经济学人财经||追逐难以企及的10%

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导读

感谢思维导图作者

Mayof, 女，大三, catti三级备考中, 比较文学考研备考中

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听力|精读|翻译|词组

Reaching for the elusive 10%

追逐难以企及的10%

英文部分选自经济学人Finance and economics版块

European banks

欧洲银行

Reaching for the elusive 10%

追逐难以企及的10%

The continent’s lenders try to claw their way back to financial respectability. Good luck

欧洲银行力争重返金融第一方阵，祝好！

It’s not all bad. In 2008 Lloyds, a large British bank, took over HBOS, a rival that was being sucked beneath the rising waters of the global financial crisis. HBOS nearly dragged Lloyds under with it; £20.3bn (then about $30bn) of public money was needed to keep the combined group afloat. But these days Lloyds is doing all right.

欧洲的银行业倒也并非阴霾遍布。2008年，英国一家大型银行劳埃德兼并了其竞争对手苏格兰哈里法克斯银行(HBOS)。当时HBOS正深陷金融风暴的漩涡之中，这一合并案差点也将劳埃德银行拖入深渊。劳埃德需要出资203亿英镑(当时约合300亿美元)才能维持兼并后的公司运营周转。但如今，劳埃德银行已经走出阴影，业绩表现出色。

Under António Horta-Osório, its chief executive since 2011, Lloyds has ditched almost all its foreign operations, narrowed its product range and (like many other banks) poured money into digitisation. The state sold its last shares in 2017. Last year the bank’s return on tangible equity (ROTE), a measure of profitability, was a decent 11.7%. This year Mr Horta-Osório is aiming for 14-15%, Brexit notwithstanding.

自2011年António Horta-Osório担任首席执行官以来，劳埃德银行几乎砍掉了所有的海外业务，缩小了产品覆盖范围，并(和许多银行一样)斥巨资进行数字化改革。2017年英国政府出售了其持有的最后一批劳埃德股份。去年，该银行的有形股本回报率（一项盈利指标，简写ROTE）达到了可观的11.7%。今年，尽管英国脱欧风雨飘摇，Horta-Osório先生仍将这一指标的目标值提升到了14%-15%。

Some other European banks also have good stories to tell. The Netherlands’ ING is also a refurbished state-aid case. Its online German bank, ING-DiBa, claims to return over 20%. Spain’s Santander, the euro area’s biggest bank by market capitalisation, sailed through its homeland’s financial storm without a single loss-making quarter. On April 3rd it set out plans to lift its rote from 11.7% last year to 13-15% by cutting costs and exploiting digitisation. Nordic banks make bonny returns—although both Danske Bank and Swedbank, beset by money-laundering scandals, have sacked their chief executives recently.

欧洲其他一些银行也有喜讯传出。荷兰国际集团ING，作为在国家援助下重获新生的另一代表，其在德国设立的网络银行ING-DiBa宣布收益率超过20%。而欧元区市值最大的银行，西班牙桑坦德银行(Santander)安然渡过了其国内的金融风暴，无一季度亏损。4月3日，桑坦德计划通过削减成本和探索数字化转型，将有形股本回报率从去年的11.7%提高到13%-15%。北欧地区的银行们也都获利颇丰，尽管深陷洗钱丑闻困扰的丹斯克银行(DanskeBank)和瑞典银行(Swedbank)最近相继解雇了各自的首席执行官。

But the overall picture is glum. In a quarterly survey published on March 29th, the European Banking Authority (eba), a supervisor, found that in the last three months of 2018 the weighted average return on equity (roe) of 190 European Union banks was 6.5%. (roe is a little lower than rote because goodwill and other intangible assets are deducted from the denominator of the latter.) Over the past four years the average roe in the eba’s report has fluctuated between 3.3% and 7.3% (see chart).

然而欧洲银行业总体形势并不乐观，在3月29日发布的季度评估报告中，欧洲银行管理局（European Banking Authority，后文简称EBA ）披露，190家欧盟银行去年（2018）第四季度的加权平均净资产收益率(ROE)为6.5%(由于ROTE计算时在分母中扣除信誉和其他无形资产，ROE会比ROTE略低)。在过去的四年里，EBA报告中记录的平均净资产收益率一直在3.3%到7.3%之间波动(见图表)。

That is not enough to keep shareholders happy. They want 10% or so. At a recent conference hosted by Morgan Stanley, 70% of attendees estimated European banks’ cost of equity (coe)—the minimum roe shareholders consider acceptable—to be between 9% and 11%. Twice a year the eba also asks banks to estimate their coes. Last December two-thirds put their benchmarks at 8-10% and another one-sixth said 10-12%. Only 55% said that they were earning more than their coe.

