【绩效工资的激励效果】

Free exchange
自由交流

Making pay work
绩效工资的激励效果

Why bosses should be careful when using performance-related pay
为何老板们要小心使用绩效工资

May 25th 2013 |From the print edition



OF ALL a firm’s inputs, its workers’ effort is perhaps the oddest. It is  as vital as land, factories or machines, but much harder to control. It  is often impossible even to measure. A manager can gauge the firm’s  output, but not the effort people put in, beyond crude gauges such as  the time they spend on the job. Employees have the informational edge,  knowing their own effort, output and skill level. This asymmetry makes  it hard for managers to distinguish, for instance, between the  low-skilled but diligent and the skilled but lazy. Monitoring schemes to  reward hard-working employees and punish slackers can boost effort, but  they can backfire badly, too.

在企业的所有投入中，工人的努力可能是最难捉摸的。这种投入和土地、厂房以及机器一样关键，但更难控制，甚至往往无法衡量。经理人可以测量企业的产出，但 不能测量人员的努力程度，只能大概估算员工工作时间等比较粗略的指标。而雇员则有信息优势，知道自己的努力程度、成绩以及技能水平。这种信息上的不对称让 经理人很难分辨哪个人技能水平低但很勤奋、哪个人则是技能水平高却很懒惰。引入考核制度奖励努力工作的人、惩罚偷懒者能够提高员工的积极性，但也可能会产 生严重的不良影响。

What should firms do? A good place to start is with the worst kind of  behaviour: crime. In a paper published in 1968 Gary Becker, of the  University of Chicago, set out the factors which policymakers should  consider when deciding on what resources they should devote to  detection. In his model criminals calculate the risks and benefits of  bad behaviour, taking into account the possible monetary reward, the  probability of being caught and the subsequent punishment. To cut crime  authorities must increase the probability of being caught, the severity  of the punishment, or both. This approach can also be applied to less  extreme forms of bad behaviour, such as slow or sloppy work: firms may  have to monitor individual workers, and then reward the good and punish  the bad.

企业该怎么办呢？先来考虑最坏的表现行为—犯罪，这可能是一个好的起点。芝加哥大学的加里·贝克尔在1968年发表的一篇论文中，阐述了政策制定者在投入 资源进行监控时要考虑的因素。在他的模型中罪犯们会计算犯罪活动的收益和风险，要考虑可能的金钱收益和被逮捕等惩罚。要降低犯罪率当局需要提高犯罪被抓住 的可能性或惩罚的严厉程度，或者双管齐下。这种思路也可以用来处理不太严重的不良行为，比如工作速度慢或工作马虎。企业必须监控个体工人，奖优罚劣。

But a system like this comes with costs. People do not work hard for  money alone. They also have other motives, such as doing a good job. In a  1971 paper Edward Deci, of Rochester University, tested the effect that  external rewards—cash bonuses or fines—have on such “intrinsic”  motivation. Two groups were given a 3D puzzle and asked to create a  variety of shapes. Because the puzzle was fun and mentally taxing,  intrinsic motivation was high. One group, left to proceed at its own  pace, worked hard. A second group was monitored, and given a $1 reward  for each shape that was successfully replicated. This payment was later  withdrawn, with the result that the second group now put in less effort  than the first. Its members switched off, turning instead to Playboy or  the New Yorker. Monetary rewards, Mr Deci reasoned, had killed their  intrinsic motivation.

但是这样的系统是需要成本的。人们不只是为了钱才会努力工作。他们也有其他动机，比如把事情做好的动机。爱德华·德西在1971年发表的一篇论文中描述了 一个外部报酬（现金奖惩）对“内在”动机影响的实验。实验中两组人员分别拿到了一套3D拼图，要求拼出各种各样的形状。其中一组任意发挥，不受干涉，结果 表现得很努力。另外一组则要进行考核，每拼出一个指定的图形就奖励1美元。最后奖励付给了第二组人员，但是他们的努力程度还不如第一组。这组的成员对工作 没了兴趣，跑去阅读《花花公子》和《纽约客》等杂志去了。爱德华·德西由此认为，金钱奖励会扼杀内部动机。

Watching workers closely can have other drawbacks. Setting up an  incentive scheme for a particular task costs time and money. And it  reveals something about the task: that it is important for a firm’s  success and considered difficult. In a 2003 study Roland Bénabou, of  Princeton University, and Jean Tirole, of Toulouse University, showed  how this can lead employees to work more slowly. Efforts might simply  shift from speed to accuracy.

密切监控工人还有其他缺点。为特定的任务设计一个激励计划既花时间也费钱，并且还会透露这项任务的某些属性，比如：这是一项对于企业的成功来说很重要的任 务，可能会比较难。2003年普林斯顿大学的罗兰·伯拉布和图卢兹大学的让·梯若尔研究发现这会让员工的工作速度变慢，员工努力的方向从速度转向了准确 性。

The effects of monitoring may be even worse if “reciprocity” is taken  into account. Matthew Rabin, of the University of California, Berkeley,  explored this concept in a paper in 1993. People with a strong sense of  fairness like to help those whom they perceive as helpful. But the flip  side is that they will punish those they see as being unhelpful. So a  monopolist charging rip-off prices may be shunned, even if the shopper  really wants the product. Similarly, an unfair boss may be punished with  bad work, even if this hurts the worker too.

