两种资本主义：苹果与谷歌 | 大西洋月刊

Capitalism the Apple Way vs. Capitalism the Google Way

While lots of attention is directed toward identifying the next great start-up, the defining tech-industry story of the last decade has been the rise of Apple and Google. In terms of wealth creation, there is no comparison. Eight years ago, neither one of them was even in the top 10 most valuable companies in the world, and their combined market value was less than $300 billion. Now, Apple and Alphabet (Google’s parent company) have become the two most valuable companies, with a combined market capitalization of over $1.3 trillion. And increasingly, these two behemoths are starting to collide in various markets, from smartphones to home-audio devices to, according to speculation, automobiles.

尽管大家的目光都聚焦在找出下一个伟大的初创企业，过去十年间科技产业故事的主线依然是苹果和谷歌的崛起。在积累财富方面，两家公司无出其右。八年前，两家公司都未杀入世界十大最有价值公司，市值加起来不超过3000亿美元。如今，苹果和字母表（谷歌母公司）已成为世界上最具价值的公司，总市值超过1.3万亿美元。两个大鳄在各个市场冲突日多，从智能手机到家庭音频设备，据猜测，它们还将在汽车产业展开竞争。

But the greatest collision between Apple and Google is little noticed. The companies have taken completely different approaches to their shareholders and to the future, one willing to accede to the demands of investors and the other keeping power in the hands of founders and executives. These rival approaches are about something much bigger than just two of the most important companies in the world; they embody two alternative models of capitalism, and the one that wins out will shape the future of the economy.

可苹果和谷歌间的最大冲突却很少有人注意。两家公司对其股东和未来发展采取完全不同的方式，一个愿意迁就投资者，另一个把权力掌控在创始人和经理人的手中。两种相互竞争的方式不仅关系世界上最重要的两家公司，还体现出两种资本主义模式，而胜出的一方将塑造经济的未来。

In the spring of 2012, Toni Sacconaghi, a respected equity-research analyst, released a report that contemplated a radical move for Apple. He, along with other analysts, had repeatedly been pushing Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, to consider returning some of Apple’s stockpile of cash, which approached $100 billion by the end of 2011, to shareholders. Cook, and Steve Jobs before him, had resisted similar calls so that the company could, in the words of Jobs, “keep their powder dry” and take advantage of “more strategic opportunities in the future.”

2012年春天，深受尊敬的股票研究分析人士托尼·萨克纳西发表报告，提出苹果采取激进之举。他和其他分析家一直以来要求苹果首席执行官蒂姆·库克考虑将苹果囤积的现金部分返还给股东，2011年底，其资金池已达一千亿美元。库克及前任史蒂夫·乔布斯则反对类似呼吁，用乔布斯的话说，存钱的公司才能“晒干火药”，对“未来更具战略性的机会”加以利用。

But there was another reason Apple wouldn’t so readily part with this cash: The majority of it was in Ireland because of the company’s fortuitous creation of Apple Operations International in Ireland in 1980. Since then, the vast majority of Apple’s non-U.S. profits had found their way to the country, and tapping into that cash would mean incurring significant U.S. taxes due upon repatriation to American soil. 

可苹果不愿拿出现金另有原因：大部分钱都存在苹果运营国际，那是公司1980年在爱尔兰偶然间创建的，如今却歪打正着。多年来，苹果公司的非本土收益都流入爱尔兰，动了那笔钱，转到美国本土，意味着要上缴大笔税收。

So Sacconaghi floated a bold idea: Apple should borrow the $100 billion in the U.S., and then pay it out to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks. The unusual nature of the proposal attracted attention among financiers and served Sacconaghi’s presumed purpose, ratcheting up the pressure on Cook. A week later, Apple relented and announced plans to begin releasing cash via dividends.