这让原本期望ROE能够达到10%上下的股东们大失所望。在摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）最近主办的一次会议上，70%的参会者预估欧洲银行的权益资本成本(COE，即公司股东可接受的最低净资产收益率)应在9%到11%之间。EBA也要求银行自己每年进行两次权益资本成本估算。去年12月，三分之二的银行将COE基准定在8-10%，另有六分之一定在10-12%。只有55%的银行表示其收益率高于其权益资本成本。

That 6.5% is also well below the returns enjoyed by investors on the other side of the Atlantic. Among America’s biggest banks, only Citigroup reported an roe of below 10% last year, and, at 9.4%, not by much. us Bancorp, the seventh-biggest by assets, weighed in with 15.4%. The Europeans underperform on whatever measure you care to choose—for example, rote or return on assets (roa), which strips out the effect of gearing (the share of assets funded by equity). Figures supplied by Stuart Graham of Autonomous Research indicate that the average roa of nine big American banks was double that of 24 leading European lenders.

6.5%的ROE也远低于大西洋彼岸的投资者获得的收益。在美国最大的几家银行中，只有花旗集团去年的净资产收益率低于10%，但其9.4%的ROE也只是差之毫厘。资产规模排名第七的美国合众银行(us Bancorp)的加权平均净资产收益率高达15.4%。相较而言，欧洲银行在任何一种衡量标准下都表现的不尽人意，无论是ROTE，还是剔除财务杠杆因素（即只考虑股权出资的资产）后的总资产收益率（ROA）。Autonomous Research的研究员斯图尔特·格雷厄姆(Stuart Graham)提供的数据也证实，美国9大银行的平均总资产收益率是欧洲24家银行的两倍。

注：

ROA: 总资产收益率=（净利润）/ 总资产总额，衡量每单位资产创造多少净利润的指标，剔除了指标中的杠杆效应。ROE(净资产收益率) = 净利润 / 所有者权益

All this is reflected in stockmarkets’ assessment of the relative worth of European banks. Markets value most big American banks at more than the net book value of their equity; but the shares of most leading European lenders trade below that mark. The price-to-book ratio of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank, which squeaked into profit in 2018 (with an roe of 0.4%) after three years of losses, languishes at a feeble 25%. Deutsche is in merger talks with its neighbour, Commerzbank, which is rated little better, with a ratio of 31%. Unicredit, Italy’s biggest bank, is rumoured to be considering a bid for Commerzbank if the talks with Deutsche stall.

这一切也反映在了对欧洲银行股价的相对估值之中。市场对大部分美国大银行的估值高于其股本的账面净值；而大部分主要欧洲银行的股票交易价格却低于该值。德国第一银行德意志银行，在连续三年亏损后最终于2018年扭亏为盈，其净资产收益率仅为0.4%，市净率也只徘徊在可怜的25%上下。德意志银行正与其“邻居”德国商业银行进行并购谈判，德国商业银行的市净率相对稍高，达到31%。据传，如果该项谈判搁置，意大利最大的银行裕信银行将考虑投标德商。

Explanations for European banks’ poor performance start with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-08. American banks were swiftly and forcibly recapitalised through the Troubled Asset Relief Programme, whether they needed it or not (“They got TARPed,” in the words of one European banker). Most European countries (though not Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland) were slow to act. The euro area lacked a single supervisor and a common authority for resolving failed banks. Both were established several years later—and only after the euro area’s sovereign debt crises had compounded the troubles of many lenders.

欧洲银行之所以经营惨淡追根溯源要从2007年至2008年的金融危机说起。在金融危机发生后，美国通过“问题资产救助计划” 迅速并强制性地对银行进行了资产重组，不管它们是否需要（用一位欧洲银行家的话说便是：“他们被‘问题资产救助化’了”）。而大部分欧洲国家（英国、荷兰、瑞典除外）却反应迟缓。欧元区缺少一个单一监管者和一个统一管理机构去处理破产银行。这两者在几年之后，并且是在欧洲主权债务危机加剧了大量银行的困境之后才姗姗迟来。

Banks complain that policymakers have since made their lives hard. In the euro area net interest income, which makes up the bulk of banks’ revenues, has been ground down by slow growth and years of ultralow, even negative, interest rates—banks must pay the European Central Bank (ecb) 0.4% a year to deposit money. In the past three years, reports the eba, net interest margins have fallen from 1.57% to 1.47%. Mario Draghi, the president of the ecb, said on March 27th that “low bank profitability is not an inevitable consequence of negative rates”, although he admitted that the central bank would consider “mitigating the side-effects”. In March the ecb announced further operations to provide banks with cheap long-term finance.

