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Foreword In recent years, various organisations have tackled issues related to the important topic of international remittances. However, few of these reports have been devoted specifically to the "payment system aspects" of remittances - in effect, the practical realities of actually transferring money. Understanding these payment system aspects is crucial to understanding remittances and to ensuring that remittance services are safe and efficient. This report provides an analysis of the payment system aspects of remittances and sets out general principles designed to assist countries in improving the market for remittance services.The report was first issued in March 2006 as a consultation document and we are very grateful to the many people who provided comments. As a result of the comments, we have made changes to the report to strengthen the analysis and sharpen the message.The report has been prepared for the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the World Bank by a task force consisting of representatives from international financial institutions involved in remittances and from central banks in both remittance-sending and remittance-receiving countries. The CPSS and the World Bank thank the members of the task force and its co-chairmen, Massimo Cirasino and Marc Hollanders, for their excellent work in preparing this report.Timothy F Geithner, Chairman Michael U Klein, Vice President Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems The World Bank Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems The World Bank世界银行付款委员会和结算系统Bank for International Settlements Press & Communications CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland E-mail: publications@bis.org Fax: +41 61 280 9100 and +41 61 280 8100 This publication is available on the websites of the BIS (www.bis.org) and the World Bank (www.worldbank.org). Box 1 The General Principles and related roles The General Principles are aimed at the public policy objectives of achieving safe and efficient international remittance services. To this end, the markets for the services should be contestable, transparent, accessible and sound. Transparency and consumer protection General Principle 1. The market for remittance services should be transparent and have adequate consumer protection.汇款服务市场应保持透明度，并为消费者提供足够的保障Payment system infrastructure General Principle 2. Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to increase the efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged. Legal and regulatory environment General Principle 应鼓励改进有可能提高汇款服务效率的支付系统基础设施。法律与监管环境总原则 3. Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, nondiscriminatory and proportionate legal and regulatory framework in relevant jurisdictions. Market structure and competition General Principle 汇款服务应得到相关法域健全、可预测、非歧视性和相称的法律和监管框架的支持。市场结构和竞争总原则 4. Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic payment infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance industry. Governance and risk management General Principle 5. Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and risk management practices. Roles of remittance service providers and public authorities A. Role of remittance service providers. Remittance service providers should participate actively in the implementation of the General Principles. B. Role of public authorities. Public authorities should evaluate what action to take to achieve the public policy objectives through implementation of the General Principles.应促进汇款业的竞争市场条件，包括适当获得国内支付基础设施。治理和风险管理一般原则5。汇款服务应得到适当的治理和风险管理做法的支持。汇款服务提供者和公共当局的作用 A. 汇款服务提供者的作用。汇款服务提供者应积极参与《一般原则》的实施。B. 公共当局的作用。公共当局应评估应采取哪些行动，通过执行《一般原则》实现公共政策目标。 3. Analysis of key issues concerning remittance services 40. This section analyses five possible features of the market for remittances that can lead to inefficiencies in the way remittance services are provided. Such market inefficiencies can mean that the price of remittance services is higher than would otherwise be the case and/or that the services offered are of lower quality. The five features are: · a lack of transparency in the market and of understanding by users; · weaknesses in the infrastructure that is used to provide remittance services; · the possibility of adverse effects from poor or disproportionate regulation or a weak legal framework; · lack of competitive market conditions; and · risk. 12 A hawala service is a remittance service provided by an individual (rather than an incorporated entity).“Hawala” is Arabic for transfer. Hawala services are also known by other terms - eg hui kuan (Hong Kong) or padala (the Philippines). 3.1 Lack of transparency and understanding 41. Whatever the service offered, it is useful for senders (and receivers) to be able to have full information about the service in advance - ie before committing themselves to the service. Such transparency enables an individual to make an informed decision about which service to use. But perhaps more importantly, it can be an important force in making the market as a whole more efficient. 