“人为何而活？”——是否幼稚的、病态的和伪的问题？

_鲲 2023-06-03 发布于辽宁

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不论是在书中还是生活中，不时会遇到“生命意义何在”、“人生目的是什么”等“人为何而活”之类的发问。

很久以前读到过一篇文章，篇名已忘，印象中作者是胡适之先生。记得文中说，“人生意义”这个的问题，本身是无意义的问题。理由是，“意义”只能在语言问题上发问，如某句话的“意义”或某个词汇的“意义”；问“人生的意义”则是误用“意义”一词，因而如此发问就是不合法的、无意义的。

司马子长曰：“夫天者，人之始也；父母者，人之本也。人穷则反本，故劳苦倦极，未尝不呼天也；疾痛惨怛，未尝不呼父母也。”有论者认为，“为何而活”属于“劳苦倦极”、“疾痛惨怛”逆境中不堪承受心理压力情况下之非常态发问。

胡适之先生所谓“语词误用”说在二十世纪前期英美哲学界颇为流行，现在看来其谬昭然，今鲜有主张之者。将“为何而活”之问视为特殊境遇下的病态之问，此说似乎尚有流传。然究其实，也属肤庸之谈。盖外在境遇只是刺激如此提问之“机缘”，其间幷无必然因果律。家境富厚、志得意满状态下，也不是没有以极其严肃的态度如此发问者。人不仅有“知性”来应对经验世界问题，此外尚有“理性”追问终极性问题。作为有理性的人，必然会发“为何而活”之问。关此，心理学家弗兰克尔（1905-1997言之深切著明：

This condition which is called existential vacuum is no neurotic symptom. Rather than being something to be ashamed of, it is something to be proud of. It is a human achievement. It is above all, particularly a prerogative of young people; not to take for granted that there is meaning inherent in human existence, but rather to try, to venture, to question and to challenge the problem of meaning of existence. This is an achievement to be proud of rather than a neurosis to be ashamed of. If a neurosis at all, it is a collective neurosis. It is a neurosis of mankind.（Meaningless,155）[此所谓“存在之虚无”状态，決非神经病症；不应为此感到羞愧，而应为之感到骄傲。它是一项人类成绩。尤其是，它是年轻人的一种特权：不是想当然地认为人类存在一定有其意义，而是去努力、去冒险、去质疑并挑战存在之意义问题。此为一项值得骄傲的成绩，而非感到有失体面的神经错乱。如果非要坚持认为其为神经疾病，那么它只能是一种集体神经疾病，即人类全体之神经疾病。]（有兴趣者可参此前所发拙文：维克多 · 弗兰克尔论人之存在和意义）

Frederick Copleston

弗兰克尔以心理学大师的分量，强调追问人生问题之重要，其权威性自然可畏，而哲学家Frederick Copleston（1907-1994）绵密细致、丝丝入扣之学理分析，则大有助于祛除殘疑。其言曰：

Now, to ask whether human existence has a 'meaning' is presumably to ask whether it fits into any finalistic pattern; and to ask this is much the same thing as to ask whether it has any purpose or end. Is such a question a 'scientific' question, capable of receiving an empirical, non-metaphysical answer? It can be turned into a scientific question; but then it is no longer the original question. What I mean is this. I might interpret the question as meaning, 'What ends or purposes have different individuals or cultural groups assigned to human existence?' In this case I have a question to which the historian and the sociologist can in principle provide a definite, even if necessarily incomplete, answer. But the question is then not the original question which was asked.（notes）[人之存在是否有 “意义”？如此发问大致等于问“是否可以将人之存在纳入某种目的论框架来对待之”。而如此发问，基本上等同于追问“人生是否有目的或目标”。此一问题是个“科学上的”问题并因而可以用一个经验性的、非形而上学的答案来作答么？将其转换成一个科学问题是可能的；但是如此一来，问题就不再是原来的问题了。我想要表达的是这样一个意思：我可以将此问题翻译为：“不同的个人或文明体迄今赋予人之存在的种种目标或目的是什么？” 在此语境下，历史学家或社会学家对此问题原则上是能给出明确答案的，尽管其答案肯定会是不完整的。]

