|
在笔者看来：战略研究是一个跨学科的研究领域，它并不专属哪一个学科，应当说战略研究是国际关系研究的关注重点，同时战略研究也在经济学、军事学、物理学等其他学科有相关体现，在不同学科领域对战略研究的侧重点有一定区别，但整体而言是关系到国家整合战略资源与实现国家战略目标的动态平衡与长远规划，包括了理论研究与政策建议，相比纯粹的国际关系理论而言，战略研究理论讲求很强的经验性、历史性与可操作性，更加强调脚踏实地和立足国家所面临的地缘政治外部环境与国内政治经济文化实际状况。当然考虑到战略研究与国际关系研究实在有太多交集，甚至很多战略家本身就是国际关系公认的中层理论甚至是大理论范式的代表人，因此借助一个图表可供参考。[1] 当然，该表格的好处在于界定了战略研究是安全研究的真子集，安全研究又是国际关系研究的一部分，国际关系研究又是广义的政治科学的分支，但也容易认为战略研究就局限于政治科学。实际上只要国际体系的主要行为体是主权国家，就不可能回避的战略的研究，设计的不同学科分支在很大程度上都是为了战略目标服务，只不过一部分学科的一些目标可能是更强调自身发展也能给全球提供思想公共产品，但本质上学科在国家的战略体系下的创设都有不同程度的目标规划（只是一部分学科的见效慢、影响深远；另一些学科的特定内容是应对眼前的危机或利益驱动等）。当然，笔者讨论的战略研究更多基于学理而非政治层面的，对战略研究的了解不一定要为国家提供直接的战略咨询服务（也不是所有人都有这个能力或意愿），对战略的思考本身有助于我们用一种跨学科的视野形成一种理解世界、发现我们所处时代的观察路径，进而对我们日常生活或学理思考构成某种启示或谈资。 本文对战略研究的内容介绍主要来自于John Baylis,James J. Wirtz,Colin S. Gray编写的《Strategy in the Contemporary World：An Introduction to Strategic Studies》一书，目前我还没有读过该书的中文版，因此就把英文版进行解读和扩展，全部内容都是笔者总结提炼和理解基础上的整合，并结合战略研究领域的其他著作供读者参考。
一、战略的定义 从早期的军事学角度而言，更多将战略的定义与军事手段的应用与战争胜利的结果联系在一起。如克劳塞维茨（Carl von Clausewitz）将战略定义为Strategy [is] the use of engagements forthe object of war。[2]克劳塞维茨作为拿破仑一世战争时期的军事家，更多是将他的学说应用（或认为可以应用）到欧洲的陆战中，当然，笔者认为克劳塞维茨的《战争论》对智力的提升和思辨远远不止是对战争的了解，当然他的战略概念确实更偏重军事内涵，不过《战争论》书中对进攻与防御、以及战争必备的三要素（政治、暴力、偶然性）、还有战争手段与政治目标的相关性介绍，都体现出他超越时代的战略视野。利德尔·哈特（Liddell Hart）对战略的定义超过了纯粹的战争目标，认为：Strategy is the art of distributing andapplying military means to fulfill the ends of policy。[3]他对大战略的定义就更为经典：Grand strategy should both calculate and developthe economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fightingservices . . . it should not only combine the various instruments, but soregulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for itssecurity and prosperity。[4]哈特突出了政治目标，而且如果看到哈特在《间接路线》一书中的战略理解，是强调战争状态与和平状态之间的战争手段动力问题，这源于他对一战、二战和战后和平缔造的理解，但对哈特的思想也是褒贬不一，如米尔斯海默在《李德·哈特与历史之锺》里，就强调哈特的思想更多缺乏实践指导，而且在战略形势发生变化后，人为强化自身的学说影响，当然，还是希望读者可以自己阅读哈特的著作、进行不同视角的评判。 劳伦斯·弗里德曼（Lawrence Freedman）对战略的定义是：The realm of strategy is one of bargainingand persuasion as well as threats and pressure, psychological as well asphysical effects, and words as well as deeds. This is why strategy is thecentral political art. It is about getting more out of a situation than thestarting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power。这里的定义是笔者觉得比较全面的，因为它涉及到讨价还价和政治游说，物质和精神层面的威慑内涵，以及行动和语言的政治艺术。这既考虑到了战略的理性平衡，也涉及到艺术（不容易掌控的、容易受到非理性因素的影响）。如果读者看过理查德·勒博的《国家为何而战？》，就能更深切理解荣誉、恐惧等战略动机是如何诱发国家陷入战略冒险甚至是主动营造必有一战的战略决心的。 “Because strategy provides the bridgebetween military means and political goals, students of strategy requireknowledge of both politics and military operations.”[5]尽管战略研究包罗万象，笔者建议读者看看钮先钟教授的《战略研究入门》一书，该书将战略这门学问的重要性极为拔高（至少是笔者阅读过的本国学者中对战略研究最为推崇的一本书），但因为战略的核心（或者说国际关系的高级政治问题仍然是首要的）是军事手段与政治目标的关系，因此战略研究的前提是要了解军事与政治相关的知识体系。“Strategy deals with the difficult problemsof national policy, the areas where political, economic, psychological, andmilitary factors overlap”。这句话足以体现战略研究的交叉性与服务国家目标的属性。鉴于跨学科，如果有志于做战略研究的读者，可能需要至少对以下学科有所涉猎（当然可以一种学科为主，其他学科就是碰到问题需要研究时可以随时补充骨架即可）：Strategy is best studied from aninterdisciplinary perspective. To understand the dimensions of strategy, it isnecessary to know something about politics, economics, psychology, sociology,and geography, as well as technology, force structure, and tactics。[6]
