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IT IS close to ten years since America's housing bubble burst. It is six since Greece's insolvency sparked the euro crisis. Linking these episodes was a rapid build-up of debt, followed by a bust. A third instalment in the chronicles of debt is now unfolding. This time the setting is emerging markets. Investors have already dumped assets in the developing world, but the full agony of the slowdown still lies ahead. 现在距离美国房地产泡沫破裂已经将近10年了，距离希腊无力还债引发了欧元危机已经6年了。将这些事件联系起来的是一场泡沫随后破裂了的、快速的债务积累。如今，这部债务演变史的第三阶段正在展开。这次的地点是新兴市场。虽说投资者早就在抛售发展中世界的资产了，但是，增长减速所带来的全部痛苦仍等在前方。 Debt crises in poorer countries are nothing new. In some ways this one will be less dramatic than the defaults and broken currency pegs that marked crashes in the 1980s and 1990s. Today's emerging markets, by and large, have more flexible exchange rates, bigger reserves and a smaller share of their debts in foreign currency. Nonetheless, the bust will hit growth harder than people now expect, weakening the world economy even as the Federal Reserve begins to raise interest rates. 较贫穷国家的债务危机不是什么新鲜事。从某种程度上来讲，这次的戏剧性会差一些，比不上已经成为上世纪80年代和90年代危机标志的违约和汇率挂钩制的破产。整体而言，当今的新兴市场有着更加灵活的汇率，更大的外汇储备和更小的外币债务占比。但是，泡沫的破裂将会严重地打击增长，其程度将超过人们当前的预期，而世界经济也会因此而愈发疲软，即便美联储开始加息也无济于事。 In all three volumes of this debt trilogy, the cycle began with capital flooding across borders, driving down interest rates and spurring credit growth. In America a glut of global savings, much of it from Asia, washed into subprime housing, with disastrous results. In the euro area, thrifty Germans helped to fund booms in Irish housing and Greek public spending. 在这部债务三部曲的所有三卷中，周期始于资本洪流的跨境流动，它推低了利率，刺激了信贷增长。在美国，一股主要由来自亚洲的储蓄所形成的全球储蓄洪流涌入了次贷房产市场，带来了灾难性的后果。在欧元区，勤俭的德国人资助了爱尔兰房地产市场和希腊公共债务的繁荣。 As these rich-world bubbles turned to bust, sending interest rates to historic lows, the flow of capital changed direction. Money flowed from rich countries to poorer ones. That was at least the right way around. But this was yet another binge: too much borrowed too fast, and lots of the debt taken on by firms to finance imprudent projects or purchase overpriced assets. Overall, debt in emerging markets has risen from 150% of GDP in 2009 to 195%. Corporate debt has surged from less than 50% of GDP in 2008 to almost 75%. China's debt-to-GDP ratio has risen by nearly 50 percentage points in the past four years. 当这些富裕世界的泡沫走向破裂，将利率推至历史低点时，资本的流动改变了方向。钱从富裕国家流向了较为贫穷的国家。虽说，这至少是正确的转向，然而，这却是另一场狂欢：钱被借得太多、太快，而且大量的由企业所承担的债务，不是投资了盲目的项目，就是被购买了定价过高的资产。总之，新兴市场的债务与GDP之比，在2009年，从150％上升到了195％；企业债务与GDP的比例，在2008年，从不足50％上升到了接近75％。中国的债务与GDP之比在过去4年中上升了了将近50个百分点。 Now this boom, too, is coming to an end. Slower Chinese growth and weak commodity prices have darkened prospects even as a stronger dollar and the approach of higher American interest rates dam the flood of cheap capital. Next comes the reckoning. Some debt cycles end in crisis and recession—witness both the subprime debacle and the euro zone's agonies. Others result merely in slower growth, as borrowers stop spending and lenders scuttle for cover. The scale of the emerging-market credit boom ensures that its aftermath will hurt. In countries where private-sector indebtedness has risen by more than 20% of GDP, the pace of GDP growth slows by an average of almost three percentage points in the three years after the peak of borrowing. But just how much pain lies ahead will also depend on local factors, from the scale of the exchange-rate adjustment that has already taken place to the size of countries’ reserves. Crudely, most emerging economies can be put into one of three groups. 如今，这场繁荣也在走向终结。中国增长的放缓和商品价格的疲软，纵然愈发强势的美元和美国加息临近能把低息资本洪流蓄积起来，它们也在使得前景变得暗淡起来。随之而来的将是清算。有的债务周期是以危机和衰退结束——次贷的崩溃和欧元区的痛苦都是证明。有的会随着借款者停止花钱和放款者停止放贷而仅仅带来增长的放缓。新兴市场信贷泡沫的广度确保了随之而来的将是伤害。凡是私营部门的债务与GDP之比超过20％的国家的GDP增速都会在借贷高峰之后的三年中平均放慢接近3个百分点。但是，今后的痛苦的程度还取决于从已经发生了的汇率调整幅度到国家外汇储备规模等一系列自身的因素。大多数新兴经济体大致可被归入三类。 