42. Particularly relevant is transparency about the total price and speed of the service. · As well as the direct fee charged to the sender by the capturing RSP and any tax that may be levied, the total price of the transaction also depends on the exchange rate applied (assuming the sender pays in a different currency to that paid to the receiver) and, possibly, a fee charged to the receiver by the disbursing RSP or its agent. Usually, all that ultimately matters to the users is how much money the receiver will get for a given amount paid by the sender. However, because fees may vary according to the amount sent and exchange rates vary from day to day, typically users will need to understand these components of the total price if they are to make an informed decision before using a particular service. · The speed of the service is the time between payment by the sender and the funds being available to the receiver. 43. At the moment, the market for remittances is not always fully transparent. Cross-border payment arrangements 58. A particularly important aspect of the infrastructure for remittance transfers are the cross-border links between the domestic payment arrangements of different countries. At the moment these links, which are typically needed for settling remittance transfers, are in most cases provided by correspondent banking. This works well for the large-value transfers which are its primary business but because of the manual, and therefore expensive, processing that is often necessary to transfer payment instructions and settle them, it is arguably less suitable for retail payments such as remittances.22 A particular problem here are the different message formats that different countries and systems use. Standardised formats, or formats that can be easily translated, would help banks achieve cheaper, automated “straight through processing” (STP). For example, adopting internationally agreed standards instead of proprietary ones in national payment systems allows cross-border payments to be more easily processed. However, changing formats is not easy. The expected volume of crossborder payments therefore has to be sufficient to justify the cost of achieving STP and this is not always the case. 59. An alternative to correspondent banking is to create a direct link between the payment systems themselves (see Annex 4 for an explanation of how this works). For such a link to be possible, three key issues have to be tackled. First, as with improvements in correspondent banking, message formats have to be sufficiently standardised to enable automated translation. Second, there needs to be an agreement about the exchange rate used to convert a payment from one currency to another. Third, settlement arrangements have to be established. The potential benefits from direct links are significant and there is correspondingly some interest in their development. However, tackling the three issues just mentioned is not straightforward and so creating a link could be costly. Market participants may therefore be reluctant to undertake such an initiative by themselves particularly if, initially, the volume of cross-border retail payments is too small to justify the cost of developing the link. Reaching an agreement that makes the arrangement sufficiently attractive to all the parties involved that they are willing to use the link could also be difficult, given that some may have a vested interest in maintaining the existing arrangements while others may be reluctant to invest because they do not see a significant market in crossborder payments. Box 3 Regulation of remittances A key form of regulation is for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing purposes and involves “know your customer” requirements and recording/reporting of individual transactions (particularly large or suspicious transactions). Particularly for these purposes, many countries require RSPs to be registered or licensed.1 In countries that have exchange controls, similar recording and reporting requirements are likely to apply, together with the need for the RSP (or its agent) to verify that the sender has permission to make the transaction. Moreover, in many countries, RSPs are not allowed to disburse funds in foreign currency. Some countries have prudential requirements - ie requirements such as capital adequacy or liquidity rules designed to ensure that RSPs are financially robust (indeed, in some countries, only banks, which are regulated for prudential reasons, are allowed to provide remittance services). Sometimes remittance services are subject to central bank oversight. But this may be more focused on the payment systems used as part of the remittance transfer process than on the remittance service per se. Where individual services are overseen, this is typically primarily for efficiency or security rather than financial stability reasons (the relatively small values handled by RSPs mean that there are unlikely to be significant systemic risk issues, particularly in developed countries). Occasionally there are specific consumer protection measures applicable to remittances (eg requiring RSPs to provide senders with certain prior information, such as the price and speed of the service). Finally, although not “regulation” as such, it is worth noting here that in some countries there are taxes on financial transfers, including remittances, that increase the cost. 4. General principles for international remittance services 4.1 Public policy objectives 71. For this report, the following public policy objectives for the provision of remittance services have been defined: Remittance services should be safe and efficient. To this end, the markets for the services should be contestable, transparent, accessible and sound. 