For the questioner did not intend to ask, What have people thought to be the end or purpose of human existence? or what ends they have as a matter of historical fact assigned to human life and activity: he intended to ask what is the 'real' purpose of human existence, irrespective of what individuals and groups may have thought about it. And this question may appear to involve an illegitimate use of terms such as 'purpose 'and' end.' And so it does if 'purpose' and 'end' necessarily mean purposes and ends determined by man. For in this case it would be absurd to ask what is the ultimate purpose or end of human existence, apart from and independent of the purposes and ends which human beings have set before themselves.[因为发问者欲叩问者并非：“人们思想中所认为的人之存在目标或目的是什么？”也不是：“作为既成的历史事实，人们将哪些目标发配给了人类生命和活动？”发问者想问的是：“撇开个人或集团曾经对其有何想法而不论，人类存在的'真正’目的是什么？”如此发问，可能涉嫌误用了“目的”、“目标”等词汇。的确，如果把“目的”、“目标”定义为人们所确立的种种目的和目标的话，确实有用词不当之弊。因为在这种语境下，撇开、独立于人类自己给自己设定的各种目的和目标，另外去叩问“那个人类存在之终极目的或目标是什么”，将是荒诞不经的。]

Human existence and human history cannot have a purpose or end in the sense intended unless it is given or fixed 'from outside,' as it were. And it cannot be given or fixed from outside unless there is a Being capable of determining it. Thus to ask whether human existence has a purpose is to ask whether there is a Being capable of determining such a purpose. [在既有的日常语境下，是不能说人类存在和人类历史是有“目的”或“目标”的——除非将此种目的姑且理解为“从外部”赋予的或指定的。而这种目的实际上是不可能“从外部”赋予的或确定的——除非有某种具此能力的存在者担此大任。如此一来，追问人类之存在是否有其目的，就是追问是否有某种存在者其能力之大足以决定人类之目的。]

Frederick Copleston之巨著《哲学史》（九卷本）

It seems to me, therefore, that the question whether human existence has a purpose necessarily implies a reference to the Transcendent. And a question about the Transcendent is not a scientific question. But it does not necessarily follow that it is a pseudo-question, unless one from the start identifies 'real' questions with scientific questions. And though it is open to anyone to recommend this identification, it is also open to anyone to say that he sees no adequate reason for this identification.[因此，在我看来，“人类存在是否有其目的”这一问题必然蕴含着某种对“超绝者”的指涉，而关于“超绝者”的问题不是一个科学问题。但是，也不能说这一定是个伪问题——除非一开始就把“真正”问题等同于“科学”问题。虽然任何人都可以把两者之间划等号，但是任何人也都可以说：在两者之间画等号，并无充分理据。]

Copleston的意思很明确：“真正的”不等于“科学的”；“人为何而活”虽不属科学上的问题，但不可先入为主地认定其为“伪问题”。至于他提到的“是否有某种存在者其能力之大足以决定人类之目的”，则是另一问题，这里存而不论。

大家知道，柯尼斯堡大哲康德老人孜孜矻矻运思一生，旨在回答“人能知道什么”、“人应做什么”、“人能希望什么”三大人生问题（参《纯批》,B833）。当代哲学家 John Kekes （1936-），曾提出五个永恒性人生问题，首当其冲的便是“意义问题”：

1. the meaning of life[人生之意义];
2. the possibility of free action[自由行动之可能性];
3. the place of morality in good lives[道德在良好生活中的位置];
4. the art of life[人生之艺];
5. the nature of human self-understanding[人类自我理解之性质].

古哲言：“未经反思的生活是不值得活的。”“人为何而活”一类问题，非伪问题，非天真幼稚的问题,更非不体面的病态问题。相反，是极其严肃、正大的真问题，乃至堪称人生第一问题（据梁漱溟先生意思，人生有三大问题：个人存续第一，种族繁衍第二，终极关切第三。此系由低到高的层次来划分的；若按高度计，则终极关切问题属第一）。古今中外哲人圣贤，无有不曾用心于此者。故路漫漫其修虽远兮，吾人当亦上下而求索也！