 期刊简介  《国际安全》（International Security）发表有关当代安全问题的全面清晰、文献翔实的文章。文章涉及战争与和平的传统主题，以及安全的最新层面，包括环境、人口、人道主义问题、跨国网络和新兴技术。40多年来，《国际安全》界定了美国国家安全政策的争论，并为国际安全事务的研究制定了议程。2023年该期刊的影响因子为8.9，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名第4。 本期目录 1 The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China's Next Decade 2 The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in China's International Crises 3 Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence 4 言辞重要：道德语言对国际谈判的影响 Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on International Bargaining 5 与军方谈判：总统如何管理文官控制的政治成本 Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control 内容摘要 The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China's Next Decade 作者：Michael Beckley，塔夫茨大学政治学副教授。 摘要：From ancient times to the present, rising powers have taken up arms to reorder the world. Yet such violent revisionism poses a puzzle: If a rising power is profiting from the existing order, why would it disrupt that progress with a reckless fit of expansion? One reason is slowing economic growth. Over the past 150 years, peaking powers, meaning rising powers whose economic booms have slowed but not yet stopped, have been the most dangerous kind of country. An extended period of rapid growth equipped them with the means to shake up the world, and then a protracted growth slowdown motivated them to move aggressively to try to rekindle their rise. Peaking power dynamics help explain some of the most consequential geopolitical events in modern history, including the surge of U.S. imperialism in the late nineteenth century, the outbreak of World War II, and Russia's 2014 aggression against Ukraine. These findings amend classic theories of great power conflict and have ominous implications for contemporary Chinese foreign policy. The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in China's International Crises 作者：Tyler Jost，布朗大学政治学系和沃森国际与公共事务研究所助理教授。 摘要：When is China prone to miscalculate in international crises? National security institutions—the rules shaping the flow of information between leaders and their diplomatic, defense, and intelligence bureaucracies—offer one important answer to this question. A theoretical framework differentiates between three institutional types: integrated, fragmented, and siloed. Integrated institutions reduce the risk of miscalculation both by building capacity to relay bureaucratic information to the leader, and by fostering a competitive dialogue between bureaucracies that improves the quality of information that they provide. In contrast, miscalculation is more likely under two types of pathological institutions. Fragmented institutions reduce capacity to relay bureaucratic information to leaders and encourage bureaucrats to manipulate information to conform with the leader's prior beliefs. Siloed institutions restrict information sharing between bureaucracies, which degrades the evaluation of information and encourages bureaucracies to manipulate information to suit their organizational interests. A medium-N analysis of China's international security crises from 1949 to 2012 demonstrates that national security institutions help to explain the majority of its crisis miscalculations. Case studies on the 1962 Nationalist invasion scare, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft incident illustrate the mechanisms by which national security institutions shape the risk of miscalculation in international crises. Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence 作者：Victor D. Cha，乔治敦大学政府系杰出教授。 摘要：Since the 2010s, China has used economic coercion against Western and Asian states to achieve territorial and political goals. China's leveraging of its market is a form of “predatory liberalism” that weaponizes the networks of interdependence created by globalization. The United States and other like-minded partners have mostly used piecemeal “de-risking” measures such as decoupling, supply chain resilience, reshoring, and trade diversion to reduce dependence on China and thereby minimize vulnerability to its economic coercion. But these practices do not stop the Chinese government's economic bullying. “Collective resilience” is a peer competition strategy designed to deter the * regime's economic predation. What informs this strategy is the understanding that interdependence, even asymmetric interdependence, is a two-way street. Original trade data show that the previous and current targets of economic coercion by the * regime export over $46.6 billion worth of goods to China on which it is more than 70 percent dependent as a proportion of its total imports of those goods. These target states could band together in a collective resilience alliance and practice economic deterrence by promising to retaliate against China's high-dependence trade should Beijing act against any one of the alliance members. 言辞重要：道德语言对国际谈判的影响 题目：Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on International Bargaining 作者：Abigail S. Post，匹兹堡大学公共与国际事务研究生院马修·B·里奇韦国际安全研究中心副研究员。 摘要：道德语言如何影响国际谈判？当国家依赖道德语言来框定一个有争议的问题时，他们降低了和平妥协的可能性，增加了争端通过军事行动升级的可能性。这种语言通过两个途径起作用。首先，道德语言使国内受众对有争议问题的妥协产生偏见，从而限制了谈判过程中谈判代表的选项。其次，道德语言促使争端的对手也使用道德论据来捍卫自己的立场。随之而来的道德辩论将两组国内受众的立场道德化，因此减少了妥协的机会，缩小了谈判范围。谈判中的让步会引起谈判对手的不满，并引发国内受众对在有关原则上做出妥协的指责。这种反弹会引发危机，迫使政府坚持先前的原则（和不妥协的）立场，增加军事升级的可能性。通过对福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛争端中道德语言对谈判破裂和争端升级的影响进行分析，可以探讨这一理论。研究结果说明了道德语言如何深远地影响政府的行为，限制了其斡旋和平妥协的能力。 How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating with military action. This language operates through two pathways. First, moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators during bargaining. Second, moral language prompts the dispute opponent to also utilize moral arguments to defend its position. The ensuing moral debate moralizes both sets of domestic audiences, consequently reducing opportunities for compromise and narrowing the bargaining range. Negotiated concessions then frustrate the bargaining opponent and elicit accusations of hypocrisy from domestic audiences for compromising on the principle at stake. This backlash triggers crises and pressures the government to stand firm on its previously principled (and uncompromising) position, increasing the probability of military escalation. An examination of the effects of moral language on negotiation breakdown and dispute escalation in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas case probes the theory. The findings illustrate how moral language can shape a government's behavior far into the future, constraining its ability to broker a peaceful compromise. 与军方谈判：总统如何管理文官控制的政治成本 题目：Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control 作者：Andrew Payne，牛津大学国际关系系讲师。 摘要：在军事政治化日益加剧的时代，总统挑战高级军事领导人的偏好会受到强大的压力。尽管总统可能在宪法上有“错误的权利”，但他们需要大量的政治资本来测试这一命题。主导性的文官与军方关系规范理论聚焦于理想情景，这些情景并不反映精英决策的混乱和固有的政治性质。在伊拉克战争期间对文官与军方动态的案例研究确定了乔治·W·布什和巴拉克·奥巴马采取的四种决策策略，以避免因违背军方的偏好而在国内政治上受到惩罚。通过解密文件和与前政府官员以及高级军事领导人的数十次访谈，研究结果表明在伊拉克战争的关键时刻（2007年的增兵和随后的撤军）两届政府都采取了这些策略来应对文官与军方之间的摩擦。学者和从业者应该着重加强文官和军事领导人在国家安全决策方面应对政治局势的能力，并重新考虑对军方非政治角色的传统理解。 In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disincentives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional “right to be wrong,” they require considerable political capital to test that proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making. A case study of civil-military dynamics during the Iraq War identifies four decision-making strategies that George W. Bush and Barack Obama used to avoid incurring a domestic political penalty for being seen to go against the preferences of the uniformed military. Drawing on declassified documents and dozens of interviews with former administration officials and top-ranking military leaders, the findings indicate that both administrations used these strategies during key episodes of civil-military friction in the Iraq War (the 2007 surge and the troop drawdown that followed). Scholars and practitioners should focus on strengthening civilian and military leaders' capacity to navigate the politics of national security decision-making and reconsidering conventional understandings of the apolitical role of the military. 编译 | 陈正兴 审核 | 李博轩 排版 | 曹越 本文来源于Internarional Security，内容为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。  |
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