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Serious injury during mooring operations Cielo di Tocopilla, a Maltese registered bulk carrier was loading steel products in the port of Ilo, Peru. On 27 March 2016, the master was instructed to leave berth due to worsening weather conditions. At the time of departure, the bridge was manned by the master, an OOW, an AB and the deck cadet. At 2142 (LT), a local pilot boarded the vessel and two tugs were made fast fore and aft. At the time, moderate to near gale was blowing from the South southwest. The sea was rough. The forward mooring station was manned by the chief mate, the bosun and two able seamen. During the un-berthing operation, Cielo di Tocopilla ranged up and down the breakwater. The chief mate thus directed the bosun to adjust the tension on the backspring. The main engine was also momentarily put astern to arrest her forward motion. However, at about 2224, Cielo di Tocopilla was pounded by heavy swell causing her to surge and heave. The sudden load brought on by the wave caused the backspring to part. The whiplash of the mooring rope section remaining on board struck the bosun on his right leg. The crew member was declared unfit to work for six months and advised physiotherapy and evaluation by traumatology. The crew member was eventually signed off and repatriated. According to the SMS, mooring operations must be conducted in accordance with statutory and industry guidelines. The master and deck officers at the mooring stations were responsible for safe mooring practice.  Four pirate attacks reported in Asia in February A total of four incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships were reported in Asia in February 2017. Of these, three were actual incidents and one was an attempted incident. Of the three actual incidents, two were incidents of armed robbery against ship and one was a piracy incident. Of concern was the continued occurrence of incidents involving the abduction of crew from ships while underway in the Sulu-Celebes Sea and waters off eastern Sabah. In February 2017, one actual incident and one attempted incident involving the abduction of crew were reported. Reducing the Risk of Liquefaction The London P&I Club together with TMC Marine and Bureau Veritas published a booklet to provide general guidance and practical advice to masters, ship owners, shippers and charterers on the loading and the carriage of bulk cargoes which may liquefy, the risks associated with liquefaction and the precautions to minimize these risks. It is not intended to replace, in any way or form, the official IMO regulations and guidance notes or any document that forms part of a vessel’s safety management system. While the main requirements for the safe carriage of solid bulk cargoes are enshrined in the IMSBC Code, this booklet outlines the precautions you should take before accepting cargoes for shipment and the procedures you should follow for the loading and carriage of the nominated cargo. You will still need to consult the Code to check whether the cargo you are about to carry or carrying complies fully with the Code. Please note that the IMSBC Code is mandatory under the provisions of the SOLAS Convention. However, some parts of the Code continue to be recommendatory or informative and therefore in the context of the language of the Code, the words “shall”, “should” and “may”, when used in the Code, should be taken to mean that the relevant provisions are “mandatory”, “recommendatory” and “optional”, respectively. Conducting Incident Investigation The North of England P&I Association published loss prevention briefing including all important issues to take into consideration for a proper incident investigation. The Club analyses how to conduct an investigation; to collect and preserve the evidence; to examine data and find probable cause and also how to use data to identify trends. The investigation should establish on below simple queries as,
As for the collection of evidence – the simple process on managing the evidence is 1. Collect : Gathering physical or documentary or even electronic evidences as well as witness statements 2. Preserve : Ensuring that the evidence remains protected 3. Record : Maintaining a record of the items on the evidence After identifying the root causes, North suggests that the next step is to consider how to prevent it. Once agreed, the recommendations should be distributed across the full company fleet, so everyone can learn from the incident. Furthermore, there must be a system of follow-up and closing-out to ensure the recommendations are implemented.
 Safe transportation of soya beans
UK P&I Club together with CWA International published guidance to advice on safe transportation of soya beans. According to the report, Brazil is expected to produce a record soya bean crop yield this year, which is reflected in the number of vessels currently queuing at Brazilian ports.
are clearly explained with recommendations for safe cargo operations as well as safe passage.
Resulted with ‘grounding’ during turning manoeuvre operations
Bundesstelle fur Seeunfalluntersuchung issued investigation report regarding the grounding of the German-flagged multipurpose ship BBC MAPLE LEA in the Lake Saint-Louis, Canada. The ship cast off from the port of Sainte-Catherine in Canada to commence her voyage to Falmouth in the United Kingdom. A pilot was on board for the passage through the Saint Lawrence Seaway. The BBC MAPLE LEA initially proceeded in a westerly direction on the Canal de la Rive Sud to turn in Lake Saint-Louis for lack of an opportunity to turn in the port of lading. The pilot favoured the firway section west of buoy A13 for the turning manoeuvre in the shipboard voyage plan, which would have entailed a detour totalling 13nm. The BBC MAPLE LEA’s draught stood at 8m. The turning manoeuvre west of buoy A13 failed, which resulted in the BBC MAPLE LEA sailing out of the fairway southwest of buoy A18 and grounding there in an area with water depths of between 6m and 7,3m. The bow thruster was damaged in the process, which resulted in a small spill of hydraulic oil. The accident did not cause injury to any individual. Factual information with ship particulars, Course of the accident and the investigation with VDR/VTS Records, Analysis on the bridge team/BTM with actions taken after the incident, Conclusions on the communication and interaction of the bridge team with final actions taken and finding are detailed in the official report.