The first group includes those for which the credit boom will be followed by a prolonged hangover, not a heart attack. The likes of South Korea and Singapore belong in this category; so, crucially for the world economy, does China. It still has formidable defences to protect it against an exodus of capital. It has an enormous current-account surplus. Its foreign-exchange reserves stood at $3.5 trillion in October, roughly three times as much as its external debt. Policymakers have the ability to bail out borrowers, and show little sign of being willing to tolerate defaults. Shovelling problems under the carpet does not get rid of them. Firms that ought to go bust stagger on; dud loans pile up on banks’ balance-sheets; excess capacity in sectors like steel leads to dumping elsewhere. All this saps growth, but it also puts off the threat of a severe crisis. 第一类包括了那些在信贷繁荣之后将会出现一场漫长的停滞而不是一次心脏病发作的国家。南韩和新加坡之类的国家属于这一类；对世界经济至关重要的中国也属于这一类。它仍然有着强大的防御去保护自身应对资本逃离，它有着巨大的经常账户赢余，它的今年10月为3.5万亿美元的外汇储备大约是其外部债务的三倍，决策者有能力去救助借款人，而且几乎没有展示出愿意容忍违约的信号。掩盖问题的做法没有绝迹，本应破产的企业仍在残喘；不良贷款在银行的资产负债表上堆积如山；钢铁等部门的过剩产能到来的是全球各地的倾销。所有这些因素都侵蚀了增长，但是，也延后了一场严重危机的威胁。 For that risk, look instead to countries in the second category—those that lack the same means to bail out imprudent borrowers or to protect themselves from capital flight. Of the larger economies in this category, three stand out. Brazil's corporate-bond market has grown 12-fold since 2007. Its current-account deficit means that it relies on foreign capital; its political paralysis and fiscal inflexibility offer nothing to reassure investors. Malaysia's banks have lots of foreign liabilities, and its households have the highest debt-to-income ratio of any big emerging market; its cushion of foreign-exchange reserves looks thin and its current-account surplus is forecast to shrink. Turkey combines a current-account deficit, high inflation and foreign-currency-denominated debts that have become more onerous as the lira has fallen. 说到严重危机的风险，目光应该转向第二类中的国家，即那些缺乏同样的手段去救助鲁莽的借款人或者是保护自己免遭资本逃离伤害的国家。此类中较大的经济体有三个。巴西的企业债市场自2007年以来已经增长了12倍，它的经常账户的赤字说明它依赖于外国资本；她的政治上的瘫痪和财政上的缺乏弹性，让他们无以安抚投资者。马来西亚的银行有着大量的外国负债，该国的家庭有着所有大型新兴经济体中最高的债务/收入比例；它的外汇储备缓冲看起来很单薄，经常账户盈余预计会萎缩。土耳其是兼具了以上这三种情况：经常账户赤字，高通胀以及已经随着里拉贬值而越发沉重的外币债务。 The third group of countries consists of those emerging markets that will either escape serious trouble or have already gone through the worst. Of the big ones, India is in healthier shape than any other big emerging economy and Russia might just surpass expectations. The rouble has already gone through a bigger adjustment than any other major currency, and the economy shows tentative signs of responding. Argentina, a perennial flop but one with little private debt, could also shine if a reformist wins the presidency this month. 第三类中的国家包括了将来无法逃脱严重问题的新兴经济体和已经经历过最坏局面的新兴经济体。说到此类的大型经济体，印度比其他任何大型新兴经济体都健康，俄罗斯可能刚刚超出预期。卢比已经经历了比其他主要货币都要大的调整，而且经济也显示出初步的响应信号。经常违约但个人债务很少的阿根廷可能会由于一位改革者赢得本月大选而闪闪发光。 Such brighter spots aside, everything else points to another pallid year for the world economy. The IMF has forecast higher growth in emerging markets next year; the lesson of past debt cycles suggests another year of slowdown is more likely. And weakness in the developing world, which accounts for over half of the global economy (in purchasing-power-parity terms), matters far more than it once did. Lower growth in emerging markets hits the profits of multinationals and the cash flows of exporters. Low commodity prices help oil importers but ratchet up the pressure on indebted miners, drillers and traders, which between them owe around $3 trillion. 把此类亮点放在一边，剩下的全都指向世界经济的又一个惨谈之年。IMF的预测认为，新兴市场明年的增长会提高；但是，以前债务周期的教训表明，明年更有可能继续继续减速。再者，占据全球经济半壁江山以上（以购买力评价计算）的发展中世界的疲软，其影响已经远非昔日可比。新兴市场的增长减速打击了跨国企业的利润和出口商的现金流，低迷的大宗商品价格有助于石油出口国，却把压力都堆积在了早已欠下了大约3万亿美元的采矿和钻探企业以及交易商身上。 Europe's open economy is most exposed to a cooling in emerging-market demand, which is why more monetary easing there looks likely. But America's policy dilemma is more acute. The divergence in monetary policy between it and the rest of the world will put upward pressure on the dollar, hurting exports and earnings. And waves of capital may again seek out the American consumer as the borrower of choice. If so, the world's debt crisis may end up right back where it started. 欧洲的开放性经济体对新兴市场需求降温的风险敞口是最大的，这就是为什么欧洲可能还会有货币宽松的原因。但是，美国的政策困境更加尖锐。他们与世界其他国家在货币政策方面的分歧将会推高美元所承受的压力，伤及出口商和利润。而且，资本洪流可能会由于借款人的选择而再次在美国消费者身上寻找出路。如此的话，这场世界债务危机可能会在开始的地方结束。 |
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