二、战略研究与传统现实主义的共同传统（通约性） （一）人性恶：In an anarchical system, power is the only currency ofvalue when security is threatened.[7] （二）自修昔底德以来所强调的国际政治的强者为尊、国家自助、安全第一位：Who wins in international relations doesnot depend on who is right according to some moral orlegal ruling. As Thucydides demonstrated in his account of the Peloponnesianwars, power determines who gets their way. In international relations, mightmakes right. （三）国际法、道德、国际制度作用是有限的。. In an international system without asupranational government, states will agree to laws when it suits them, butwill disregard them when their interests are threatened. When states want tobreak the rules, there is very little to stop them from doing it apart fromcountervailing force. 相信理论功底深厚的读者能够列举一堆传统共识，但笔者要补充的内容是，战略研究之所以被诟病，就是高度的政治应用往往容易低估道德因素的权衡，而虽然现实主义对道德、国际法与制度的看重程度不如自由主义，但在爱德华·卡尔和汉斯·摩根索的著作中，有鲜明的现实主义与理想主义的调和色彩，认为离开道德谈权力是不合逻辑的。同时，类似麦金德、斯拜克曼这些非正统的现实主义者（这源于地缘政治在内容上与现实主义通约，但在理论地位上自豪斯霍弗与纳粹生存空间论被唾弃后，长期被主流现实主义游离于理论边界之外。）也是重视权力与制度的并用，比如麦金德非常强调心脏地带的战略稳定需要在德苏两国之间建立隔离带，通过国际联盟扶持一些东欧国家成为战略缓冲，麦金德本人非常赞同国联理应借助权力政治发挥制度性的建构作用，这一点被很多学者低估甚至强调地缘政治与现实主义是不讲道德和制度的。麦金德·斯拜克曼、卡尔、摩根索这些学者的思想可能没有后世描述的那样排斥威尔逊主义，至多是批评国际制度安排缺乏权力政治考量、而非忽略制度与道德对权力冲突的缓和作用。 现实主义、自由主义、建构主义都是高度政治性与战略维度的，尽管不乏普适性的思想学术内容体系（这也是国际关系研究不能总是强调彻底摒弃三大主义另立山头做研究的重要性、它山之石可以攻玉），但三大范式无非就是在侧重程度不同的三个维度进行了战略性的启示思考：权力与安全、制度与相互依赖、观念与文化，现实主义整体上最偏向战略研究，尤其是进攻性现实主义与防御性现实主义的分野；自由主义的初始目标是实现美国延缓霸权衰落的战略目标；建构主义是以头脑风暴的方式让人相信乌托邦主义的世界图景很难建构、但又可以通过观念改变的方式去做到（虽然亨廷顿的《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》一书褒贬不一，但至少说明观念与文化的共识想达成和解丝毫不亚于领土争端零和博弈解决的困难程度）。 大战略与地缘政治是密不可分的： The emergence of geopoliticsreflected a new sense that the world was now a unified political space at theend of the nineteenth century, which emerged as a result of the imperialcompetition of European great powers. ● It also reflected a shifting constellation ofpower, with British economic strength in decline and Germany and the UnitedStates rising as new powerful actors in world politics. ● Classical geopolitical thought linksterritory to power and sees world politics as a competition between the mostpowerful states. It proposes that geographical and other environmental factorsexplain why some states thrive while others decline. 这段话充分体现了地缘政治是高度权力变量的考虑，是国家大战略层面运作的背景与效果。对地缘政治与大战略的思维体系掌握非常有助于在历史阅读中发现研究问题。 凯南的遏制战略就是一种地理与权力变量的战略应用思考：Containmentwas first developed at the onset of the cold war by George F. Kennan, adiplomat who had studied the Soviet Union closely. He proposed a strategy whichrelied on countering Soviet influence 'bythe adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantlyshifting geographical and political points’。