关于思想本质的第二种理论来源于福多(Jerry Fodor)的工作,福多辩论说存在一种内在的心灵语言,他称之为思想的语言( language of thought)。就像计算机需要一种程序语言来运作,人脑也需要一种思想语言来运作;就像计算机的程序语言可以由计算机的物理硬件来实现,人脑的思想语言也可以由人脑的神经硬件来实现。通过这种思想语言的语言学上的句法、语义学上的内容和指称及句子与句子之间的逻辑和推衍关联,思想在理性思维中的作用以及思想和自然世界的关联才能得以实现。关于命题态度的最后一种理论是取消主义。丘奇兰德(PaulChurchland)以“理论”理论和翻译理论为出发点,他认同命题态度只是我们大众心理学理论的理论假设(theoretic posits)。但是他进一步说这种陈旧的理论也许从根本上就是错误的,因为在这种理论框架下关于心灵的许多现象得不到满意的解释。因此当关于思维的新的科学理论框架取代这个旧理论时,作为旧理论框架中的理论假定的命题态度也就会随之而消亡。[10]
第四,取消主义(eliminativism):支持取消主义的有三大论证:我们已经看到丘奇兰德建立在先进科学理论框架应彻底取代陈旧的大众心理学理论的断言上的论证。第二种论证来自斯蒂奇(Stephen Stich),他的论述是建立在关于命题态度的思想语言( language of thought)型理论上的。他辩论说如果这种理论是对的,即命题态度或思想的本质就是对这种思想语言的一种操纵,那么我们大众心理学理论中关于信念、欲望等命题态度的概念在对思想的解释中就是毫无用处的,从而应该被抛弃和取消。最后罗蒂(Richard Rorty)提出一种渐逝型(disappearing form)的取消主义理论,根据这种理论,随着将来科学的深入发展,因为实用主义的需要,我们社区的语言实践会渐渐地改变,结果关于心灵状态的语义内容也会渐渐地改变,从而目前大众心理学理论中的一些概念也会渐渐地消逝。[18]
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[12]关于内容因果性,请参见: Heil J. and Mele, A. (eds), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Baker, L. Explaining Attitudes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Jacob, P. What Mind sCan Do, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 关于自我知识,请参见: Ludlow, P. andMartin, N. (eds), Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications,1998. Wright C.; Smith, B.; and Mac Donald, C. (eds), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Nuccetelli S. ( ed), New Essay on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 关于空名问题、信念之谜等涉及专名的问题,请参见: Soames, S. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. [13] Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981. Fodor, J. Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. Chalmers, D. “The Components of Content”, in Chalmers (ed), 2002, pp. 608-633. [14] Alter, T and Walter, S. (eds), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), erceptual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Gunther, Y. (ed), Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. [15]关于行为主义的正面论述,请参见: Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949. Carnap, R. “Psychology in PhysicalLanguage”,Erkenntnis3, 1932, pp. 107-142. 关于对行为主义的批评,请参见: Putnam, H. “Brains and Behavior”, in R. Butler (ed), Analytic Philosophy, pp. 1-19. Block, N. “Psychologism and Behaviorism”,PhilosophicalReview5, 1981, pp. 5-43. [16] Putnam, H.“The Nature of Mental States”, in Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Armstrong, D.The Nature of Mind, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981. Block, N. “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol 1, N. Block, (ed), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. Searle, J. The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. [17]关于同一论的经典工作,请参见: Smart, J. J. C. “Sensations and Brain Processes”,PhilosophicalReview68, 1959, pp. 141-156. 关于同一论的当前讨论,请参见: Loar, B. “Phenomena lStates”, in N. Block, etal (eds),The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. [18] Stich, S. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Rorty, R. “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories”, Review ofMetaphysics19, 1965, pp. 24-54. [19] Davis, S. (ed), Connectionism: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996.