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Is Globalization Drawing Us Together or Tearing Us Apart? 全球化使我们更团结还是更分裂？
A century ago, on the eve of World War I, the global advance of science and material prosperity made perfectly reasonable men look forward to a new era of humanitarianism and peace. In 1914, in search of that dream, the industrialist Andrew Carnegie established the Church Peace Union, which later evolved into today’s Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. 一个世纪以前，第一次世界大战前夕，科学和物质繁荣的全球进展使人们完全理性地期待人道主义与和平的新时代。 1914年，为实现这一梦想，实业家安德鲁·卡内基成立教会和平联盟，后来演变成今天的卡内基国际事务伦理委员会。 The 20th century did not work out as Carnegie imagined. In our own day, globalization has proved to be the most mixed of blessings. Nevertheless, the institution Carnegie fostered has continued to propagate his ideals. To celebrate its centenary, the Carnegie Council (for which I have given and moderated talks) posed a question whose premise reflected the idealism of a vanished age: ”Is globalization drawing us together morally?” 20世纪并未像卡内基想象的那样和平。 在我们这个时代，全球化被证明是最见仁见智的祝福。 尽管如此，卡内基创建的机构仍继续宣传他的理想。 为庆祝百年诞辰，卡内基理事会（我已就此进行并主持会谈）提出了一个问题，其前提反映了一个消失的时代中的理想主义：“全球化是否在道德上把我们凝聚在一起？” The organization turned for an answer to Michael Ignatieff, who, as a moral philosopher now teaching at Harvard, might have had good reason for wishing the proposition to be true. But Ignatieff is also a journalist who has seen humans do horrible things to each other. One of the chief merits of “The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World” is that the author discovered in the course of his research — or perhaps he knew all along but slyly withholds the insight — that he was asking the wrong question. The right question is: “How can we hang on to decency in a world where old patterns, good and bad, have been disrupted?” In addressing that challenge, Ignatieff’s admirable little book represents a triumph of execution over conception. 该组织寻求迈克尔·伊格纳蒂耶夫的回答，他是一位任职于哈佛大学的道德哲学家，他本来有充分理由希望这个命题是正确的。 但伊格纳蒂耶夫也是一位记者，他曾看到人类对彼此做过的可怕事情。《普通美德：分散的世界中的道德秩序》的一个主要优点是，作者在研究过程中发现一个结论，或者他本来都知道却狡猾地瞒住了内心的想法，即他提出了错误的问题。正确的问题应该是，“在这样一个或好或坏的旧模式被破坏的世界中，我们该如何坚持正派？”在应对这一挑战时，伊格纳蒂耶夫令人钦佩的书代表了一种执行而非概念的胜利。 “The Ordinary Virtues” is a shotgun marriage of moral philosophy and global junketeering. Ignatieff traveled with a team from the Carnegie Council to Brazil, Bosnia, Japan, Myanmar and South Africa, as well as to Los Angeles and New York City’s borough of Queens, where they met with civic groups, as well as men and women on the streets. 《普通美德》一书是道德哲学与公费全球旅游的强迫联姻。伊格纳季耶夫与卡内基理事会团队一起前往巴西、波斯尼亚、日本、缅甸和南非，还有洛杉矶和纽约市的皇后区，他们在那里接触民间团体和大街上的男男女女。 With the exception of passages on Bosnia, which Ignatieff knows well, and Fukushima, which he writes about movingly, the reader rarely feels the sense of immersion-in-the-other that fine journalism, including Ignatieff’s, provides. The touching-the-bases format appears to have been the result of an imposed schedule. Nevertheless, locality itself matters, for it is locality, rather than globalization, that is the book’s true subject. 除了伊格纳蒂耶夫熟悉的波斯尼亚的段落和笔触生动的福岛之外，读者很少感受到包括伊格纳季耶夫在内的优秀新闻记者提供的沉浸于他者之中的感觉。联系采访人的套路似乎也应为时间表固定。 然而，地区本身很重要，因为地方性而非全球化，正是本书的真正主题。 Ignatieff concludes that globalization has, in fact, shaped certain fundamental aspects of the moral reasoning of his interlocutors. The spread of democracy and of the idea of human rights universalized the notion that citizens have a right to be heard. The people Ignatieff speaks with have not only a sense of standing, but of equal standing. And even nondemocratic leaders find they must satisfy the aspirations of ordinary citizens. 