份来自美国国家经济研究局的最新论文运用人口出生率去检验这一理论。经济学家发现了在官员任职地区的GDP的增长和随之而来的官员晋升之间的关系，但是GDP的数据有多准确是很难知道的（这个问题一直萦绕在关注中国经济的人的脑中）。期待您的试译,您可将翻译留言到文章底部，第二天会有答案解析哦。这就能够精准地找到哪些地方的官员一直都在谎报数据。
Examining data on 967 mayors in 28 provinces from 1985 to 2000, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato and Xiao Yu Wang of Duke University and Shuang Zhang of University of Colorado, Boulder, find that officials who claimed to have suppressed population growth were rewarded. Mayors who reduced the local birth rate by one child per 1,000 people per year by their own count had a 10% greater chance of being promoted.来自杜克大学的 Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato 和 Xiao Yu Wang以及来自科罗拉多大学波尔得分校的Shuang Zhang调查了从1985年到2000年间28个省份的967位市长递交的数据。他们发现那些声称已经抑制了人口增长的市长受到了嘉奖。据官员们声称的数据来看，那些可以降低出生率（即每年每1,000人对应的活产数）的市长，比其他市长的晋升机率高10%。
But the relationship between fertility rates and career trajectory disappears when using the census data rather than the figures reported by the local officials themselves. Mayors who received promotions were no better or worse at curbing population growth than those who did not. The way to get ahead in the Chinese bureaucracy, it seems, is to falsify statistics. It makes you wonder what other data have been doctored.但是当采用人口普查的数据而不是当地官员自己上报的数据为依据时，人口出生率和职业发展轨迹的关系就消失了。在人口增长控制方面，那些获得了晋升的市长并不比那些没获得晋升的市长做得好。看起来要想在中国的官僚体系中获得成功的方法就是伪造数据。它让你怀疑是不是还有别的什么数据也已经被篡改了。
Population data are different: in addition to the figures provided by local officials, China conducts a census every ten years, revising population data all the way down to the village level.
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