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导读：本周，塞浦路斯议会以36：0的投票结果否决了欧元区的救助，以抗议欧盟计划对银行存款实施大规模的征税。 Charlemagne 查理曼 Small island, big finger 岛国虽小，脾气却不小 Cyprus's rejection of a bail-out plan raises new doubts about the future of the euro 塞浦路斯否决救助计划再次引发对欧元未来的担忧 Mar 23rd 2013 |From the print edition CALL it the cussedness of an island nation. Beneath the cheeriness of Aphrodite's sun-kissed island lies the intransigence of the Balkans and the Middle East. On the eve of its accession to the European Union in 2004, the Greek-Cypriot republic rejected a UN plan to reunite with the Turkish-Cypriot north, where the plan was supported. 你可以把它称之为一个岛国的倔强。这是一个沐浴在爱神阳光之中的岛国，在它那欢乐的表面之下是巴尔干和中东的不妥协与不让步。在2004年加入欧盟的前夕，希腊族控制下的塞浦路斯否决了一项联合国提出的计划，拒绝同土耳其族控制下的北部实现重新统一。 Within the club the Greek-Cypriot government has used and abused EU institutions to wage its feud with Turkey and to lend support to Russia. 加入欧盟后，希腊族控制下的塞浦路斯政府又利用这个机构来对抗土耳其，并且还把欧盟提供给他们的援助出借给俄罗斯。 This week's 36-0 vote in the Cypriot parliament to reject a euro-zone bail-out, in protest at a large proposed tax on bank deposits, may be the most momentous act of bloody-mindedness yet, raising new questions about the stability, and even the survival, of the euro. 本周，塞浦路斯议会以36：0的投票结果否决了欧元区的救助，以抗议欧盟计划对银行存款实施大规模的征税，这可能是迄今最为严重的一次蓄意犯上行为，它不仅重新引发了对稳定的质疑，而且还威胁到塞浦路斯以及欧元的生存。 Outside parliament, a demonstrator's poster summed up the mood: “Fuck Europe”. Such defiance from the island will be admired by some, yet it does not alter Cyprus's predicament. It is bust, and cannot afford to salvage its oversized and insolvent banks (see article). 在塞浦路斯议会外面，一位抗议者手中的标语概括地道出了这个岛国的反抗情绪。标语是这样写的：“XXX，欧洲”。虽然有人会对这种不屈大加赞赏，但是这改变不了塞浦路斯的困境。这个国家已经破产，而且无力拯救那些规模过于庞大而且资不抵债的银行。 Cyprus is also trying to play the euro zone against Russia, amid rumours that it might be prepared to offer Russia concessions in offshore gasfields or a naval base. 塞浦路斯正在试图依靠俄罗斯来对抗欧元区。有传言说，该国准备以近海天燃气气田或者海军基地来换取俄罗斯的让步。 But who really holds the gun—the firing squad, or the prisoner? The question was raised in Greece last year, and leaders decided to keep it in the euro, even at the cost of overt and covert debt-forgiveness. 但是，谁才是真正拿枪的那个人呢？——是刽子手，还是囚徒 ？这个问题早在去年就曾在希腊出现过。当时，欧盟领导人们决定，即使付出部分或全部减免债务的代价，也要让希腊留在欧元区内。 Cyprus is even smaller, accounting for just 0.2% of euro-zone GDP. Yet Eurocrats insist it too is of “systemic” importance. A bank run in Cyprus could start one in other countries with dodgy banks. And the prospect of Cyprus's exit from the euro would raise doubts about the future of other weak members of the currency. 相比之下，塞浦路斯是一个更小的国家，其国内生产总值仅为欧元区GDP的0.2%。不过，欧盟官员坚持认为，塞浦路斯也具有“系统性”的重要性。塞浦路斯银行的挤兑有可能引起其他国家的问题银行也出现挤兑，同时，塞国退出欧元区的预期也会引发了人们对该货币体系中其他弱势国家的未来的担忧。 