29 72. The report is based on the belief that the best way to reduce the price of remittance services is to encourage a competitive market for remittances. Because competition in the provision of remittance services helps to improve the services being provided, the market should be open to new entrants (ie the remittance industry should be contestable). Further, such a market would give senders and receivers: · clear information about the price and other features of the services (ie the remittance industry should be transparent); · easy access to remittance services (ie the remittance industry should be accessible); and reasonable protection from operational failures and criminal abuse (ie the remittance industry should be sound). 4.2 Application of the General Principles 74. In order to achieve the public policy objectives, the report sets out principles covering five key areas: (1) transparency and consumer protection; (2) payment system infrastructure; (3) the legal and regulatory environment; (4) market structure and competition; and (5) governance and risk management. The five principles correspond to the five areas of possible market weakness identified in Section 3. Their purpose is to help remove those weaknesses in order to create a safe and efficient market. They do not aim to set specific service level standards for remittance transfers since, beyond a certain basic level of service and in normal circumstances, low price may be more important than a high level of service for most end users. Moreover, effective competition is more likely than service level standards to result in a range of remittance services that offer suitable combinations of price and service. The general principles are aimed at all remittance services except, as noted in Section 2.2, those based on purely physical transfers of cash.75. The Principles, which require a combined effort by both RSPs and public authorities if they are to be implemented effectively, are designed to assist countries that want to improve the market for remittance services. This applies to both sending and receiving countries. Of course, the importance of remittance flows varies from country to country. Therefore, although these Principles are designed to be generally applicable, some countries may decide that the size of the remittance market does not justify significant action or that there is no need for such action. However, in taking such a decision, authorities should bear in mind that if the attempt to improve the market in a particular remittance corridor is to be fully effective, in many cases it will require cooperation between the relevant sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries may therefore be significantly handicapped in their ability to act if they do not receive the necessary support from sending countries. 76. In most cases the Principles are likely to be applied in sending countries regardless of the destination of the funds and in receiving countries regardless of their origin. However, in applying some aspects of the Principles, authorities may want to prioritise their efforts in the most important bilateral corridors or corridors where they believe their efforts will be most productive.30 77. As discussed in Section 2, it will often be difficult for RSPs to distinguish remittances from other cross-border retail payments, including small payments to and from businesses, so authorities implementing the Principles need to be aware that they are likely to have to be applied to other low-value cross-border transfers as well as remittances. However, this is not likely to be a disadvantage since it would generally be undesirable to distinguish between payments according to their purpose. 4.3 The General Principles Transparency and consumer protection General Principle 1. The market for remittance services should be transparent and have adequate consumer protection. 79. Transparency in remittance services, combined with adequate consumer protection, helps to foster a competitive and safe market for remittances. Transparency by individual remittance service providers 80. Transparency of prices and service features is crucial to the ability of consumers to make informed choices between different services and to the creation of a competitive market. RSPs should therefore be encouraged to provide such information in easily accessible and understandable forms. As far as possible, such information should include the total price (ie fees at both ends, foreign exchange rates including the margins applied on them, and other costs to the user), the time it will take the funds to reach the receiver, and the locations of the RSP’s access points in both sending and receiving countries. However, any recommendation or requirement concerning transparency needs to take into account that the business model adopted for some remittance services (namely, those using open networks) may make it extremely difficult for the RSP to provide all this information (see Section 3.1 above). 