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Free exchange
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Zoning out 分出去
Why leaving the euro would still be bad for both Greece and the currency area
为什么说离开欧元对希腊和这个货币区来说仍旧是一件坏事
Jan 17th 2015 | From the print edition of The Economist
译者：老狒狒
IN 2012 Greece held two elections which might have led to its exit from the euro zone. In the event, that was avoided—a good thing since the costs of a “Grexit” would almost certainly have outweighed any gains, not only for Greece but for the entire currency area. Now yet another election, on January 25th, threatens Greece's membership of the euro zone. What would Grexit entail this time? And does it make any more sense?
2012年，希腊举行了两次可能会导致该国离开欧元区的选举。到头来，退欧被避免了。这是好事，因为“希腊退欧”的代价几乎肯定会超过任何所得，不仅对希腊来说是如此，对整个货币区也是如此。如今，定于1月25日的另一场选举又在威胁希腊的欧元区成员国资格。那么，这一次的希腊退欧会带来什么呢？是否还有其他影响？
The mechanics of Grexit would be straightforward. The change in currencies would be immediate as the government redenominated domestic assets and liabilities into drachma, most likely on a one-to-one basis with euros. The Greek central bank would be severed from the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt. Instead it would conduct Greek monetary policy, in drachma, through operations with banks whose domestic balance-sheets would now be in drachma, too.
希腊退欧的机制将是简单明了的。随着政府重新启用德拉克马来标价其国内资产和负债——极有可能是建立在1欧元兑换1德拉克马的基础上，货币方面的变化会是直接的。希腊央行会被剥离出法兰克福的欧洲央行。它会转而通过与其国内资产负债表也使用德拉克马计价的银行之间的操作来指挥希腊的货币政策。
Though the starting-point might be parity between a euro and a drachma, the new currency would quickly depreciate. Estimates from the IMF in 2012 suggested that it would fall against the euro by 50%. Such a reduction could spur an eventual economic revival by making Greece more competitive. After Argentina severed its decade-long link with the dollar in 2002, it experienced several years of rapid growth, helped admittedly by a commodity-price boom that played to its strengths as an agricultural exporter. The hope would be that Greece could also exploit its improved competitiveness, especially by attracting more tourists.
尽管在一开始的时候，欧元和德拉克马可能是平价的。但是，新货币会快速地贬值。 根据IMF在2012年的估算，德拉克马会对欧元下跌50％。如此的缩水可能会因为让希腊变得更有竞争力而最终带来一场经济复苏。在阿根廷于2012年切断其与美元长达十年之久的联系后，该国曾经历了数年的快速增长，虽然这场快速增长被公认为得到了可以发挥该国作为一个农业出口国的力量的大宗商品价格上涨的帮助。现在的希望是，希腊也能利用好他们已经得到提高的竞争力，尤其是通过吸引更多游客的办法。
Even so, there would be several drawbacks. Grexit would be a huge short-term shock to the economy. Reintroducing new notes and coins would take several months. This would be likely to create chaos, even though ever more people are making payments electronically. In all likelihood, Greece would have to leave the EU as well, which would cut it off from the bloc's single market (and regional financial assistance). Inflation would surge as soaring import prices rippled through the economy; the IMF's analysis in 2012 suggested that Greek domestic prices would rise by 35%. The uncertainties caused by Grexit would undermine both consumer and business confidence.
即便如此，希腊退欧依旧存在数个缺陷。希腊退欧会在短期内对经济造成巨大的冲击。重新引入新的货币会用去几个月的时间。即便是越来越多的人正在让支付电子化，这仍有可能造成混乱。希腊极有可能也要被迫离开欧盟，这会将该国从欧盟统一市场（和地区性财政援助）中分割出去。随着飞涨的进口价格传导至整个经济体，通胀会大幅上升。IMF曾在2012年的分析中指出，希腊的国内物价会上涨35％。希腊退欧所带来的各种不确定性会动摇消费者和商业的信心。
All of which makes an Argentina-style boom highly unlikely. The economy would probably be pushed back into recession, only a year after it had started to recover. The IMF estimated that Grexit would cause an already sliding economy to contract by an additional eight percentage points in 2012.
所有这一切让一场阿根廷式的繁荣成为极不可能的事情。经济体可能会在开始复苏后仅一年，就被推回到衰退之中。根据IMF在2012年的估算，希腊退欧会导致这个已经处在下滑之中的经济体额外收缩8个百分点。
The uncertainties would persist as the Greek government found itself stuck in an Argentine-style legal imbroglio, making it impossible to borrow from abroad. Although the Greek government could redenominate domestic debt it could not do so for foreign debt. That burden, still in euros, would grow dramatically overnight in relation to the devalued drachma-based economy and the Greek tax base, which would make a fresh default unavoidable. Long legal battles would be inevitable, especially with private holders of the new Greek bonds issued in a restructuring in 2012, which were written under English law.