伊格纳蒂耶夫的结论是，全球化事实上已经塑造了受访者道德理性的某些基本方面。 民主和人权观念的普及统一了公民有权发表意见这一观念。伊格纳季耶夫采访的人不仅感觉到自己的地位，而且认为具有平等的地位。甚至非民主国家领导人也认为他们必须满足普通公民的期待。 But more democracy does not necessarily lead to more respect for human rights. Ignatieff furnishes the dismaying example of Myanmar, where brutal military dictators agreed to a peaceful transition to a political party led by the Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi. “Her example,” Ignatieff writes, offered Westerners “vivid, personal proof that the yearning for freedom, democracy and rights was universal.” But it was not so. “The Lady,” as she is reverently known, now presides over a regime that persecutes its Muslim minority, known as Rohingyas. Ignatieff finds that scholars and activists — the typical bearers of global moral discourse — support the ugly crusade. 但更多民主并不一定会导致更大程度上的人权尊重。伊格纳蒂耶夫说缅甸提供了令人沮丧的榜样，在那里残酷的军事独裁者同意和平过渡到由诺贝尔和平奖获得者昂山素季领导的政党。 “她的例子，”伊格纳蒂耶夫写道，向西方人提供了“生动的个人证据，表明对自由，民主和权利的渴望是普遍的。”但事实并非如此。她被大家虔诚地称呼为“夫人”，现正在执掌了一个迫害穆斯林少数民族罗兴亚人的政权。 伊格纳蒂耶夫发现，学者和活动人士支持丑恶的十字军进攻，而他们正是全球道德话语的旗手。 What went wrong? Ignatieff explains that Myanmar is a plural society that never answered the primal question of who is “us,” and who “them.” Majority rule thus unleashed resentments that autocrats had suppressed, just as it had in the former Yugoslavia. In fact, globalization had not only failed to overcome an ancient divide but had widened it, for now local Muslims were seen as the advance guard of a mighty wave. Not just these Buddhists, but “Buddhism,” was now at war with “Islam.” All politics is not local, Ignatieff writes, but political responses are rooted in local loyalties and antagonisms. Yet this stubborn resistance to the universalisms that govern moral thought in the West is itself an alternative source of just behavior. This is the collection of habits and intuitions that Ignatieff calls “the ordinary virtues.” People need a sense of moral order, he argues; they need to feel that their life has meaning beyond the mere struggle to survive. They need to feel that they have acted rightly. But before whom? Not before an abstraction like “mankind.” They think instead about themselves and people like them, family and friends, caste and community. 然而，对统治西方道德思想的普遍主义的顽固抵制本身就是正义行为的另一种源泉。 这是习惯和直觉的集合，伊格纳季耶夫称之为“普通美德”。他认为人们需要一种道德秩序感。他们需要感觉到自己的生活有超越单纯为生存而奋斗的意义。他们需要觉得自己的行为是正确的。但向谁证明呢？不是像“人类”这样的抽象概念，他们思考的是自己和像他们一样的人，家人和朋友、种姓和社区。 This sense of kinship is in turn the foundation of the ordinary virtues: loyalty, trust, forbearance. This is what Ignatieff finds in Rio’s favelas, in the municipal workers of Fukushima, in the haggard, persistent survivors of genocidal violence in Bosnia. 这种亲属关系反过来又是普通美德的基础：忠诚、信任和宽容。 这就是伊格纳季耶夫在里约贫民窟、福岛市政工人、波斯尼亚境内延宕的种族灭绝暴力的憔悴幸存者中所发现的。 Of course if we flip over the card of the ordinary virtues we find the ordinary vices: resentment, pettiness, chauvinism. The sense that moral obligation extends only to “us” is the source of the blood-and-soil nationalism now spreading across the world like a virus. The saving grace, Ignatieff argues, is that these intuitive moral systems are in constant contact with those of other people, and of the institutions that surround us. 当然，如果我们翻过普通美德的卡片，我们会发现普通恶习：怨恨、偏狭和沙文主义。道德义务仅仅延伸到“我们”，这是现在像病毒一样传播到世界各地的“血与土”式的民族主义的来源。伊格纳蒂耶夫认为，可取之处在于这种直观的道德体系与他者以及我们周围的体制不断接触。 