81. It should also be clear to the sender if the price or other aspects of the service vary according to, for example, how the receiver is paid (eg in cash or by crediting an account) or the ability of the sender to provide information about the receiver (eg the relevant account number and bank identifier). Finally, full transparency would mean that RSPs disclosed the information without imposing requirements on the consumer such as opening an account or committing themselves to using the remittance service. Enabling end users to understand the market for remittances 82. As well as the information provided by individual RSPs, authorities may want to encourage efforts to enable end users to better understand the market for remittances. For example, authorities or other organisations may want to provide comparative price information. They may also wish to undertake educational campaigns to give senders and receivers sufficient background knowledge to be able to understand the information provided. Appropriate consumer protection 83. Both senders and receivers should have adequate rights as consumers of remittance services, including error resolution procedures. Individual RSPs may have their own procedures. In addition, many countries have national schemes to resolve domestic consumer disputes, although the cross-border nature of remittances and cultural and language barriers can make such procedures complex. Authorities may therefore wish to encourage individual RSPs to evaluate the adequacy of their error resolution procedures. Where appropriate, they may also want to review whether national schemes give adequate protection to customers of remittance services.Payment system infrastructure General Principle 2. Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to increase the efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged. Legal and regulatory environment General Principle 3. Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, non-discriminatory and proportionate legal and regulatory framework in relevant jurisdictions. 90. The legal and regulatory framework includes both the general legal infrastructure (such as the law relating to contracts, payments, securities, banking, debtor/creditor relationships and insolvency) and any specific statutes, case law, regulations or contracts (for example, payment system rules) relevant to remittances. As noted in Section 3.3, the points covered by this principle may also be relevant to non-legally binding policies (such as recommendations) issued by the authorities. 91. This principle does not call for the establishment of a specific legal regime for remittances. A country’s existing laws and regulations may already address the requirements of the principles or may be capable of being modified to do so. In particular, the provision of remittance services is likely to be helped by a well founded legal framework governing domestic payments. Multiple legal and regulatory frameworks 96. A remittance involves at least two jurisdictions, the sending and the receiving countries. Where the RSP or its agents operate in third countries, other jurisdictions may also be involved. Laws and regulations in relevant jurisdictions need to be well founded for the legal and regulatory framework governing the provision of remittance services to be fully effective. The authorities of a given country can, of course, only have a direct influence on the framework in their own country. Nevertheless, particularly if they are aware of a significant legal issue in another country in an important bilateral corridor, they may want to work with the authorities of the other country to try to resolve the issue. 97. To achieve a well founded legal and regulatory framework internationally, harmonisation of legal and regulatory structures may sound appealing. However, different jurisdictions have different priorities and can take different legal approaches. As such, universal harmonisation of laws and regulations is extremely difficult to achieve and may be of no additional benefit if the laws and regulations of different countries are aimed at the same public policy objectives. Content of the regulatory framework 98. Considering the way in which remittances in a country are regulated, an important aspect of any regulatory framework is that it should meet internationally agreed standards. Particularly relevant in this context are regulations implementing AML/CFT recommendations such as the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendations and special recommendations (see Box 4). All RSPs should comply with the AML/CFT regulations applicable to them. A. Role of remittance service providers. Remittance service providers should participate actively in the implementation of the General Principles. 107. Remittance service providers should endeavour to follow the General Principles. Box 6 Transparency to the sender When a customer enquires about a specific remittance transfer, full transparency would mean that RSPs clearly disclosed the following information without requiring any other action from the consumer such as opening an account or committing to use the remittance service: (A) the total amount in originating currency that will be paid by the sender; (B) the amount in disbursing currency that will be paid to the final recipient; (C) the fees paid by both sender and receiver (and any other relevant costs such as taxes) and the exchange rate; (D) the time when the remittance will be available for pickup by the recipient or delivered to the recipient; (E) the location(s) where the remittance will be available for pickup. If the above information varies according to how the receiver is paid (eg in cash collected by the receiver, in cash delivered to the receiver or by crediting an account) or according to the information the receiver is able to provide about the sender (eg if a bank