因此萨克纳西提出一个大胆的想法：苹果公司在美国贷款一万亿美元，再以股息或回购股份的方式把钱付给股东。这一不同寻常的提议吸引了银行家的注意，这也符合萨克纳西的预期，即对库克施压。一周后，苹果发了慈悲，公布计划以股息方式发放现金。

The results of Sacconaghi’s report were not lost on Silicon Valley, and Google responded three weeks later. At the time, the share structure that the company put in place when it went public in 2004 was becoming fragile. This original arrangement allowed Google’s founders to maintain voting control over the company, even as their share of ownership shrunk as more shares were issued. The explicit premise was that this structure would “protect Google from outside pressures and the temptation to sacrifice future opportunities to meet short-term demands.”

硅谷也注意到萨克纳西的报告，三周后，谷歌做出回应。谷歌2004年上市时确定的股权结构越来越不稳定。最初的安排让谷歌创始人拥有对公司的投票控制权，尽管发行更多股票后他们手中的所有权份额缩水。很明显，这种结构可以“保护谷歌免受外界压力，避免因短期需求的诱惑而牺牲未来的机会”。

But by the time of Apple’s announcement in March 2012, this bulwark against outside influence was eroding, as Google’s founders continued to sell stock and employees were issued shares in their compensation packages. A few weeks after Apple’s concession to shareholders, the founders of Google announced a new share structure that would defend against a similar situation: The structure gave the founders’ shares 10 times the voting power of regular shares, ensuring they’d dictate the company’s strategy long into the future and that Google was, in the words of the founders, “set up for success for decades to come.”

但2012年3月苹果发表声明前，对抗外界影响的堡垒正在瓦解，谷歌创始人继续抛售股票，作为薪酬待遇，员工持有股份。苹果对股东做出妥协的数周后，谷歌创始人宣布建立新股权结构，以应对类似情形。新股权给予创始人股十倍于普通股的投票权，确保他们能对公司的长远战略拍板，用创始人的话说，谷歌可以“为未来几十年的成功打好地基”。

What has happened to Google and Apple in the wake of these events is the defining story of early 21st-century capitalism. Apple’s decision in 2012 to begin paying dividends didn’t satiate shareholders—it sparked a wider revolt. Several hedge funds started asking for much larger payouts, with some of them filing suits against Apple and even proposing an “iPref”—a new type of share that would allow Apple to release much more cash in a way that didn’t incur as high of a tax bill. 

事件发生后谷歌和苹果做出的反应是二十一世纪初资本主义的典型故事。苹果2012年决定支付股息并未满足股东们的胃口，反而激起了更大范围的抗议。多家对冲基金要求获得更多股利，其中某些对冲基金还对苹果提出诉讼，甚至还提出“i优先”计划，那是要求苹果释放更多现金却无需支付高额税收的一种新型股。

In 2013 and 2014, Apple upped its commitments to distribute cash. From 2013 to March 2017, the company released $200 billion via dividends and buybacks—an amount that is equivalent to, using figures in S&P’s Capital IQ database, more than 72 percent of their operating cash flow (a common metric of performance that is about cash generation rather than profit accrual) during that period. And to help finance this, Apple took on $99 billion in debt. Sacconaghi’s vision had come true.

2013年和2014年间，苹果提高了发放现金的承诺。2013年到2017年三月止，公司通过股息和回购释放了两千亿美元，采用标普资本智商数据库数据，这超过同期苹果公司营运现金流的72%，营运现金流通常用来衡量现金增殖而非利润增长情况。为了筹集资金，苹果负债990亿美元，萨克纳西的设想成真。

What has Google done in that same period? Google is, like Apple, making loads of money. From 2013 to March 2017, it generated $114 billion in operating cash flow. How much has the company distributed to shareholders? In contrast to Apple’s 72 percent payout rate, Google has only distributed 6 percent of that money to shareholders.

谷歌同期都做了些什么呢？和苹果一样，谷歌也赚了很多钱。2013年到2017年3月，谷歌产生1140美元的营运现金流。公司将多少资金分配给股东了呢？与苹果72%付现率相差悬殊，谷歌仅把其中6%分配给股东。

The paths taken by Apple and Google manifest alternative answers to one of the main questions facing capitalism today: What should public companies do with all of the money that they’re making? Even as corporations have brought in enormous profits, there has been a shortage of lucrative opportunities for investment and growth, creating surpluses of cash. This imbalance has resulted in the pileup of $2 trillion on corporate balance sheets. 

