     期刊简介  本期编委 【编译】王川 谢菁 扎西旺姆 施榕 【校对】李玉婷 【审核】施榕 【排版】高思慧  本期目录 表演型治理 【题目】Performative Governance 【作者】Iza Ding，匹兹堡大学政治学助理教授。 【摘要】政府常常难以满足公民的需求，但却面临着强大的公众压力。当公众期望超过其实际治理能力时，政府该怎么办？这篇文章表明，政府可以通过实施表演型治理来应对——戏剧化地运用语言、符号和姿态在公民中培养良好治理的印象。表演型治理应区别于其他类型的政府行为，如不思进取、家长和对公民需求的实质性满足。作者在中国环境治理领域阐述了这一概念。考虑到中国环境污染的严重程度、由此引发的公众抗议，以及解决这一问题所涉及的组织上的和政治上的挑战，政府如何能挽回自己的声誉？在某市环保局的参与性观察中发现的民族志证据表明，当官僚们面临国家能力低下和公众监督程度高的双重负担时，他们会通过表演型治理来缓解公民的抱怨。本研究关注“表演”在政治情境中的双重含义，以及实质性与戏剧性的本质区别。 The state often struggles to meet citizens’ demands but confronts strong public pressure to do so. What does the state do when public expectations exceed its actual governing capacity? This article shows that the state can respond by engaging in performative governance—the theatrical deployment of language, symbols, and gestures to foster an impression of good governance among citizens. Performative governance should be distinguished from other types of state behavior, such as inertia, paternalism, and the substantive satisfaction of citizens’ demands. The author illustrates this concept in the realm of environmental governance in China. Given the severity of China’s environmental pollution, the resulting public outcry, and the logistical and political challenges involved in solving the problem, how can the state redeem itself? Ethnographic evidence from participant observation at a municipal environmental protection bureau reveals that when bureaucrats are confronted with the dual burdens of low state capacity and high public scrutiny, they engage in performative governance to assuage citizens’ complaints. This study draws attention to the double meaning of “performance” in political contexts, and the essential distinction between the substantive and the theatrical. 【编译】施榕 【校对】李玉婷 社会革命与威权持久性 【题目】Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability 【作者】Jean Lachapelle, 哥德堡大学V-Dem（民主变量）研究所博士后研究员；Steven Levitsky, 哈佛大学政府系拉丁美洲研究大卫·洛克菲勒教授；Lucan A. Way，多伦多大学政治学系教授；Adam E. Casey，密歇根大学Weiser新兴民主国家中心研究员。 【摘要】本文探究了威权持久性（durability）的原因。为什么有的威权政体即使经常出现严重的危机也能够存续几十年，而有的即使没有面临重大挑战也会很快崩溃？基于对1900年到2015年威权政体的分析，作者认为诞生于暴力社会革命（violent social revolution）的政体尤其能够持久。革命政权（revolutionary regimes），如俄罗斯、古巴、越南的政体在面对外部强大压力、经济低迷、大规模政策失败的情况下仍存续超过了半个世纪。作者基于一系列始于1900年的革命政权的数据集提出并检验了一种解释这种持久性的理论。作者认为，诞生于暴力社会革命的威权政体常常会面临严重的军事威胁，这有助于形成有凝聚力的执政党以及强有力的、忠诚的安全机构（apparatuses），也使得其他权力中心（alternative power centers）趋于瓦解。以上特征能够解释革命政权异常持久的原因。 This article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? Based on an analysis of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015, the authors argue that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable. Revolutionary regimes, such as those in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, endured for more than half a century in the face of strong external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. The authors develop and test a theory that accounts for such durability using a novel data set of revolutionary regimes since 1900. The authors contend that autocracies that emerge out of violent social revolution tend to confront extraordinary military threats, which lead to the development of cohesive ruling parties and powerful and loyal security apparatuses, as well as to the destruction of alternative power centers. These characteristics account for revolutionary regimes’ unusual longevity. 【编译】王川 【校对】李玉婷 威权领导人的受欢迎率——跨国家调查 【题目】The Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders: A Cross-National Investigation 【作者】Sergei Guriev，巴黎政治学院经济学教授，研究兴趣包括契约理论、公司治理、政治经济学和劳动力流动；Daniel Treisman，加州大学洛杉矶分校政治学教授，研究兴趣包括比较政治经济学，特别是俄罗斯政治和经济。 【摘要】威权国家的公民如何看待他们的领导人？一些威权领导人通过恐怖统治，而另一些威权领导人似乎真正受欢迎。利用盖洛普世界民意在2006-2016年对一百四十多个国家的追踪调查，作者发现不同政权类型的政治支持率的驱动因素是不同的。虽然公开威权政权中的残酷镇压可能会导致受访者伪述自己的偏好，但在信息较温和的威权政体中，更强的镇压实际上预示着更低的支持率。在威权政体和民主政体一样，经济表现很重要，公民的经济认知虽然不完全准确，但却能跟踪客观指标。威权者也会从更大的公共安全感中获益，但作者发现在民主政体中没有这种效应。