account is to be credited, whether the sender knows the relevant BIC and IBAN1 ), this should be clear to the sender. For key remittance corridors, it may be appropriate to provide the information in the languages of both the sending and receiving countries. If the customer chooses to use the remittance service, the RSP should also provide the information above (plus the information provided by the sender to identify the receiver) in written form as confirmation of the agreed service. To achieve full transparency, RSPs should also provide information about any other relevant aspects of their service. For example, this might include: (a) the ability, if any, of the sender to revoke the transfer after it has been paid for; (b) whether the RSP will inform the receiver when the funds are available; (c) information about the rights of the consumer in the event of any problems (eg the procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute about the service) and (d) appropriate contact information about the RSP. ______________________ 1 Bank Identifier Codes (BICs) and International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs) are globally recognised codes. The BIC is a unique address which, in a telecommunications message, identifies the financial institution and the IBAN is a code that uniquely identifies an account held at the financial institution. Appropriate consumer protection 1.11 It is helpful if there is a set of clear, publicly available and easily applicable procedures in cases of fraud and disputes. At a minimum, individual RSPs could establish their own procedures that customers could follow in the event of difficulty, and provide clear information to customers about these procedures. Box 9 Receipt-of-funds guarantees A receipt-of-funds guarantee could either be introduced voluntarily by RSPs or imposed on them by the authorities. Individual RSPs or groups of RSPs might voluntarily offer a receipt-of-funds guarantee in order to make their service more attractive, particularly if they were new RSPs trying to establish a reputation for being safe. Such a guarantee might be achieved through some form of external insurance, self-insurance by a group of RSPs creating a pool of funds, or by individual RSPs segregating their funds in some way. However, the guarantee would involve a cost, so increased safety would come at a price, which might not be desirable for many end users. Many RSPs, particularly those who already have a reputation for safety and speed, would thus not find it commercially attractive to offer such a guarantee. Moreover, in some cases there could be practical difficulties. For example, it could be argued that such a guarantee would be most useful in open services, which may involve a number of intermediaries that are not known to or under the control of the sending RSP and thus where the risk of loss in transit may be greater. But this lack of control may equally make a guarantee scheme more difficult to implement, not least because of the difficulty to the sending RSP of reliably identifying whether or not the funds have reached the intended receiver. Because of the cost and practical difficulties, authorities are unlikely to want to impose such a guarantee scheme on the industry. In particular, the scheme would amount to a tax on safer RSPs and a subsidy to riskier ones, except in the unlikely event that it was possible to devise some reliable means of assessing the riskiness of individual RSPs and charging them accordingly for the guarantee. Indeed, without such a risk-based charge on RSPs, end users would have an incentive to use the cheapest RSP regardless of its riskiness because they would be protected by the guarantee; this in turn would give RSPs an incentive to cut costs even when that resulted in greater risk, because in the event that funds were lost the cost would be borne not by them but by the industry as a whole (including RSPs who offered an intrinsically safe service). This is an example of “moral hazard”, where individuals act in their own self-interest to the detriment of others because they do not bear the full consequences of their actions.1 Box 12 Development of a “quality mark” In the United Kingdom the Department for International Development has set up a Remittances Task Force consisting of representatives from the private sector, including money transfer organisations, international banks, domestic banks, payment system operators and consumer representatives. One of the possible outcomes from the task force is a code of conduct or “quality mark”. To be awarded a quality mark, RSPs would be required to be transparent about their service by providing information about such things as the fee to be charged, the exchange rate and how long it will take for the funds to be transferred. RSPs would also sign up to meet certain other quality standards (including redress procedures) and a body to monitor compliance would be required. RSPs awarded the quality mark would be expected to display it and it is hoped that, over time, consumers would look for the quality mark when choosing which RSP to use. Box 13 Mobile phone remittance services and their regulation In the Philippines, two telecoms companies are competing to offer remittance services that use mobile phones and e-money (stored value). Both schemes are of the negotiated network type, where to provide the service the telecoms company has recruited RSPs in sending