银行们纷纷抱怨决策者自金融危机之后使得银行的经营变得举步维艰。净利息收入是银行收益的主要来源，但欧元区银行的该收入受挤压严重，受累于经济增长缓慢以及执行多年的超低利率，甚至负利率（银行向欧洲央行存钱时必须支付每年0.4%费用）。EBA报道称，过去三年里，银行的净利差已从1.57%将至1.47%。3月27日，欧央行行长马里奥德拉吉宣称，“负利率不一定会导致低利润”，尽管他承认央行可能会考虑采取措施“减轻负面影响”。三月，欧洲央行宣布将进一步向银行提供低息的长期贷款。

Bankers also complain about capital requirements. Not only have these been tightened since the financial crisis, but the new rules, known as Basel 3, were finalised only at the end of 2017. Banks are having to raise billions in debt that would be able to absorb losses, should some catastrophe wipe out their equity. Magdalena Stoklosa of Morgan Stanley says that resolution regulation is obliging banks to finance themselves by fairly expensive means when deposits cost them nothing and margins are wafer-thin.

银行家们也对资金要求的提高颇有怨言。这一要求在金融危机后逐渐收紧，并且由于2017年末出台的巴塞尔协议Ⅲ而变得更加苛刻。银行不得不负债筹资数十亿作为准备金，以备弥补未来可能发生的股价崩盘灾难所造成的损失。来自于摩根斯坦利的Magdalena Stoklosa表示，这一决议正迫使银行在存款利息为零、收益极其微薄的情况下，还得通过高成本融资渠道获取资金。

European banks also lack the scale of America’s biggest. Differences among national markets and the eu’s failure to complete its “banking union” thwart cross-border mergers that might create continent-spanning giants. Peer more closely at specific countries, and further burdens on profitability become visible. Banks in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Portugal are still weighed down by bad loans, even if the load is getting lighter. Overcrowding is common; so is competition from publicly owned and co-operative banks, which have other goals besides profit. Germany is the harshest environment on both counts. Even combined, Deutsche and Commerzbank would struggle for elbow room.

欧洲银行同样缺乏美国大型银行的规模。各国市场之间的差异和欧盟建立银行联盟的失败，阻碍了跨境并购及由此产生洲际巨头的可能性。深入观察一些特定的国家，就能找到另一些制约盈利能力的负担因素。塞浦路斯，希腊，意大利以及葡萄牙的银行仍受着坏账的拖累，即使这些坏账负担正在不断减轻。银行过多在这些国家很普遍，来自不以盈利为唯一目标的公有银行和合作银行的竞争也普遍存在而这两类银行并。从这两方面中的任一方面来说，德国都堪称是对商业银行最严苛的市场。即便德银和德商成功合并，它们也将很难拥有灵活发挥的市场空间。

But struggling banks cannot simply blame history, officialdom and market structure for their troubles. They could do a lot more to help themselves. The eba’s new survey finds, for instance, that at almost three-quarters of European banks, costs consume more than 60% of income. The average cost-income ratio, 64.6%, is higher than it was four years ago.

但是挣扎的银行们也不能简单的将他们的问题归咎于过去，官僚作风以及市场结构。它们自救的方法还有很多。比如据EBA的最新调研发现，大约有四分之三的欧洲银行的成本占据了收益的6成。如今64.6%的平均成本收益比远高于其四年前。

Europe’s most successful banks show what can be done. A study by five ecb economists published last November—and commended to banks by Mr Draghi—found that euro-zone banks which have cut costs, spent heavily on information technology, are geographically diverse (like ing, Santander and bbva, another Spanish bank) and rely less on interest income tend to be more profitable. Banks that carry lower credit risks (ie, that are safer) also do better.

欧洲最成功的银行们已经指明了行动的方向。去年11月，来自欧洲央行的五位经济学家发表的一项研究发现：欧元区里那些已经削减成本并在数字化转型上投入巨大的银行在地理分布上具有多样性（如荷兰国际集团（ING）、西班牙的桑坦德银行（Santander）及西班牙毕尔巴鄂-比斯开对外银行集团（BBVA）），对利息收入的依赖性更低，并且更具盈利能力；同时，信用风险较低（即更安全）的银行也相对做得更好。Draghi先生向各大银行推荐了这项研究。

None of this will transform European banking into a magic money tree. Banking everywhere is less lucrative than it was before the crisis. Banks can take some comfort from evidence in the ecb economists’ study and the eba’s survey that coes are coming down, largely as a by-product of persistently low official rates. But bank bosses would be foolish to rely on that—or to suppose that they are not ultimately responsible for their own fates.