Bythe 1950s, the competition for spheres of influence between the United Statesand the Soviet Union acquired a global dimension, partly as a result ofdecolonization in Africa and Asia. Containment was reformulated and expandedinto what became known as 'domino theory’—the idea that Soviet influence had tobe countered everywhere, since one state turning communist could easily spreadcommunism to neighbouring states until an entire world region would fall.Containment was a form of geopolitics, but one which encompassed ideologicalcompetition as well as competition for resources. It required the US to engageacross all areas of the globe to stop the spread of communism, whether or notthe countries concerned were strategically important. In Vietnam in particular,hundreds of thousands of US soldiers were sent to help fight communistguerrillas in a costly, drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful war. Overall,containment was a consistent, if not always consistently implemented, grandstrategic framework that was remarkably long-lived. Since the Soviet Unionremained the much weaker economy, containment was an effective long-termstrategy that helped to drain Soviet resources, though it was by no means theonly factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. 由此可见，这种遏制战略本质上还是一种消耗战逻辑，并非是要消灭苏联，而是要用长期的军事与政治对抗拖垮苏联，但是拖垮的前提是什么？是苏联扩张地缘空间会加剧有限资源的耗尽与国内政治经济体系的崩溃，实质上就是目标与手段的平衡逻辑的战略思维产物。
三、到底是战略思想影响了历史上的政治行为、还是政治行为塑造了战略思想？这也是战略研究经常被诟病的一个原因。下面一段话供读者参考，因考虑政治敏感性，不便于直接翻译，笔者的主要观点可以精要概况为：理论家摆脱政策干扰的判断或者不了解政策实际的理论空想恐怕都是很难的，但是战略研究如果被贬低为纯粹的智库政策建议就有些不伦不类的： In general, strategists recognize the dangers ofdeveloping too cosy a relationship with officials when they advise governmentson a paid basis. Like many other experts (e.g. economists), however, they seeno necessary inconsistency between scholarship and advice. Because it is apractical subject, there are some benefits from analysing strategic issues atclose hand, providing that a detached approach is adopted. Policy advocacy, however,is a different matter. Some strategists do drift into the realm of advocatingspecific policies, but when they do so they slowly but surely lose theircredibility. People who make a career out of arguing for the adoption ofspecific policies or weapons systems gain a reputation for knowing the 'answer’regardless of the question that is posed.Another forceful criticism of strategicstudies is that it is part of the problem, not the solution. What opponentsmean by this is that the Clausewitzian perspective of strategists, which seesmilitary power as a legitimate instrument of policy, helps to perpetuate aparticular mindset among national leaders and the public that encourages theuse of force. It is this realist thinking, critics argue, which lies behind thedevelopment of theories of deterrence, limited war, and crisis management thatwere especially dangerous during the cold war。[8] 如果读者了解豪斯霍弗的地缘战略思想，在结合纳粹德国的实际扩张行为，就会发现战略思想与国家政治永远都是既难以割舍又难以完全应用的。豪斯霍弗希望达成类似麦金德所提防的德苏心脏地带结盟和对英国海上主导权的挑战，但希特勒德国尽管采纳了很多豪斯霍弗的思想（或者说政策的理论工具支撑），不过对苏宣战却是豪斯霍弗反对的，德国最终在二战失败也侧面说明豪斯霍弗的地缘学说的预见性还是有的，只不过国家实践是作为负面案例佐证了观点。乔治·凯南主要是强调政治遏制战略，而美国实际的NSC68号文件更强调军事遏制，相比前者更具进攻性；同时凯南的思想在朝鲜战争前后也发生了一定变化，在坚持自身的地缘战略与遏制思想体系的同时，也从反对朝鲜战争到支持适度的介入，这一点如果有兴趣的读者可以阅读《乔治·凯南与美国的东亚政策》一书，里面有详细的介绍凯南在中国、日本问题、朝鲜半岛等东亚不同地区的政策影响力差异与历史细节。