countries with significant Philippine communities. To make a remittance transfer, the sender pays cash to one of these partner RSPs, in return for which the RSP sends a secure text message to the mobile phone of the receiver in the Philippines. The effect of this text message is to load e-money onto that phone, which the receiver can then transfer, by a further text message, either to the phone of another person or to an agent of the telecoms company. In the latter case, the agent will give the receiver cash in return. Settlement between the sending RSP and the telecoms company, and between the telecoms company and its agents in the Philippines, is via the usual banking channels. The electronic money transfer services of which these remittance services are one aspect are regulated by the central bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as payment system overseer. The regulation is primarily for AML/CFT purposes and includes, for example, know-your-customer requirements and a limit on the amount that can be transferred each month. Messaging 9. The information from the capturing agent to the disbursing agent will sometimes travel together with the funds - ie passed through the various intermediaries in the settlement process (see below). This would typically be the case in an open service,37 where there is no direct relationship between the capturing RSP and its agent, on the one hand, and the disbursing RSP and its agent on the other hand, and so there is no easy way for the two to communicate directly. Transferring information with funds can be difficult and timeconsuming if the different payment instructions in the settlement chain use different message formats, requiring translation from one format to another, which may involve expensive manual intervention. 10. In other remittance services, the information will typically be transferred independently of the funds (eg directly from the capturing agent to the disbursing agent, with a copy to the RSP) by any one of a wide variety of means (eg public channels such as the internet, e-mail, fax, phone, mail or courier or proprietary communication channels such as intranets or interbank links). Settlement 11. Settlement can be complex. Readers who are not familiar with payment systems and correspondent banking may want to read Annex 3, which describes various possibilities. A remittance transfer is likely to involve a “settlement chain” - a series of separate payments, each of which may be made differently. Payments to and from end users have already been described. For each of the payments in-between (from capturing agent through to disbursing agent), settlement will normally take place by means of a credit transfer from the payer to the payee’s bank, with one of the payments being cross-border (typically by correspondent banking). 12. Unlike payments between end users and agents, where each remittance transfer usually requires a separate payment, the payments between agents and the RSP may be batched and possibly netted (eg all the transfer instructions from the agent to the RSP that day are netted against all the transfer instructions from the RSP to the agent in order to create a single payment). Often, the scope for netting may be limited given the largely one-way nature of remittance flows; however, in some cases the flow may be sufficiently even in each direction that, after netting, the amount to be settled is small or fluctuates around zero, requiring no settlement. 13. Some RSPs may have bank accounts in both sending and receiving countries, in which case the cross-border element can be partially “internalised”. In this case, the funds from the capturing agent are credited to the RSP’s account in the sending country, the funds to the disbursing agent are paid from its account in the receiving country, and the RSP records this fact internally.38 However, again because of the largely one-way nature of remittance flows, the RSP may sometimes have to transfer funds from the sending country to top up its account in the receiving country. Annex 3: Examples of settlement in remittance services 1. This annex uses stylised examples of remittance transfers from Italy to the Philippines to illustrate how remittance services settle. The initial example is designed to show that even a remittance service that appears to be simple to end users may involve complex settlement arrangements. Three variations on the example with less complex settlement arrangements are then considered. Description of initial example 2. Figure 1 illustrates a sender (S) in Italy transferring euros (say, €200) to a receiver (R) in the Philippines, who will be paid in pesos. It is assumed that the capturing agent and capturing RSP in Italy are different entities, and that they, and the sender, have euro accounts at different banks. Similarly, the disbursing RSP and the disbursing agent in the Philippines are different entities, and they, and the receiver, have peso accounts at different banks.39 Both countries have two domestic payment systems which settle at the central bank. 3. The capturing and disbursing RSPs are assumed to be part of a negotiated network in which the information about the remittance is sent separately from the funds (eg by encrypted e-mail), as shown by the dotted line, and passes more or less immediately from one end of the chain to the other.40 Figure 1 Key to figures Sender (S) and receiver (R) Payment systems