For now, the Eurocrats say it is up to Cyprus to come up with an alternative plan. Perhaps they think Cyprus will have to come to its senses if it is ever to reopen its banks. And if it remains obstinate, some would see advantage in making an example of the Cypriots. To euro-zone hawks, the spread of moral hazard is the most dangerous form of contagion. 目前来看，欧盟官员认为，现在该是塞浦路斯提出替代性的方案的时候了。他们之所以这样想，或许是因为他们认识到，如果塞国想让银行重新开门营业，该国将不得不做出让步；如果塞国继续顽抗下去，有人就会利用他们的例子大做文章。对于欧元区的鹰派来说，道德沦丧的扩散是最危险的传染方式。 In many ways, the mess in Cyprus comes down to the political symbolism of round numbers. Germany said the euro zone would lend no more than €10 billion ($13 billion) to recapitalise Cyprus's banks and refinance its debt. The IMF insisted the island's debt should be kept below 100% of GDP by 2020. 塞国的混乱从多个方面体现出了周边国家的政治。德国认为，欧元区借给塞浦路斯为银行注资和为债务再融资的资金不能超过100亿欧元（合130亿美元）；国际货币基金组织（IMF）则坚持说，这个岛国的债务到2020年时应当低于其GDP的总额； And Nicos Anastasiades, the new president of Cyprus, was adamant that any tax levied on big depositors should be kept below 10%. Put crudely, the euro zone and the IMF ensured the bail-out should be accompanied by a bail-in of depositors; but Cyprus chose to inflict much of the pain on grandmothers' savings so as to limit the losses of Russian oligarchs. 而塞浦路斯新总统尼克斯·阿纳斯塔夏季斯也不肯让步，坚持对大储户的征税税率应当保持在10%以下。笼统地讲，欧元区和IMF要确保救助与自救同步进行；而塞浦路斯则选择将大部分痛苦转嫁给祖父辈的存款，为的是以此减少俄罗斯寡头们的损失。 As so often, short-term politics has trumped rational crisis-management. The deal in Cyprus should have been a dry run for the banking union that the euro zone seeks to create. Instead it has raised questions about whether Europeans genuinely intend to break the link between weak banks and weak sovereigns. 如同以前经常发生的那样，短期的政治行为总是能压倒理性的危机管理。塞浦路斯协议本应是欧盟想要建立的那种银行联盟的一次预演。谁承想，该协议却对欧盟是否真心想要打破弱势银行与弱势主权国家之间的联系提出了质疑。 Take deposit guarantees. In the early days of the financial crisis the EU raised deposit insurance to €100,000 to prevent bank runs. Now it risks provoking them by seeming to breach that guarantee. National deposit insurance is plainly limited by the solvency of the state. A common deposit-guarantee system in the euro zone makes sense, however much the Germans and Eurocrats may claim it is irrelevant. 让我们以存款担保为例来说明一下这个问题。在金融危机初期，为了防止银行发生挤兑，欧盟将受保护的存款上限提高到100000欧元。如今，欧盟似乎正在以违背担保的方式来冒险激怒储户。国家对存款的保护完全是由国家的主权来界定的。虽说在欧元区内建立一个普通的存款保证制度属于情理之中的事，但大多数德国人与欧盟官员却宣称这与他们毫不相关。 Then look at the promise of a common means of winding down troubled banks. Uniform bank-resolution rules were supposed to be adopted in each EU country, and later on a unified system was due to be created for the euro zone. The Cyprus deal makes a mockery of the proposed hierarchy of creditors to absorb bank losses: senior bondholders (few in the case of Cyprus) have been spared but small depositors penalised. 其次，我们再来看看那些采取普通方式对问题银行进行瘦身的承诺。根据欧盟的设想，每一个成员国都应当采纳统一的银行决议规则，随后，欧元区还将为此而创建一个统一的体系。塞浦路斯协议是对由债权人按照等级来承担银行损失这一提议的嘲讽。因为优先债券持有人的利益（在塞浦路斯的案例中几乎没有）并受到损害，最后买单的都是小储户。 