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What is India’s “Cold Start” military doctrine? 【经济学人】怎么理解印度的“冷启动”军事政策？ 2017年1月31日 BY M.F. 翻译：巍峨群山 微信公众号：Yeetii 个人博客：Yeetii.com LAST week India celebrated its 68th Republic Day, the highlight of which is an elaborate parade to show off India’s military might (pictured). Soldiers goose-stepped and tanks rolled down Rajpath, New Delhi’s main ceremonial thoroughfare, as India's president, Pranab Mukherjee, and this year’s guest of honour, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, looked on. Fighter jets screeched overhead. The annual display was particularly pointed this year, coming barely three weeks after Bipin Rawat, India’s new army chief, acknowledged in an interview the existence of the country’s “Cold Start” military doctrine. What is Cold Start and why did General Rawat, who took office on December 31st, mention it in public? 上周，印度第68届共和国日，印度举办了盛大的游行庆典，充分展示它的军事力量（如上图）。在新德里的主干道国王大道上，士兵们鹅行前进，坦克群滚滚而来，天空上战机呼啸而过，印度总统普拉纳布·穆克吉和特邀嘉宾阿布扎比王储阿勒纳哈扬在一旁观礼。今年的军事展示特别的突出，而就在三周前，印度新任陆军参谋长比平·拉瓦特将军在一次采访中承认了印度“冷启动”军事政策的存在。什么是冷启动政策？而刚刚在12月31日走马上任的拉瓦特将军，为什么会公开这个政策？ Cold Start is the name given to a limited-war strategy designed to seize Pakistani territory swiftly without, in theory, risking a nuclear conflict. It has its roots in an attack on India’s parliament in 2001, which was carried out by terrorist groups allegedly used as proxies by Pakistan’s powerful intelligence services (ISI). India’s response to the onslaught was a flop: by the time its lumbering Strike Corps were mobilised and positioned on the frontier, Pakistan had already bulked up its defences, raising both the costs of incursion and the risk that it would escalate into a nuclear conflict. Cold Start is an attempt to draw lessons from this: having nimbler, integrated units stationed closer to the border would allow India to inflict significant harm before international powers demanded a ceasefire; by pursuing narrow aims, it would also deny Pakistan a justification for triggering a nuclear strike. Yet India has refused to own up to the existence of the doctrine since it was first publicly discussed in 2004. Nor was its rumoured existence enough to stop Pakistani terrorists from launching devastating attacks in Mumbai in 2008, killing 164 people. 冷启动政策是一种有限战争战略，这种策略从理论上设想，快速夺取巴基斯坦的领土，但又不会引发两国核冲突。2001年印度国会遭遇了一次恐怖袭击，印度指责发动袭击的恐怖分子是巴基斯坦强大的情报部门（ISI）的代理。但印度对这次袭击的反击行动却很失败：当它行动迟缓的打击部队在印巴前线集结完毕时，巴基斯坦已经完全巩固了它的防御，印度这时进攻会损失惨重，并面临冲突升级到核冲突的危险。冷启动政策就是从这次失败中吸取教训而诞生：通过把灵活，集成的战斗单元布置在边境附近，印度可以在国际社会进行干涉之前对巴基斯坦实施重大打击，并且通过缩小打击范围，使巴基斯坦没有理由扣动核扳机。自从2004年第一次公开讨论这个政策以来，印度一直拒绝承认这个政策的存在。而且这个传说中的政策也没能阻止巴基斯坦恐怖分子在2008年对孟买的恐怖袭击，那次袭击杀死了164人。 One reason for India to keep its cards close to its chest is that it may not be capable of acting on Cold Start. Indeed, India’s army chief admitted to civilian leaders after the 2008 attacks that his battalions were “not ready for war” with Pakistan. It probably did not help that India’s political leaders never signed off on it either, as a leaked diplomatic cable from 2010 suggested. Yet things have taken a different turn since an assault last September on the Indian garrison of Uri in Kashmir, which left 19 dead. In a departure from India’s traditionally defensive posture, the government responded by authorising “surgical strikes” along the frontier, targeted at “terrorist launchpads” and “those protecting them”. By acknowledging the doctrine, which would demand a more potent retaliation than these commando operations, the army seems keen to signal that it has a range of strategic options, introducing an element of unpredictability in the seriousness of its response. Political leaders may have also come closer to embracing it. The government of Narendra Modi has shown keen interest in national-security matters, moving India into the world's top-five defence spenders, addressing servicemen’s grievances and mulling a wholesale revamp of the armed forces’ structure. 印度对此保密的原因，可能是因为它没有能力实施冷启动。在2008年袭击发生后，印度陆军参谋长对政府首脑承认他的军队“没有准备好”与巴基斯坦一战。这可能也是印度政治领袖从来没承认这个政策存在的理由，2010年泄露的一封外交电报暗示了这一点。而去年九月，印控克什米尔地区的尤里军事据地受到袭击，19人死亡，这使情况发生了变化。与以前印度的防御性姿态不同，印度政府授权前线军队实施“外科手术式打击”，目标是“恐怖分子的前哨站”和“他们的保护者”。在这种突击行动之上，冷启动政策允许实施更强力的报复行动，军方通过承认这个政策的存在，向外界发出一个强烈的信号：它有一系列的战略措施可供选择，它对恐怖行为的反应将是认真的，不可预测的。而印度政治首脑随后表示欢迎这个政策。莫迪政府一直强烈的关注国防事务，印度在他的任期成为全球国防开支最高的五个国家之一，他关注军人的抱怨，并考虑对军事机构进行整体改造。 Whether the strategy will prove effective remains to be seen. By pursuing Cold Start, the army may have reaped “the worst of both worlds”, says Walter Ladwig, a scholar at King’s College London. Should it come after a terrorist attack prepared with the ISI’s knowledge, India’s response would lack the element of surprise. That makes Cold Start a dubious deterrent. And Mr Rawat’s recognition of the doctrine’s existence provides further reason for Pakistan to develop “tactical” nukes—tiny warheads that could easily end up in inexpert or malevolent hands. The risk of overreaction on Pakistan’s side is heightened by India’s continued obfuscation about what exactly the concept means, making the whole premise seem misguided. Indeed, Pakistani officials have already threatened to use nuclear weapons, should India put Cold Start into action. In conventional war, confusing an enemy can lead to victory; when two nuclear powers are involved it is a surer step towards a disastrous draw. 这个政策的效果有待观察。伦敦国王学院的学者沃尔特·拉德维格认为，实施冷启动政策，印度军队的行动将会造成对于双方而言都是最糟糕的结果。假如恐怖分子在ISI的指导之下实施了恐怖袭击，印度就会实施冷启动政策，那印度的行动将毫无出奇制胜之处。这使冷启动政策毫无威慑力。（巍峨群山注：如果这时发生了恐怖袭击，意味着策划者和巴基斯坦军方都已经做好了印度实施“冷启动”报复的准备，这个政策毫无威慑力。）并且拉瓦特将军宣布这项政策的存在，反而给了巴基斯坦发展“战术”核武器的借口——这种武器可以很容易的落到新手或者恐怖分子手中。而一直以来印度这个政策的内容含糊不清，这加重了巴基斯坦可能会过激反应的风险，与这个政策的目标南辕北辙。事实上，巴基斯坦已经公开威胁，如果印度实施冷启动政策，巴基斯坦将使用核武器。在常规战争中，使敌人迷惑将会带来胜利；但如果是两个拥有核武器的国家处于迷惑当中，这毫无疑问将带来灾难性的后果。 版权声明： |
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