RSPs (banks or non-banks) and their agents Funds Intermediary banks Information Annex 5: Extract from G8 summit document G8 action plan: applying the power of entrepreneurship to the eradication of poverty (Sea Island, 9 June 2004) “ … G8 countries have agreed on the following set of actions to encourage and support national policies and programs that promote effective private sector-led development to help alleviate poverty, thereby helping to achieve the international development goals of the Millennium Declaration. G8 countries will work to ensure that bilateral and multilateral assistance help to mobilize capital and expertise to accelerate growth and free up resources for productive use by people in developing countries. These innovative programs are intended to support the efforts that developing countries are undertaking themselves. This approach complements official development assistance, which remains crucial for poverty alleviation. … Facilitating remittances to help families and small businesses The flow of remittances across international borders, mostly a few hundred dollars at a time, is growing rapidly and now totals nearly $100 billion per year. This money is the fruit of the work of immigrants and plays an increasing role in the financing of development in the workers’ home countries. Remittances can therefore play a key role in private-sector development efforts, enabling families to receive needed capital for, for example, education, housing and small business start-ups and expansion. But transaction costs can be high - as much as 10 to 15 percent even for flows to large, urban markets. Attracting remittance flows into formal channels can strengthen financial systems in developing countries and reduce the risk that remittances will be diverted for illicit purposes. G8 countries will work with the World Bank, IMF, and other bodies to improve data on remittance flows and to develop standards for data collection in both sending and receiving countries. G8 countries will also lead an international effort to help reduce the cost of sending remittances. The developmental impact of these flows may be fostered by increasing financial options for the recipients of these flows. To accomplish this, we will take actions, including through pilot partnerships and programs, with developing countries on remittances. The G8 programs … will: 1. Make it easier for people in sending and receiving countries to engage in financial transactions through formal financial systems, including by providing access to financial literacy programs, where appropriate, and by working with the private sector to extend the range and reach of these services. 2. Reduce the cost of remittance services through the promotion of competition, the use of innovative payment instruments, and by enhancing access to formal financial systems in sending and receiving countries. In some cases, remittance costs between sending and receiving countries have been reduced by up to 50 percent or more. G8 countries believe that similar reductions of high costs could be realized in the case of other countries. 3. Promote better coherence and coordination of international organizations that are working to enhance remittance services and heighten the developmental impact of remittance receipts in developing countries. 4. Encourage cooperation between remittance service providers and local financial institutions, including microfinance entities and credit unions, in ways that strengthen local financial markets and improve access by recipients to financial services. 52 CPSS/World Bank - General principles for remittances - January 2007 5. Encourage the creation, where appropriate, of market-oriented local development funds and credit unions that give remittance-receiving families more options and incentives for productively investing remittance flows. 6. Support dialogue with governments, civil society, and the private sector to address specific infrastructure and regulatory impediments. For example, governments should ensure non-discriminatory access to payment systems for the private sector, consistent with strong supervisory standards, and work together to modernize overall financial infrastructure.” Annex 8: Members of the task force Co-Chairmen Massimo Cirasino The World Bank Marc Hollanders Bank for International Settlements Members Arab Monetary Fund Yisr Burnieh Asian Development Bank Austin Belton Central Bank of Brazil Marcelo Deschamps d’Alvarenga José Antonio Marciano European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Piroska M Nagy European Central Bank Tom Kokkola Deutsche Bundesbank Birgit Zeitschel Hong Kong Monetary Authority Osbert Lam Inter-American Development Bank Gregory Watson International Monetary Fund Maud Bokkerink Chee Sung Lee Bank of Italy Veronica Fucile Bank of Mexico Ricardo Medina Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Evelyna C Avila Central Bank of Sri Lanka H A G Hettiarachchi D Wasantha Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Elvan Göçmen Ertem Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jack Walton Jeffrey Yeganeh Federal Reserve Bank of New York Sandy Krieger The World Bank Mario Guadamillas Secretariat Bank for International Settlements Isabel Cerqueiro Robert Lindley UK Department for International Development Seymour Fortescue The World Bank Ole Andreassen José Antonio García |
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