苹果与谷歌选择了不同的道路，这体现出回答今天资本主义面临的一个主要问题的两种答案：上市公司该如何处理他们赚到的钱？虽说公司利润丰厚，可缺乏有利可图的投资和增长机会，于是资金过剩。这种不平衡现象导致公司资产负债表上堆积了2万亿美元。

As companies continue to generate more profits than they need to fund their own growth, the question becomes: Who will decide what to do with all those profits—managers or investors? At Google, where the founders and executives reign supreme, insulated by their governance structure, the answer is the former. At Apple, where the investors are in charge because of the absence of one large manager-shareholder, it’s the latter. (To be clear, even though Apple’s previous efforts to stifle investors’ concerns were no longer tenable, the company can still afford to spend mightily on research and development.)

当公司持续产生的利润多于促进自我增长的投资需求时，问题就来了：谁来决定如何处置这些收益呢？是管理层还是投资者？谷歌，在治理结构的保护下，创始人和经理人说了算，答案显然是前者。苹果由于缺少庞大的管理层股东，于是投资者说了算，答案明显是后者。（明确一下，尽管此前苹果扼杀投资者担忧的努力无法维持，它仍可动用大量资金用于研发）。

Why has each company taken the approach that it has? These two strategies reflect different reactions to an issue central to modern capitalism, the separation of ownership and control. In short, owners aren’t managers, as they once were when businesses existed on a smaller scale. And when owners have to outsource running the company to executives, this leads to what economists call “the principal-agent problem,” which refers to the issues that come up when one person, group, or company—an “agent”—can make decisions that significantly affect another—a “principal.”

为何两家公司各行其道呢？这两种战略反映出对现代资本主义的核心问题的不同反应，即所有权与控制权的分离。简而言之，在公司规模较小时，所有者就是管理者，可现在所有者并非管理者。当所有者必须将运营公司外包给经理人时，就产生了经济学家们所说的“委托代理问题”，即一个人、一个组织或公司，即“代理人”，可以做出对“委托人”产生重大影响的决定。

Having investors dominate, as Apple does, is a good way of handling one principal-agent problem: getting managers to do right by their owners. Rather than spending money on failed products (remember Google Plus?) or managers’ pet projects, Apple has to face the disciplining force of large investors. In a way that individual shareholders would have trouble doing, larger investors can act swiftly to put a check on managers who might pursue goals that enrich themselves, such as wasteful mergers, excessive executive compensation, or lush perks. And, after all, a company’s profits theoretically belong to investors, so why shouldn’t they decide how they are put to use?

像苹果公司一样，让投资者处于主导地位，这是一种处理“委托代理问题”的好办法：所有者促进管理层做出正确决定。这可以避免在失败产品（还记得“谷歌+”吗？）或管理层的私人项目上浪费钱财，但苹果却必须面对大投资人的管制。大投资者可以做单个股东做不了的事，他们可以迅速遏制经理人谋求自我肥富的企图，例如浪费资金的兼并、过高的经理人薪酬或大量特权。毕竟从理论上说，公司利润属于投资者，他们为什么不能决定如何使用利润呢？

Proponents of the managerial model embodied by Google worry about a different principal-agent problem. Rather than being concerned about managers ignoring investors, they are concerned that investors won’t serve the people who would benefit from the long-term success of the company. Those professional investors are both the principals for the CEOs but also the agents of many other shareholders. 

谷歌管理模式的拥护者担心另一个“委托代理问题”。他们并不担心管理层无视投资者，倒是担心投资者无助于那些可以从公司长期成功中获益的人。那些专业投资者既包括首席执行官们的委托人，也包括众多股东的代理人。

The hedge funds that pressured Apple are the dreaded “short-term” investors who are interested only in quick wins and don’t serve their longer-term beneficiaries, such as pension funds, that allocate capital to them in the first place. As investors, hedge funds are impatient, and, the argument goes, ruining the economy by shortening time horizons.