Malaria prevention for seafarers Under its “Seafarers’ Health Information Programme”, International Seafarers’ Welfare and Assistance Network issued a report on malaria prevention, as the disease causes at least 1 million deaths every year, the majority of which occur in resource-poor countries, such as Africa, south and central America, Asia and the middle east. The symptoms of the most life-threatening type of malaria are usually experienced between 1 week and 2 months after infection. There are other, less severe types of malaria, which can cause symptoms more than a year later. Even in its uncomplicated form, malaria is debilitating. It clinically presents with a variety of non-specific, flu-like symptoms, including: Fever (often exceeding 40°C) / Chills / Malaise / Nausea and vomiting / Fatigue / Myalgia (muscle pain) / Headaches / Sweating
Fire in the Engine Room due Oil Leakage – MT ASKARA The Maltese registered chemical / oil tanker Askara departed the port of Kobe, Japan after completing her cargo discharge operations. The vessel was bound for Hong Kong for bunkers. In preparation for the bunkering operations, and in order to avoid mixing the new parcel of bunkers with the one already on board, the chief engineer instructed the second engineer to transfer all the fuel oil from port heavy fuel oil (HFO) storage tank to starboard HFO storage tank. The fuel oil transfer was carried out successfully as requested by the chief engineer. However, towards the end of the transfer, the second engineer noticed that the low level alarm fitted on port HFO storage tank did not activate. A manual sounding of port side HFO storage tank confirmed that the fuel oil had indeed been transferred and that the level was well below the 0.5 m (the level which should have triggered the low level alarm). Suspecting a fault in the low level alarm switch, the second engineer instructed the third engineer to overhaul the alarm low level alarm switch on port side HFO storage tank in order to identify and rectify the fault. The task was also discussed between the third engineer and the chief engineer and the necessary ‘Permit to ‘Work’ document was issued. Just after 1700 (LT), after his engineering watch, the third engineer commenced the dismantling of the low level alarm switch. The low level alarm was a conventional float switch, fitted by means of four studs and its removal was a relatively simple task. At about 1710, immediately after dismantling the low level alarm float switch, fuel oil escaped almost instantaneously from the opening. It was immediately evident that the tank from where the low level alarm switch had been removed contained a significant volume of fuel oil and there was enough static pressure for the leaking fuel oil to reach the main engine exhaust manifold. The third engineer tried to mount the fuel oil low level alarm back to the tank in an attempt to stop the fuel oil leak. However, in view of the heavy flow and the high temperature of the fuel oil, he was unsuccessful. Soon after, the fuel oil coming in contact with the main engine’s exhaust manifold auto ignited. Shortly after, the fire alarm sounded around the vessel. Cause of Fire, Safety actions taken during the course of the safety investigation further detailed in the publication.
FIRE! – Near-misses International Marine Contractors Association has published safety flash as latest focusing on Fire Safety. Four recently reported incidents are all involving fire or the risk of fire. The first involves an actual galley fire which was extinguished by automatic equipment. Lack of knowledge, inadequate maintenance and work standards and lack of skill and poor practice were amongst the root causes identified. The next two incidents deal with near misses where equipment failure caused smoke or a small fire. In both cases the presence of smoke triggered automatic smoke detection systems, causing a General Alarm. The prompt and professional response of the vessel crew ensured that neither incident got out of control. The second of these incidents was caused by fuel impacting on hot metal. The final near miss, in which during a drill the vessel bridge was found to have no control of the emergency fire pump, could have led to a serious issue in the event of a real fire.
Tugger Winch Incident A Platform Supply Vessel had completed loading operations and the deck crew was securing the cargo for sea with assistance from the tugger winch. The AB who was operating the tugger winch was well experienced and had carried out this operation many times. The AB stood at the tugger winch with his right foot resting on the winch support plate and started heaving up the wire using the control handle which was located above the winch. As the winch barrel rotated the wire securing bar trapped the AB's foot between the winch support plate and the rotating barrel crushing his foot as it rotated.
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