Thus in a polyglot neighborhood like Jackson Heights, in Queens, diversity works not because immigrants believe in it as a principle, but because their “moral operating system” has been shaped by the community’s “tacit code of welcome,” its respect for privacy and, above all, the prospect it offers everyone of “a way up and a way out.” 因此，在像皇后区杰克逊高地这样一个多语种的社区中，多样性并非源自移民们相信它是一个原则，而是因为他们的“道德操作系统”已经被社区的“默许欢迎代码”塑造，奉行尊重隐私，且最重要的是，为每个人提供了“一种改善和退出”的前景。 Collective behavior is the consequence of a series of pragmatic accommodations. Difference is tolerated in the interest of group survival; it is not intrinsically admired. Ignatieff notes that people in Jackson Heights live “side by side,” not together, and concludes that “it may be the case that the only realistic way for diverse populations to live together is to live side by side.” To adopt the ordinary-virtues perspective is to accept that such liberal principles as “cosmopolitanism” will probably not flourish outside laboratory settings like the university campus. 集体行为是一系列务实性安排的结果。为了团体的生存，差异是可以容忍的。它并未受到内心的赞赏。伊格纳蒂耶夫发现，杰克逊高地的人们“肩并肩”地生活在一起，而不是一起生活，他得出结论：“可能情况是，不同人群共同生活的唯一现实方式就是并肩生活。”采用普通美德的观点相当于接受“大都会主义”式的自由主义原则可能不会在大学校园等实验室环境之外蓬勃发展。 The ordinary virtues and vices are a human given. So is the inner world of moral intuition. The variable is what lies outside, which is to say institutions, understood in the broad sense of social structures of belief and practice, whether in the form of the corner barbershop or the political party. Ignatieff concedes that the centrality of institutions has become a cliché of development economics and state-building. What distinguishes the ordinary-virtues perspective is the claim that institutions matter above all because they shape private behavior. “If the test of a decent society is that it allows people to display these virtues easily,” he writes, “what policies and institutions do we need to create so that virtue can remain ordinary?” 普通的美德和恶习是人类被赋予的，道德直觉的内心世界也是如此。不同的是外在，即制度，广义上说，信仰和实践的社会结构，无论在理发店或是政党中。伊格纳蒂耶夫承认，制度的中心地位已成为发展经济学和国家建设的陈词滥调。普通美德观点的不同之处在于，制度最重要的是它塑造了私人行为。“如果对一个体面社会的考验是它允许人们轻松表现这些美德，”他写道，“我们需要制定什么样的政策和制度，以便美德能够保持普通呢？” The problematic word in that sentence is “we.” If “we” believe that we should, and can, promote democracy abroad, then we seek — humbly, of course — to help democratic practices take root. But if people resist the moral abstractions we peddle — if that resistance is “an enduring element in ordinary people’s defense of their identities” — then our humility must be so much the greater. The moral choices of people in Bosnia, or even Jackson Heights, are founded on a world they know, and one we don’t. Think, for example, of the lives lost and the billions of dollars wasted trying to install a Western legal system in Afghanistan. Perhaps we would have been better off helping Afghans achieve Afghan justice. 那句话中，有问题的词是“我们”。如果“我们”相信我们应该而且能够在海外推广民主，那么我们当然会寻求帮助民主实践扎根，当然，以谦逊的方式。但是，如果人们抵制我们兜售的抽象道德，如果这种抵制是“普通人捍卫自己身份的持久因素”，那么我们还要更谦卑才行。 波斯尼亚甚至杰克逊高地人们的道德选择建立在他们所知而我们却不知道的世界之上。 例如，想想在阿富汗试图建立西方法律体系所失去的生命和浪费的数十亿美元。 也许帮助阿富汗人实现阿富汗的正义，我们会变得更好。 If globalization will not save us, then there are no big, all-inclusive answers — not technology or democracy or spiritual rebirth or anything that happens to everyone everywhere. There are only small, local answers, though they may well incorporate the technologies or policies dreamed up by the benevolent globalizers. 如果全球化不能拯救我们，那么就大一统的答案，没有所谓技术或民主或精神重生适合任何地方的任何人，只存在适用于本地的小答案，尽管这些答案可能被仁慈的全球化人士梦寐以求的技术或政策包含在内。 The little solutions will not bring us to heaven; but they must keep us from hell. 小小的解决方案不会把我们带到天堂，但他们必须让我们远离地狱。 |
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来自： smiller2016 > 《201802252627》