如果考虑到“以牙还牙”效应的影响，监控员工的影响还可能更糟。加州大学伯克利分校的马修·拉宾在1993年的一篇论文中解释了这个概念。具有强烈的公平 感的人喜欢帮助那些他们认为是愿意帮忙的人。但反过来，他们也会惩罚那些被认为是不愿帮忙的人。所以人们不愿搭理索要高价的垄断者，即使他提供的产品很有 吸引力。同样，工人们会通过把事情搞糟的方法来惩罚不公平的老板，即使他们本身也因此遭受损失。

If monitoring has both benefits and costs, what is the right level?  Michèle Belot, of Edinburgh University, and Marina Schr?der, of  Magdeburg University, have devised a test. They gave volunteers boxes  containing €780 ($1,010) in coins and asked them to separate these into  different types. The job is trickier than it sounds, because the euro  zone has 160 different types of coin: eight values, from one cent to €2,  in 20 designs, one for each of the zone’s 17 members plus Monaco, San  Marino and the Vatican. The task, for which volunteers were paid €20,  has some clever properties. First, it can be completed perfectly with  effort but not much skill (time pressure was minimal and volunteers were  allowed to take the boxes home). Second, bad work can be measured and  comes in several forms. The coins could be badly sorted. The box could  be returned late. And the coins might be stolen: the boxes contained  Vatican coins which are worth more to collectors than their face value.  By replacing a 50-cent piece from the Vatican (worth around €3 in online  auctions) with a regular 50-cent coin, the volunteer could net €2.50.

如果监控虽然有成本也能带来好处，那么什么水平的监控最合适呢？爱丁堡大学的米歇尔·贝洛和马格德堡大学的玛丽娜·施罗德设计了一项测试。他们每个志愿者 发一个装有780欧元硬币（相当于1010美元）的盒子，请他们给硬币分类。这个测试实际上比看上去的要复杂：欧盟有160种不同的硬币，从一分到两欧元 一共有8种面值、17个欧元国家再加上摩纳哥、圣马力诺和梵蒂冈一共20套设计方案。完成这些工作志愿者将获得20欧元的报酬，其中有许多机巧。首先，完 成这些工作只需要付出努力，不需要什么技术水平（时间很宽松、志愿者还可以把盒子带回家）。其次，工作做得不好可以表现为多种不同的形式，而且可以进行衡 量：硬币可能被分错类、盒子交还的时间可能会拖延，还有硬币可能会被偷换—盒子里有梵蒂冈发行的硬币，对于收藏者而言它们的价值高于面值。把一个50分的梵蒂冈硬币（网上拍卖价在3欧元左右）换成一个普通的50分硬币，志愿者就赚到了2.5欧元。

High bar or no bar
要么严苛，要么不管

The researchers tested different configurations of monitoring and  rewards. A control group was not supervised at all and paid immediately  regardless of performance. Two other groups were watched, and rewarded  according to their performance. The first scheme was pretty lax: workers  lost just €1 for every ten mistakes. The second was much harsher: the  payment was cut by €15 if more than two coins were wrongly identified.

测试人员对考核和奖励的不同方案进行了测试。有一个完全不做考核，不管工作完成得怎么样做完立即付款。还有两个组则进行了考核。第一组的考核很宽松，每犯十个错误扣1欧元。第二组的考核要严厉得多，如果硬币弄错两个以上，报酬减少15欧元。

The results suggest that lax monitoring is a bad option: 30% of  volunteers made more than ten mistakes—worse than the group with no  supervision. On top of this, late returns increased. This means that the  resources devoted to monitoring were wasted. The stricter regime,  however, did offer some benefits. Accuracy improved, with only 16% of  volunteers making more than ten mistakes. But some also shifted their  effort, working more slowly and handing the coins in late. Neither  system had any effect on theft: in all three groups one in ten  volunteers stole coins.

结果表明宽松的考核是件坏事。考核宽松的组中有30%的志愿者犯的错误超过10个，比完全不考核的组还要差。而且延期归还盒子的情况也增加了。这说明为考 核所付出的资源全都浪费掉了。然而最后一个组的严格考核，带来了一定的好处。准确率提高了，只有16%的志愿者犯的错误超过了10个。但这也使得志愿者的 努力方向发生了变化，工作完成得更慢、盒子交回的时间更迟了。不管哪一种方案对偷换硬币的问题都没有影响，这三个组中都是每十个志愿者就会有一个偷换硬 币。

In economics opting for the middle ground is usually best. But in this  case the extremes seem to be a better choice: monitor hard, or do not  monitor at all. A little bit of monitoring only annoys the good workers,  causing them to slacken off. And sometimes the wisest thing is just to  let people get on with the job.

在经济学中，折衷方案往往是最佳方案。但在这个案例里似乎“走极端”更好：考核严格或完全不考核都可以。一点点考核只会让好工人厌烦、懈怠。有时最明智的做法是让人们自由发挥。