当然这些改革并不能使欧洲银行业摇身一变成为一棵神奇的摇钱树。对世界各地的银行业来说，金融危机前那种富到流油的日子都已经一去不复返了。虽然银行可以依靠上面欧洲央行经济学家研究中的证据，以及EBA的调研获知权益资本成本正在下降的利好消息（主要是长期低官方利率所带来的副产品），从而得到一些安慰，但银行的决策者们如果仅仅指望着低COE或者认为他们最后不用为自己的命运负责，那么就真的是蠢到家了。

翻译组： 

Olivia，教育从业者，经济学人粉丝

Jasmine，税务，爱笑爱生活爱经济学人

Leon,  男，金融专业研究生，经济学人铁粉

Lucia ，女，翻译学硕士三年制，经济学人粉丝

Martina，女，谷歌广告从业者，爱电影爱生活，爱金融经济

校核组：

Jessie Lulu, 金融从业者，爱阳光，爱细雨，爱经济学人

Alex，男，工科研究生，文学与科学爱好者，经济学人忠实读者

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观点|评论|思考

本期评论员

Alan，男，金融工程硕士，经济学人粉丝

欧洲长达十年的低利率环境、欧洲银行们的过度竞争和欧洲银行们并没有在危机后得到类似美国银行们的救助计划，这三点可能是欧洲银行们盈利困难的原因。

欧洲的低利率环境是老生常谈了，利率低的原因可能是因为像日本一样人口老龄化不愿消费所以通胀起不来，也可能是因为ECB为了兼顾欧元区拖后腿的各国经济从而不得不长期将利率压低。无论什么原因，低利率确实会伤害银行的利润，而负利率更是。银行的盈利模式是贷款-存款的息差，或者理财产品-存款的息差，因为巴塞尔协议三，对银行的持有资产的风险有严格控制，所以银行将钱投向能更赚钱的理财产品是被严格限制的，这样它的大多数资金还是只能用于贷款，而贷款受困于低利率和萎靡的经济，在几个国家甚至还是负的。

欧洲并不像美国那样是一个各地区差异较小联结紧密的国家，虽然在欧盟商品、货币和劳动力都已经在很高程度上可以自由流通了，但是两千年来的民族性很难改变，各个国家还是有较为显著的不同偏好，德国人还是爱自家的黑啤意大利人还是爱自家的意面，很多企业还是更专注于本土化，导致很多欧洲很少出超大型企业，欧洲企业们更多发展成为中型公司或是精品公司（专精特定领域的商品或服务）。于是欧洲的每个国家都有专著本国市场的本国银行还有将分支机构延伸过来的外国银行。银行业是一个需要相对保护避免过度竞争的行业，这一点从历史上大大小小的银行业危机已经看出来了，政府一般也会控制银行的数量以免过度竞争挤压银行的利润导致引发危机。但是从目前来看，在欧洲银行间的竞争要高于美国银行们的。

第三点是在危机过后，美国在吸取了过往大萧条的经验后，近乎完美得应对了危机。（史上最大宏观对冲基金创始人Ray Dalio不仅成功预测了08金融危机的到来，还提出了宝贵的应对经验。具体的去杠杆剖析见(https://www./images/uploads/overmyshoulder/Bridgewater_-_an-in-depth-look-at-deleveragings--ray-dalio-bridgewater.pdf）

与此相对的是欧洲在发生主权债务危机爆发后才开始应对危机，同时并没有类似的银行救助计划，导致西班牙葡萄牙意大利当时很多银行的坏账井喷，而同时欧元区的经济迟迟不见气色又让银行消化这些坏账的过程变得缓慢（如果经济变好银行贷出去的钱都能收的回来那么赚到的钱就能更快抵消这些亏损的坏账了）。

欧洲的银行们能做的就是将服务越来越多的数字化，提供更好的线上服务削减门店员工开支等以提高竞争力，或者在各国聘请当地人做管理层做到在各国都实现本土化，但是这种建议只能给银行们，也只有个别银行可以靠这种策略赚钱，欧洲如果不想要银行的低利润率成为下一场危机发生的隐患，最直接的方法还是控制银行数量和竞争程度。

4

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