  机构纵向持股能否破解中国企业专利创新陷阱——基于产业链治理的视角 Can Institutional Vertical Shareholding Break the Patent Innovation Trap of Chinese Enterprises: From the Perspective of Industrial Chain Governance 《财经研究》2024年50卷第1期 页码：94-108 online：2024年1月3日 作者 中：丁黎黎 , 赵忠超 , 王垒 英：Ding Lili, Zhao Zhongchao, Wang Lei 作者单位：中国海洋大学 经济学院，山东 青岛 266100 摘要及关键词 摘要：中国产业链企业存在专利创新“量质错配”陷阱，这阻碍了创新要素的沿链扩散与技术整合，导致重点领域的关键核心技术难以实现有效突破。文章从产业链治理的视角出发，实证检验了机构纵向持股能否提升产业链企业的专利创新质量。研究发现，嵌入产业链的机构纵向持股与企业专利创新质量之间呈现出“U”形非线性关系。在U-test非线性测试、控制样本选择偏差和反向因果等内生性与稳健性检验后，上述结论依然成立。异质性分析表明，机构纵向持股的投资组合权重以及产业链上下游非对称持股影响其治理行为。其中，监督型机构纵向持股在企业专利创新治理中发挥主要作用；随着产业链非对称持股程度加大，来自联结供应商或者分销商的机构纵向持股的治理策略逐渐由“策略均衡”向“主动干预”演化，从而提升企业专利创新质量。在作用机制方面，当持股比例小于26.27%时，机构纵向持股通过纵向关联交易和垄断竞争强化垄断效应，降低企业专利创新质量；当持股比例大于26.27%时，机构纵向持股通过企业供需优化和委派董事加强协同治理效应，以此促进专利再配置和专利引用，进而加强创新扩散效应，提升企业专利创新质量。文章的研究结论可以深化对机构纵向持股这一新兴持股模式促进产业链企业专利管理的认识，同时也为政府监管部门制定关于产业链韧性和稳定的相关政策提供有益参考。 关键词：专利创新质量；机构纵向持股；产业链治理；创新陷阱；非对称依赖 Summary: The “quantity-quality mismatch” trap of patent innovation in Chinese industrial chain enterprises hinders the diffusion of innovation elements along the chain and technological integration, making it difficult to achieve effective breakthroughs in key areas of “bottleneck” technology. From the perspective of industrial chain governance, this paper empirically tests whether institutional vertical shareholding can improve the quality of patent innovation in industrial chain enterprises. The findings reveal that there is a “U-shaped” nonlinear relationship between the vertical shareholding of institutions embedded in the industrial chain and the quality of enterprise patent innovation. After U-test nonlinear testing, controlling for sample selection bias, and other robustness tests, the above conclusion still holds. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the portfolio weight of institutional vertical shareholding and the asymmetric shareholding in the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain affect their governance behavior. Specifically, supervisory institutional vertical shareholding plays a major role in patent innovation governance. As the degree of asymmetric shareholding in the industrial chain increases, the governance strategy of institutional vertical shareholding from suppliers or distributors gradually evolves from “strategic equilibrium” to “active intervention”, thus improving the quality of enterprise patent innovation. When the shareholding ratio is less than 26.27%, institutional vertical shareholding strengthens the collusive monopoly effect through vertical related-party transactions and monopolistic competition, thereby suppressing the quality of enterprise patent innovation. When the shareholding ratio is greater than 26.27%, institutional vertical shareholding enhances the collaborative governance effect through enterprise supply-demand optimization and director appointment, and enhances the innovation diffusion effect by promoting patent reallocation and citation, thereby improving the quality of enterprise patent innovation. The conclusions contribute to a better understanding on the micro-level implications and mechanisms of the emerging market phenomenon of institutional vertical shareholding in promoting patent management in industrial chain enterprises, and provide useful references for government regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies on industrial chain resilience and stability. Key words: patent innovation quality; institutional vertical shareholding; industrial chain governance; innovation trap; asymmetrical dependence 其他信息 DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230920.301 收稿日期：2023-01-31 基金项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目（23BGL108）；山东省自然科学基金面上项目（ZR2023MG013）；山东省社会科学规划研究项目（22CCXJ14）；泰山学者工程专项经费资助（tsqn202306089） 点 |
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