With a proper banking union, other options become possible. One is the orderly wind-down of Cyprus's two big crippled banks. This would impose heavier losses on large deposits (up to 50%), but protect small savers and shrink the banking sector. Another option would be the direct recapitalisation of banks by the euro zone. And with a less rickety banking system, it would be easier to get tough with rule breakers. 在建立了合适的银行联盟后，欧盟的选项可能会随之而增多。其中之一就是允许塞浦路斯国内已经瘫痪的两家大银行有序地破产，这虽然有可能给大储户（约总储户总数的50%）带来较为沉重的损失，却能让小储户免受其害，并且还可缩小该国的银行业。另一个选项是由欧元区对银行进行直接注资。随着银行系统变得不再那么不堪一击，欧盟就可以更容易地惩处违规者。 Draghi's dilemmas 德拉吉的两难困境 Amid the muddling of European leaders, Mario Draghi, boss of the ECB, has stood out as the prime guarantor of the euro. His conditional promise to buy the bonds of vulnerable sovereigns did much to restore calm last year, though it has never been tested. 虽然欧洲领导人表现的昏聩无能，但作为欧元主要担保人的欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉却一直表现出色。他曾在去年做出购买脆弱主权国家债券的有条件承诺，该承诺虽然为恢复局势做出了巨大的贡献，但一直没有接受检验。 The ECB, moreover, is being charged with overseeing a new single euro-zone bank supervisor. Its jealously guarded independence is supposed to lend credibility to the system. Yet the more the ECB involves itself in managing the crisis, the more it sullies itself with politics. 除此之外，欧洲央行还承担着欧元区新型单一货币银行监督者的责任，它小心翼翼地维护着自己独立性，而这种独立性被认为是给整个货币体系提供了信用。然而，只要欧洲央行更多地介入危机应对，它同政治的瓜葛就会越发纠缠不清。 And having been intimately involved in the botched plan for Cyprus's banks, and insisted on the protection of senior bondholders, it is reasonable to question whether the ECB is up to the task of bank supervision. 由于它深深地卷入了拯救塞浦路斯银行的蹩脚计划，并且还在保护高级债券持有人问题上固执已见，因此完全有理由对欧洲央行是否履行了监管责任提出质疑。 There is another question: now that voters in Italy and MPs in Cyprus have openly rejected the strictures of the euro zone, might the ECB's magic spell be broken? After all, its bond-buying policy depends crucially on troubled countries submitting to a euro-zone reform programme. The ECB may reach a decisive moment sooner. 另一个问题是：既然意大利选民和塞浦路斯议员都已经公开反对欧元区的刁难，那么欧洲央行的魔咒有可能被打破吗？说到底，欧洲央行的债券购买政策关键在于问题国家是否会屈服于对欧元区的改革计划。欧洲央行很快就会迎来一个决定性的时刻。 Cyprus' banks survive only on the ECB's emergency liquidity. If there is no deal in Cyprus, the ECB will have to decide whether to follow through on its ultimatum to cut off the money within days. 塞浦路斯的银行只有依靠欧洲央行提供的紧急流动性才能生存下去。如果塞浦路斯拿不出协议，欧洲央行将被迫决定，是否按照其最后通牒的要求在数天之内切断资金供应。 This would cause a messy collapse and almost certainly push Cyprus out of the euro. Mr Draghi has bravely stepped in to defend the weakest members of the euro zone. But would he dare to shoot one of his own? 这可能会引发一场无序的崩溃，而且几乎肯定会逼迫塞浦路斯退出欧元区。德拉吉曾经勇敢地站出来保护欧元区内最弱势的成员国。但现在的问题在于，他敢向自己人开枪吗？ 【日积月累】 intransigence n.不妥协 feud n.不和 contagion n.蔓延 oligarch n.寡头统治集团成员 stricture n.狭窄 |
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