种种不确定性会随着希腊政府发现自己深陷一场阿根廷式的法律纠纷之中而持续存在下去，这种情况会让向国外借钱变得不可能。尽管希腊政府能重新对其国内债务进行计价，但是他们不能对国外债务做这种事。债务负担，因为仍旧以欧元计价，相对于以贬值的德拉克马为基础的经济和萎缩了的希腊税基来说，会在非常短时间内急剧加重，这会让一场新的违约成为无法避免之事。漫长的法律斗争将是不可避免的，尤其是同希腊在2012年的债务重组过程中发行的新债券的私人持有者之间的法律斗争，因为这些新债券都是根据英国法制定的。
In some respects, Greece is better-placed now to cope with an exit than in 2012. According to the European Commission, the government ran a primary surplus (ie, before interest payments) of 2.7% of GDP in 2014, whereas two years earlier it was still heavily in deficit (3.6%). Greece's once forbiddingly large current-account deficit (which reached 15% of GDP in 2008) is more or less back in balance. Grexit would therefore not cause a sudden budgetary crunch, and the balance of payments would be more resilient to the immediate effects of rising import prices and would gain from bigger exports.
从其他一些方面来说，在应对退欧这个问题上，希腊当前的境况要好于2012年。据欧盟委员会，希腊政府的基本盈余（即支付利息之前的盈余）为该国2014年GDP的2.7%，而就在两年前，该国还处于严重的入不敷出之中（赤字占2014年GDP的3.6%）。希腊曾经一度令人望而生畏的巨额经常账户赤字（2008年曾经达到当年GDP的15%）已经多少回归收支平衡。因此，希腊退欧不会引发一场突如其来的预算危机，同时，收支的平衡会对不断上涨的进口价格的直接影响更具弹性，并且会让该国从出口的增加中有所收获。
But Greece is also better placed than before to prosper within the euro zone. A sudden exit would set back a promising recovery. Following a savage recession, in which GDP shrank by 27% from its previous peak, the economy has been growing since the start of 2014. It is now much more competitive than before, following big falls in wage costs. The sheer size of Greek public debt, at 175% of GDP, is cause for concern. But in fact much of this is owed to other euro-zone countries, and these have provided hidden debt relief through extending maturities and charging minimally low interest rates. Interest payments have also been deferred for ten years on a big chunk of Greek debt. As a result, even though Greece's stock of debt is now much higher than before the crisis, its interest payments are lower: 4% of GDP compared with 5% in 2008, when the debt was 109% of GDP.
但是，希腊当前在欧元区内处境也比以前有所改善。突然的退出会推迟一场原本令人期盼的复苏。在经历了一场GDP比其巅峰时期萎缩了27％的残酷衰退后，自2014年开始，希腊经济就一直在增长。如今，在工资成本大幅降低后，竞争力比以前有了很大的提高。为GDP175％的希腊公共债务的庞大规模是担心的原因所在。但是 ，实际上，这些债务大都是欠其他欧元区国家的，而且已经通过延期和支付最低利率等方式提供了隐性的债务减免。大部分的希腊债务的利息支付也被延期了10年。因此，即便希腊当前的巨额债务远远高于危机之前，但是因该支付的利息降低了。相比债务为GDP109%而应当支付的利息为GDP5%的2008年，现在应该支付的利息为GDP的4％。
Beware Greeks bearing precedents
小心希腊成为先例
For the euro zone, the balance of benefits and costs is also unfavourable, though less so than in 2012. The gain for Greece's creditors from Grexit would be one of discipline. A departure would show that members of the currency club have to abide by its rules, sending a strong message to rebellious politicians elsewhere on the periphery to fall into line. The risk that Grexit might cause a wider break-up is lower than in 2012 thanks to various new defence mechanisms, including a permanent rescue fund and the readiness of the ECB to come to the aid of countries facing a buyers' strike on their government bonds.
对于欧元区来说，收获与付出之间的平衡也是难以称心如意的，尽管其程度比2012年减少了一些。希腊债权人从希腊退欧中的所得将是纪律方面的。分手将向外界展示，这个货币俱乐部的成员不得不恪守自己制定的纪律，这将是对欧元区外围国家的反叛政客发出一个强烈的信息，目的就是让他们就范。希腊退欧可能引发一场更大范围解体的风险，已经因为一系列新的防御机制比2012年有所降低。这些新的防御机制包括一个永久性的救助基金以及欧洲央行对政府债券面临买家攻击的国家伸出援手的意愿。
Even so, Grexit would still be a shock. Its detrimental impact on an already weak economic recovery could cause GDP across the rest of the euro zone to be lower by 1.5% in 18 months' time than it would otherwise have been, according to JPMorgan Chase, a bank. Grexit would shatter the principle that membership of the single currency is for ever. A sell-off in the bonds of other countries that might appear susceptible would naturally follow. The euro zone might now cope better with Grexit, but the cost of showing that the currency club can fracture would still outweigh the gain of enforcing discipline.
即便如此，希腊退欧仍会是一场冲击。据摩根大通估算，相比不退欧，退欧对已在微弱复苏的经济的不利影响可能会导致欧元区其他国家的GDP在18个月内下降1.5%。希腊退欧会彻底打碎“单一货币的成员国资格是永久的”这一原则。对其他可能是易受影响的国家的债券的抛售潮会随之而来。如今，欧元区可能能够更好地应对希腊退欧，但是展示这个货币俱乐部可以破裂的代价依旧会超过执行纪律所带来的收获。
From the print edition: Finance and economics
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