四、我们这个时代战略研究的特征 战略研究具有经久不衰的传统，也是中西方思想对话的重要领域，无论是孙子还是克劳塞维茨，跨越两千多年的中西方代表，都有很多不是传承的共识： The logic of war and strategy is universal; it isvalid at all times and in all places. This is primarily because war is a humanactivity, and human nature has remained unchanged in the face of materialprogress. The same passions that motivated those who lived millennia agocontinue to drive us today. Although such strategic theorists as thenineteenth-century Prussian officer and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz and theancient Chinese author Sun Tzu wrote from very different historical andcultural experiences and thus viewed strategy from unique perspectives, thephenomenon they described—war—is the same. It is the character and conduct ofwar—how it is waged, by whom, and for what ends—that has changed over time.[9] 限于篇幅，就精要介绍一下笔者对战略研究不会过时的一些理解： （一）非传统安全越发重要，但传统安全的主导地位不会动摇；因为国际冲突与合作是高度政治的，哪怕是纯粹的经济问题，只要是政治家做出的决策也一定关涉政治目标，政治主导经济而非经济主导政治仍然是战略研究的一个理解思路（当然并不绝对，在特定领域的相互依赖可能产生某些非线性、间接的非战略影响，但最好视为是战略研究领域的子议题而非与战略无关。） （二）全部战术的失败只会带来战略的失败、强调战略重要性不代表战术不重要，一部分战术失败换来整体战略成功是值得的。 （三）时间与空间的维度是理解战略研究（或者是很多学科）的必备条件，因为战略是要立足于特定的时间条件的机遇/限制以及选择某一空间作为实践场所，不同的时间与空间条件的组合会带来战略观念的变化。技术变革也的确会对时间（到达目的地的时间长短等）和空间（单位时间移动的距离等）的战略观念构成不可回避的影响。技术的变革不会导致地缘战略研究的过时，因为技术变革本身就是地缘研究的不可分割内容，这源于马汉与麦金德以来对技术、地理与政治高度战略互动性的理解描述。 （四）地缘政治本身就属于大战略研究，大战略与现实主义传统的密切程度，可以通约认为如果说地缘政治是过时的，就等于强调大战略与现实主义本身也失去了很多研究的维度与学理价值。尽管三者并不能简单等同为一个体系框架，但确实可以有很多内容深入探讨，比如新古典现实主义的大战略维度如果想进一步实现突破，减少现实主义学说在冷战结束以来逐渐空中楼阁的虚化困境，回归地缘政治是根本性的理论实践要求。 The concept of grand strategy was first developed inthe context of the Second World War and was an extension of the long-termstrategic view inherent in geopolitical thought. ● Both theSoviet Union and the United States acted geopolitically during the cold war.Containment was a grand strategy informed by geopolitical reasoning, but drivenby ideological concerns rather than resource competition. ● The revival ofgeopolitics in the 1970s occurred at a time when the US was seen to be inrelative decline, and means other than the nuclear arms race were sought tosecure its position.[10] 大战略概念最早是在第二次世界大战背景下提出的，是地缘政治思想中固有的长期战略观的延伸。苏联和美国在冷战期间都采取了地缘政治行动。遏制是一项宏大的战略规划，受到地缘政治因素的影响、意识形态担忧的驱动，而非资源竞争的作用（笔者认为地缘政治与大战略学说可以反驳经济决定论的观点）。20世纪70年代地缘政治的复兴，发生在美国被视为处于霸权相对衰落的时期，当时美国寻求核军备竞赛以外的其他战略手段来确保其国际体系的主导地位。 大战略应高度重视地缘政治的作用，尤其是地理、技术变量对政治事务的影响： Geography is not a fixed and immutable factorin world affairs. ● Technologicalchange affects the way that geographical factors play out in internationalpolitics. ● Geographicalfactors matter both as external constraints and because they are interpretedand politically contested, and often part of identity narratives. ● This dualitycomplicates the uses of geopolitics for grand strategy, but also adds a new,important dimension that makers of grand strategy need to take into account. （五）战略文化的研究是经典议题，未来很长一段时期也不会过时。 （六）目标与手段的平衡是战略研究的经典理解，但不要狭隘，有时候要让目标限定手段使用，有时候要提前预设目标来增进手段累进的政治合理性，还有时候需要让手段的实践操作来验证与修订战略目标的规划。之所以要制定战略目标，也源于要抓住特定战略机遇期（时间）与不同战略地带的轻重缓急不同（空间）。 （七）对中美关系的分析具有极高价值 The rise of China and the relative economic decline ofthe US are driving the current revival of interest in geopolitics and grandstrategy. ● China’s economic expansion and its need forenergy supplies are already having an effect on political dynamics in variousregions of the world. ● The US remainsmilitarily dominant. Russia, China, and some other states are rearming, but at presentthis is not a direct challenge. ● Some suggestthat the US suffers from 'imperial overstretch’, spending so much on its defence budget that it is weakened overall. ● The emphasisof grand strategy has shifted to peacetime development, partly because warbetween great powers now seems improbable.[11] 笔者并不认为对美国霸权衰落的理解是一种单向度的必然论，霸权衰落可以重新复兴、还可以在战略透支过程中及时止损、也可能对手比霸权国失误更多导致霸权国的实力看上去没有明显衰落，因此过于唱衰或者霸权长存不变都是缺乏战略理性的论调。 中国的崛起和美国的相对衰落，正在推动当前人们对地缘政治和大战略的兴趣复苏。美国遭受帝国过度扩张的困扰是自从杰克·斯奈德的《帝国的迷思》一书出版以来就成为新世纪国际关系理论争论的焦点（至少笔者认为这本书是极具学理与战略应用价值的标志性著作，在冷战后的美国战略界绝对算是独树一帜）。只要详细观察，一些美国战略界人士总结冷战经验教训启示时，强调国防预算的适度增加能实现长期战略目标、而非通常理解的过度扩张。可以判定美国对第三世界的战争行为不太可能终止，笔者认为，这是美国这种非正式殖民的帝国所不太可能放弃的发挥海外地缘政治投射能力与地缘文化塑造能力的“机会”，地缘经济的扩张则有助于提升美国模式的吸引力；而中国只要想崛起，就无法同时回避在地缘政治、地缘经济与地缘文化层面的发展，就势必与美国会发生碰撞，中美就算真的迎来类似“古巴导弹时刻”也不必过于大惊小怪，正如1957年的“斯普特尼克恐慌”到今天已经演变为5G技术的打压。 不要认为大战略就是纸上谈兵的无用学问，有大战略谋划的意图、哪怕战略试错也比没有大战略要好太多。借用本文介绍该书著作的一段话作为结尾： In a complex and fluid world, it has become much moredifficult to formulate grand strategies. ● Rigid grandstrategies, or those based on the wrong assumptions, can have negativeconsequences, since they blind decision-makers to unpredictable changes in thestrategic environment. ● For a large,powerful state, grand strategic planning may be necessary, since the effects ofsimply 'muddling through’ may be worse.
下面也为读者预留一些该书提出的思考问题，可以供大家阅读一些文献的问题导引（读者普遍英文应该都比笔者要好很多，就不翻译了）： 1. What are the aims of grand strategy? 2. Why is there renewed interest in geopolitics andgrand strategy at this particular historical juncture? 3. What explains the emergence of geopolitical thoughtat the turn of the twentieth century? 4. Compare and contrast evolving definitions of grandstrategy and geopolitics. How and why have these definitions changed? 5. To what extent was the grand strategy ofcontainment during the cold war motivated by geopolitical reasoning? 6. What are the problems inherent in formulating grandstrategies? Can they be overcome? 7. Why is grand strategy associated with the statecraftof great powers? 8. How has geopolitics traditionally been associatedwith grand strategy? What are the problems of this association? 9. If geopolitics is both about the 'out there’ andthe 'in here’, as Colin Gray has written, what is its use for the formulationof grand strategy? 10. Is the rise of China a challenge to US primacy? 总之，笔者认为：战略思维的素养绝非短期可以形成，也不是遇到问题现学现卖，而是应该将战略研究的学术训练进行战略化管理与运作，只有对战略研究本身进行战略规划，才能实现战略研究的进化。 （注释略） |
|
|