对苹果施压的对冲基金只对捞快钱感兴趣，他们是令人生畏的“短期”投资者，他们对最初向他们拨付资本的长期获益者有害而无益，例如养老基金。对冲基金公司是一群缺乏耐心的投资者，有观点认为，它们缩短投资期限，从而毁了经济。

Who’s right? Which principal-agent problem is more vexing? Stock-market returns are one, albeit imperfect, way of answering this question and since the initial developments, Google has far outperformed Apple. But that pattern is flipped if the time frame is restricted to the past year. So it won’t be known for many years to come if Apple or Google has a sharper financial strategy.

孰对孰错？哪一种“委托代理问题”更令人忧虑？股市收益是回答这个问题的一种答案，尽管并不全面。从公司最初发展看，谷歌远胜于苹果。若将时间局限于过去一年，结论则恰好相反。若非时过经年，没人知道苹果和谷歌的金融战略哪个更好。

More importantly, though, how do these strategies impact the lives of everyday people? A capitalist system aims for the efficient allocation of capital, and indeed, workers have a better shot at seeing median wages increase when money is being put to its most productive use. So to an extent, how they fare under each system has to do with who is deciding where and how profits get invested. 

更为重要的是，公司策略如何影响人们的日常生活呢？资本主义制度注重如何有效分配资本。没错，最有效率地利用资本，工人阶层就更有可能看到工资中位数增加。从某种程度说，他们在某一模式下过得如何，必须看谁在做出决定，决策是什么，如何对利润进行投资。

When managers reallocate profits, that reallocation benefits from the capabilities and knowledge that companies have built over decades, but suffers from the possibly poor incentives of managers. When investors are the ones reallocating profits, however, the scope of the reallocation can be broader, theoretically leading to more innovation; at the same time, those investors don’t have preexisting organizational capabilities and they may suffer from their own short-term time horizons.

管理层对利润再次分配时，公司数十年来积累的能力和知识会派上用场，对管理层激励不足可能导致处置不当。然而，由投资者负责对利润进行再次分配时，再分配的范围会更广，理论上这会引导更多创新。可另一方面，投资者缺少多年积淀的组织能力，可能受制于自己的投资短视。

Even if one considers the disparities in the shares of wealth accruing to labor and capital problematic—and there certainly are other strategies for addressing those disparities—making sure that managers and investors are dividing their responsibilities on capital allocation efficiently is critical for making the economic pie as big as it can be. And in that regard, while the problems of Google's model are significant, they are also well appreciated. The excesses of Apple's model and the widespread deployment of share buybacks are just as dangerous—and not nearly as well understood.

有人认为公司财富分配的差距让劳资双方问题加剧，当然有其他方法解决这种差距，确保管理层和投资者就资本分配有效划分责任，对尽可能做大经济这块蛋糕至关重要。就这一点来说，尽管谷歌模式问题突出，但也有值得赞赏之处；苹果模式导致的资金过剩和大量股权回购同样危险重重，人们还远未意识到。

So which model of capitalism will win out? The dominant corporate-finance pattern for the last decade has been Apple’s. Companies have been distributing cash via share buybacks and have borrowed money to finance these distributions at a rapid rate. As American stalwarts such as Deere, IBM, Amgen, and 3M cede power to investors, it’s like watching leveraged buyouts unfold in slow motion.

那么哪一种资本主义模式会胜出呢？过去十年间，苹果代表了主要企业融资模式。公司用股份回购来分配现金，通过借钱以快速筹措回购资金。另一个阵营中，迪尔、IBM、安进和3M等美国品牌将权力让渡给投资者，就好比你在慢速观看一场杠杆回购。

The importance of these two models might soon escalate dramatically. There’s a real possibility that tax reform at the federal level will unlock the offshore cash that corporations have amassed, and the subsequent flood of money will have to be reallocated in the economy—somewhere, somehow.

这两种模式的重要性将大幅提升。联邦税制改革很可能释放公司在海外积聚的现金，汹涌而来的资金洪流必然在经济体中重新分配——在某些领域，以某种方式。

译者 洪珮嘉