对媒体和互联网的隐蔽审查与威权政体——尤其是信息威权政体——较高的支持率有关，但当公民意识到审查制度时，评分就会下降。在信息型威权政体中，如果领导人更替，行政选举会引发收视率激增，但与民主政体不同的是，连任的威权领导人几乎没有蜜月期。 How do citizens in authoritarian states feel about their leaders? While some dictators rule through terror, others seem genuinely popular. Using the Gallup World Poll’s panel of more than one hundred-forty countries in 2006–2016, the authors show that the drivers of political approval differ across regime types. Although brutal repression in overt dictatorships could cause respondents to falsify their preferences, in milder informational autocracies, greater repression actually predicts lower approval. In autocracies as in democracies, economic performance matters and citizens’ economic perceptions, while not perfectly accurate, track objective indicators. Dictators also benefit from greater perceived public safety, but the authors find no such effect in democracies. Covert censorship of the media and the Internet is associated with higher approval in autocracies—in particular, in informational ones—but ratings fall when citizens recognize censorship. In informational autocracies, executive elections trigger a ratings surge if there is leader turnover, but, unlike in democracies, reelected autocrats enjoy little honeymoon. 【编译】扎西旺姆 【校对】李玉婷 欧元危机的政治地理学 【题目】The Political Geography of the Eurocrisis 【作者】Pablo Beramendi，杜克大学教授；Daniel Stegmueller，杜克大学副教授。 【摘要】面对2008年的金融危机，欧盟作出了混合式的应对。一方面，它拒绝通过共同预算来实现财政一体化，另一方面，它在国家间进行了大量的转移支付，以维护金融稳定。作者分析认为，这样的应对方式是欧盟领导人受到民主约束的结果。鉴于欧盟如今的体制结构，公民的偏好对领导人的行为构成了约束，因为这些偏好限制了成员国之间风险分担的范围以及对不同行动方案的政治容忍度。作者表明，公民的偏好反映了收入地域、生产制度和机构组织的差异。选区再分配偏好的异质性与多样化的经济地理相结合，帮助我们解释为什么各国政府受到的政治限制阻止他们参与进一步的财政一体化。相反，成员国之间的外部性转移了可能会受到负面影响的公民的偏好并使国际再分配在政治上可实行。作者分析了这两种机制，并就欧元危机后财政一体化和国际再分配偏好的决定因素提出了新的实证结果。 The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU’s current institutional structure, citizens’ preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action. The authors show that citizens’ preferences reflect differences in the geography of income, production regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity of constituencies’ redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast, externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible. The authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis. 【编译】谢菁 【校对】李玉婷 脆弱性和平民受害的逻辑：不断转移的意大利前线（1943-1945） 【题目】The Logic of Vulnerability and Civilian Victimization: Shifting Front Lines in Italy (1943–1945) 【作者】Stefano Costalli, 意大利佛罗伦萨大学政治和社会科学系副教授；Francesco Niccolò Moro, 意大利博洛尼亚大学政治和社会科学系副教授；Andrea Ruggeri，牛津大学国际研究中心主任、政治学和国际关系学教授。 【摘要】是什么导致平民在传统内战和经历叛乱的常规战争中受害？作者认为，平民受害的一个关键驱动因素是现役部队的脆弱性，特别是在冲突前线不断转移的时候。脆弱性的大小依信息的和物流的挑战而定：当前线移动时，现役部队面临的信息不确定性和不稳定的供应链增加了它们的脆弱性。因此，现役部队将增加对平民的伤害来应对有关叛乱分子的位置和身份的高质量信息的缺乏，以限制可能的信息泄露，并遏制供应中断和对对手的后勤支持。作者通过对二战期间(1943-1945年)意大利纳粹-法西斯暴行的原始次国家数据进行匹配的双重差分分析和定性证据来支持他们的论点。 What causes civilian victimization in conventional civil wars and in conventional wars that experience insurgencies? The authors argue that a key driver of civilian victimization is the vulnerability of the incumbent forces, specifically when the conflict’s front line is shifting. Vulnerability is a function of informational and logistical challenges: when the front line is moving, incumbents face increased informational uncertainty and unstable supply chains that augment their vulnerability. Thus, incumbents will increase the use of civilian victimization in response to a scarcity of high-quality information on the location and identity of insurgents, to limit possible information leaks, and to contain supply disruption and logistics support to adversaries. The authors support their argument using matched difference-in-differences analyses of original subnational data on Nazi-Fascist violence in World War II Italy (1943–1945) and qualitative evidence. 【编译】施榕 【校对】李玉婷 添加“国小政”微信 获取最新资讯 |
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